FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE PRACTICE OF PARTNERSHIP

By Dean Acheson

IN the crisis precipitated by the discovery of Russian strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems in Cuba, many Americans came to a new understanding of the great accretion of strength which membership in our alliances in this hemisphere and in Europe brings to a confrontation of power. They got a new understanding, too, of the vast importance of having choices of means, other than nuclear means, of meeting a hostile threat. These truths, seen in the sharp light of experience, bring into clearer relief the central problem of our European alliance.

In the immediate postwar years, the United States wisely helped Western Europe restore itself to economic health. Equal wisdom led the way in binding together Western Europe and North America in the defense of this center and powerhouse of an environment for free societies. Since then inspired European leadership has brought about economic integration of the Continent, paving the way for even greater development and political unity. At the same time new problems have confronted and new strains divided the Atlantic Alliance. Sometimes they have come from the dissolution of colonial ties which has caused many of our allies the most acute distress and, in the case of Suez, led to conduct, by both this country and its allies, gravely damaging to the alliance. Sometimes strains have come from inherent limitations of our power, as in the case of our balance-of-payments difficulties.

But a principal difficulty of the alliance today—if not its chief difficulty—comes from failure to think through to an agreed solution its primary task: the defense of Europe and America. Let me obviate here at the start, if possible, a distracting misunderstanding. I do not believe that military security, or such as is attainable, solves the problems of the free world, or of the Atlantic

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nations. On the contrary, I believe that a sound allied military defense must rest upon conviction by the peoples involved that it is essential to protect basic values and lively expectations which stir their deepest loyalty and devotion. To create the basis in truth and reality for these values and expectations requires domestic and international policies of great complexity; and this, in turn, calls for statesmanship in all the allied countries of so high and sustained an order that it is likely to be only approximated. Finally, a military strategy and establishment which by its burdens or methods destroyed what it was intended to preserve would be worse than futile.

In short, a successful military policy is possible when, and only when, it is one of at least three strands of the policies of the allied countries. The other two are the political and the economic. Each of us may have other strands which we may like to add. It is plain, then, that the perfect discussion of alliance policy would be like the performance of an orchestra in which a host of instruments from the kettledrums to the piccolo weave together all the elements of a symphony. But unfortunately an individual can play only one instrument at a time, discuss one subject at a time. I am discussing here only the need of a master military strategy for the alliance, fully aware that it cannot stand self-contained or alone; but aware, also, that unless the alliance is capable of developing—and sooner rather than later—military forces and an effective strategy for their use to provide what security is possible, both political and economic policies within the alliance and in relation to other states may take truly disastrous courses.

Let us begin with a look at the history of NATO's strategy. Its first strategic thoughts were simple and short-lived. The political commitment undertaken in the treaty—"an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all"—combined with the sole possession of nuclear weapons by the United States was to furnish the necessary deterrent to a Soviet move into Western Europe. The treaty, said the State Department in its analysis, with its clear intention of united action by members, "should remove the danger of miscalculation by any potential aggressor that he could succeed in overcoming them one by one."

Second thoughts soon raised doubts about this happy conclusion. Soviet forces in Eastern Europe could, it was pointed out, move westward with only token resistance in Europe. Our nuclear

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weapons would be worse than useless there, and the use of them in Russia after an attack began might well come too late. Our European allies had no enthusiasm for another occupation and liberation—if the latter would have any meaning. So in 1950 came the unified NATO command and force in Europe under General Eisenhower, and the strategic concept of the shield of conventional forces on the spot to hold and protect until the nuclear sword wielded by the United States struck down the aggressor.

Unhappily, the conventional shield, while by no means negligible, has still a long way to go even to perform that temporary function. At the outset, it could not develop until Germany should become a part of it, which was not even agreed to for another four years. By the time Germany came in, French military power had been absorbed in Algeria, Britain's meager resources had been divided between an attempted nuclear force and garrison needs from Aden to Singapore, leaving little for the army of the Rhine; and the Eisenhower Administration had adopted nuclear retaliation as its defense strategy. The result is that, while there is a quite decent conventional structure to build on, it has not reached the limited shield dimensions, and is wholly inadequate. The nuclear retaliation decision, strangely enough, almost coincided with the first Russian thermonuclear explosion in 1953. NATO took the first step toward reliance on nuclear tactics in 1954, and became deeply committed in 1956 and 1957 as a result of an American effort to meet the near collapse of European confidence brought on by Suez, and the Russian sputniks close afterwards. In 1959 General Norstad proposed that NATO become the fourth nuclear power and be armed with medium-range ballistic missiles based in Europe. The next year Secretary of State Herter endorsed the idea with the amendment that the missiles be on Polaris submarines under what was called "multinational control," to be worked out.

As the years went by without adequate shield forces, our allies became less confident in their defense; and, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increased, the rationalization of allied defense, called "the strategic concept," grew, as Alice remarked in Wonderland,"curiouser and curiouser." Metaphors multiplied. The "shield" melted into a "trip-wire," over which the aggressor would stumble, setting off the retaliatory atomic blast. But the Soviets now had a counterblast; and, since intermediate-range missiles—1,000 to 1,500 miles—were more numerous and accurate in the late 1950s

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and early 1960s than the intercontinental types, Europe seemed to the Europeans more exposed than the more distant United States.

So the trip-wire was thought not to be enough. Accordingly, nuclear weapons were added in the form of fighter-delivered weapons and army battlefield weapons delivered by artillery as well as by several comparatively short-range missiles. The purpose was to defend Europe against the invading Russians during the general war which would result if the trip-wire were tripped. For a time it was the hope—and, perhaps, the fact, though it is no longer—that the Russians were not adequately supplied with similar battlefield weapons. The next decision came in 1957; in order to counter sputnik and bridge over our development of intercontinental missiles it was decided to send slower-firing, and vulnerable, intermediate-range missiles and nuclear warheads. The custody of all warheads remained, at least theoretically and legally, in the President of the United States. General Norstad explained to the NATO parliamentarians in November 1960 that increasing the firepower of the small NATO force would cause an aggressor to pause at or near the threshold to consider the full consequences of his ill-advised intentions.

This new metaphorical twist seemed to mean that arming European NATO forces with tactical and intermediate-range ballistic missiles gave them a new significance and, to soldiers at least, a more appealing role. They ceased being a rather ignominious trip-wire and took on a certain deterrent quality. But a closer look disclosed defects. To General de Gaulle, the defect lay in the fact that the control of the deterrent, such as it was, was not in Europe but in Washington. To others the defect lay in leaving no apparent alternative between yielding to Russian threats and bringing on a nuclear exchange in which Europe was certain to suffer heavily. No comfort came from the suggestion made at just this time that the two nuclear giants might wisely refrain from attempting to destroy one another and confine hostilities to tactical nuclear war in Europe.

The Kennedy Administration has, thus far, given cautious support in principle to a multinationally manned and controlled seaborne nuclear force; has announced that some Polaris submarines (to be followed by more) were on station assigned to the defense of NATO in event of attack; has taken the lead in the development of rules designed to determine in advance when nuclear

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weapons should and would be used to defend Europe; and has pressed our allies for an increase in NATO's conventional forces. Meanwhile General de Gaulle continues adamant in his determination to develop a French nuclear force; and, due in large part to the Algerian revolt, most of the French Army and all of the Navy were withdrawn from NATO command. The British Government is weary of its disappointing military nuclear venture, but is undecided whether to struggle on or to give up; while the German authorities are making it clear that, whatever decision may be reached on nuclear arms or their control, Germany does not intend to be left out or accept an inferior position.

In short, when President Kennedy in his first State of the Union Message of January 30, 1961, said that the NATO alliance was "unfulfilled and in some disarray . . . weakened by economic rivalry and partially eroded by national interest" and "has not yet fully mobilized its resources nor fully achieved a common outlook," he was not exaggerating its malaise then or now. A beginning cannot be made to end this unhappy and dangerous state until the alliance has a strategic theory, a master plan, for carrying on the defense which it is charged with providing, and an agreement, tacit or expressed, for making the decisions and issuing the commands which are necessary for its execution.

In this discouraging recital, two facts stand out with singular clarity. First, since the development of Soviet nuclear weapons, NATO has never had an adequate long-range plan for the defense of Europe. The military explanations given from time to time—the so-called strategic concepts—were largely rationalizations of what was thought practicable action under varying political and economic circumstances. Second, the United States, by its policy of resting defense in Europe so heavily on nuclear weapons, inevitably made the control of nuclear weapons appear to be the primary and essential requirement for that defense. On the Americans' own strategic theory it could be, and was, said in Europe that European defense was wholly dependent upon the United States. Could the United States be relied upon, it was asked, in view of possible consequences to itself, to use nuclear weapons unless the security of the United States itself was immediately in danger? Europe quite understandably thought it had its answer, when Under Secretary of State Herter, on April 21, 1959, said before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, during the hearing on his nomination to be Secretary: "I can't conceive of the

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President involving us in an all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are in danger of devastation ourselves, or that actual moves have been made toward devastating ourselves."

At any rate, these ambivalent attitudes of our government and publicists have brought on a series of controversies among and with our allies about the control of nuclear weapons which distracts us from, and obscures, the more fundamental problem of working out and putting in train a strategic plan for forces and their use in the defense of Europe. In this plan, nuclear forces will play a vitally important part. But that part, and also the matter of their placement and control, will look very different in the light of an entire strategic plan with the organization and forces to execute it than it does in isolation. Furthermore, the control of nuclear weapons is impossible to solve at the present moment because of intractable differences between the allies which for their solution require, in part, the erosion of time.

A sound strategic plan or theory for the defense of Europe does not consist of a catch-phrase or slogan around which can be built a speech or a justification of the status quo, or a dream unconnected with reality. It must be a plan of operations based on political objectives, responsive to the needs and interests of those for whose benefit it is devised, which brings together and applies at critical times and places the forces and resources which can be made available to accomplish the result desired with the minimum harm to those doing it. It should not be designed, like the monstrous giants who guard the entrance to the temples at Nikko, to deter evil spirits and the ill-intentioned from entering the sacred precincts, even though they scare the daylights out of the faithful as well.

A strategic plan must be one which the participants are willing to engage in, if they have to, fully conscious that the price, though high, has been kept no higher than necessary and is preferable to accepting the imposition of a hostile will. To devise the plan and all the means for its execution is a vast undertaking of infinite complexity. It requires major attention by the most highly placed civil and military persons with the best brains to help them, a progression of decisions, the wiser the better, firmly adhered to, and a disciplined military establishment which accepts decisions made and builds upon them. The first step in attaining a strategic plan for NATO is for the United States to develop one upon which the entire executive branch, civilian and military, is united, which

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it is prepared to stand behind and therefore to propose to the other members of NATO.

The test whether a strategic defense plan is sound and workable will lie in millions of details, but enough is known now of the placement of military and economic power in the world, of the state and trend of weapon development, and of the temper and temperament of peoples, to make tentative predictions of some of the major elements in a workable defense plan. They are probably correct enough to show the nature of the political problems which a common defense will soon present, their order of importance, and the way in which we can best go about solving them.

First of all, a sound defense plan should increase the importance and the size of the non-nuclear defense force in Europe and redefine its function. Secondly, the function, positioning and command of strategic nuclear weapons in such a plan should be based, not on fear that the alliance will break up or that the United States will not use them when necessary, but on providing as many alternatives to their use as possible; on defining "when necessary" and tieing the nuclear power of the United States integrally into the plan; and on the most effective use of the weapons. Let us turn to the function of the non-nuclear force.

That force should not be designed as an instrument for bringing on a nuclear response to an armed attack, which is the function inherent in the analogy of a trip-wire. Nor should it be designed to be merely enough more substantial than a trip-wire force to stop something larger than a border raid, or to "produce a pause" in fighting during which an aggressor might reflect on possible nuclear implications. Its purpose should be to deny the Soviet Union the capacity to impose its will in Europe by conventional force. At present, if an issue should be pushed to the point of using force, the options open to the NATO alliance are acquiescence or, very shortly, a nuclear response. If the situation should be reversed and the Soviet Union should itself be faced with the necessity of relying upon nuclear force in attempting to impose its will, more glittering prizes than are now apparent would be required to justify assuming the risks involved. Let us see, therefore, how far this purpose is possible of achievement, being careful not to claim too much.

It can be stated flatly that Western Europe can be defended well to the east of the Rhine in the face of a massive Soviet attack which included forces mobilized, deployed and supported from the

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Soviet Union. This view flies in the face of much received doctrine, but should not cause surprise if one pauses to consider (1) that the combined manpower and resources of Western Europe and North America far exceed those of the Soviet Union; (2) that the Soviet satellites would be most untrustworthy allies, especially in an offensive operation of this sort; (3) that the Soviet communications system and general war-support apparatus is distinctly inferior to that in Western Europe; and (4) that NATO has more men under arms than the Warsaw Pact countries. So we can conclude that it is entirely feasible to stop conventional forces of the Russians in Europe without the use of nuclear weapons. And without a very large increase in defense budgets.

Nevertheless, the danger of nuclear war would remain and would probably dominate any major crisis or conflict. But the inhibitions against a projected offensive Soviet action would have been greatly increased. A conventional offensive would have been rendered incapable of success, and the risks of attempting one would include the near certainty of an escalation to nuclear war. The suggestion is sometimes made that to increase conventional armaments would carry the implication that the United States would not use nuclear ones. I should suppose that the opposite would be more nearly true. It would clearly carry the implication that the United States wanted an initial alternative to fighting with nuclear weapons. But surely our determination and capacity to fight with conventional weapons, if forced to do so by threat or attack, would make more, rather than less, credible our willingness to throw the nuclear ones into the scales either to protect our troops, if necessary, or to anticipate a blow from a deeply committed enemy.

That this should be credible is essential if the issue presented is, not stopping a Russian advance into Western Europe, but countering the use of Russian force behind the present frontier—for instance, in Berlin. I am not claiming that the conventional force suggested could, without the use or threat of nuclear weapons, prevent an occupation of Berlin. But I submit that the threat to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, in a clash over Berlin, which Mr. McNamara made on September 29, becomes more, and not less, menacing as the number of our own and allied troops at stake along the front increases.

How large a conventional force would be required or how it should be armed or employed is not for an amateur strategist to

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decide. But one must have some order of magnitude in mind to discuss the matter with any sense of reality. Clearly, larger forces are needed in Europe than now exist there, but it would surprise me if a pretty good job could not be done by a well armed, supplied and supported force on the central NATO front in the neighborhood of the 30 divisions now talked about, with an equal number of quickly mobilized reserves. This is quite within practicable possibility.

One may ask whether it is realistic to talk in terms of this magnitude since in the past our European allies have not provided for NATO the smaller forces asked of them. I think that it is, and that the development of such a strategic plan is an essential precondition to making the talk realistic. In the past, our allies have believed—partly, as I have pointed out, because of our own attitudes—that the conventional effort asked of them had little real military importance and would be a mere curtain-raiser to nuclear blows. Furthermore, they cannot believe that we are asking them to do what we ourselves are unwilling to do—that is, provide conventional forces. Today we have *in Europe*, including the sailors of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, over 400,000 men. Indeed, our forces in Europe are larger than the total men under arms in any but two NATO countries, Turkey and France.

The removal of Soviet dominance on the eastern front would also have important political effects. The stability of the satellite régimes in Eastern Europe rests upon this dominance. Present Soviet policy toward East Germany and Berlin would be much more difficult without it. Much of allied hesitations and doubts stems directly from it. The essence of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe is to take action supported by force, as in Hungary and East Germany, confident that no counterforce exists capable of supporting local opposition and that "massive retaliation" by nuclear weapons would be regarded as too hazardous. If the Soviet Union were confronted on its western front with equal conventional forces, and in some localities with superior forces, calculations of actions and risks both in the Soviet Union and in Europe would be very different. Calculations of actions and risks make governmental policy.

Consider now the nuclear armament of the alliance. At present a common complaint in Europe is that the Government of the United States has an inordinate control of the calculations of actions and risks because of its vast preëminence in nuclear

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weapons. But one hears no speculation upon the dramatic change in relative military weight which would occur, if, in accordance with the defense strategy for NATO barely suggested above, Europe provided conventional forces within the magnitudes outlined. In that event, plainly, those who provided the power which would be called upon initially to block a Soviet attempt to impose its will—as, for instance, in an effort to change or impair movement to and from Berlin—would have an immense leverage on political and military strategy in the West. This would be an inevitable reflection of new power assumed by Europe within the alliance. It might stimulate realistic methods of agreeing on action and carrying it out. Obviously, an allied defense force such as suggested, operating on a strategic plan such as suggested, cannot be controlled by a town meeting requiring unanimity for decision. It should surprise no one if the needs of supranational organizations grew fast in this forcing bed. But plainest of all would be the certainty of a greatly enhanced position for Europe—so much so that the United States might not find it easy to obtain a voice equal to the importance of its nuclear capabilities, essential though these would be to policy and strategy but pushed out of the forefront of a confrontation.

In other words, the basic problem before the Atlantic Alliance is not how to control a particular weapon, but what ends the alliance proposes to accomplish, how it proposes to accomplish them, and how to make the decisions to use force to meet force—that is, force of any kind—knowing the full risks involved, but knowing also that its first incidence may be local. Even when all the allies are wholly convinced that nuclear weapons are available and will be used at the critical moment, the basic decision will remain that of entering on a concert of action which may involve them.

Discussion of the positioning and control of nuclear weapons has been bedeviled by its involvement with pride and fear. For instance, it is asserted as a requirement that the defense of France should not depend on any other country. The defense of France —and, indeed, that of Europe—does depend, and throughout this century has depended, on association with the United States, just as the security of the United States is vitally bound up with Europe in no less important—though different—ways than when the sanction behind the Monroe Doctrine was the British fleet.

The same idea is put differently when it springs from fear rather than pride. Then it is said that some day the United States may

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withdraw from Europe into isolation. Against that day Europe must have an independent European-supported nuclear capability, or it will be without power to deter or resist Soviet domination. The withdrawal of the United States from the defense of Europe would, indeed, be an evil day for the whole free world, and neither Europe nor the United States could long or successfully maintain their free institutions or resist the domination of a Communist system embracing Eurasia, Africa and South America. To plan and act on the assumption of that eventuality will ensure the failure of any common defense plan for Europe. For neither the conventional forces nor the nuclear forces required for that defense can then be made available.

It is an illusion to believe that Europe can or will produce an independent nuclear deterrent within any time relevant to military planning, even if given the necessary technological help. Our European NATO allies spend annually on all defense about $15 billion. Secretary McNamara has told us that in the coming fiscal year the United States will spend $15 billion on nuclear weapons and delivery systems alone. The British nuclear effort over many years has strained available resources, reduced conventional forces to a minimum and produced a nuclear capability that may be, perhaps, 2 percent of the nuclear striking power which the United States could now bring to bear in the NATO area. If we assume that France is capable of equalling that result and that the rest of NATO Europe could add as much again, the total would not be a significant addition to nuclear power contributed by the United States, or to what the United States would be adding to that power during the same time. Furthermore, it would be made, as in England, at the expense of essential strengthening, perhaps even of maintaining, present non-nuclear forces. In other words, a European-produced nuclear force would be a tragic misuse of resources essential to provide basic elements of defense. Nevertheless, we must ask whether this waste would give Europe either a significant deterrent against the Soviet Union, or an increased "say" in the direction and control of NATO, or any other element in the defense of Europe.

Viewed as a deterrent, a European—and certainly a French—nuclear strategic force would contain little threat against Soviet nuclear power. It could cover only a fraction of the targets and plainly it could not disarm the Soviet Union or seriously weaken its nuclear strength. As a weapon in use, it would be soon de-

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stroyed or spent. As an anti-city weapon, a small European force could threaten serious damage. But the threat would work both ways and would also impose grave risks to European, and also American, cities by way of retaliation. It would have a measure of deterrent power, like that of a determined man with a drawn revolver. He inhibits some action, but in doing so he incurs risks which eventually mature; and his career ends in violence or reform. Too many have an interest in ending it.

Sometimes it is said that an independent, even though small, European nuclear power would gain Europe a larger "say" in the use and control of nuclear weapons by the ability to initiate a nuclear strike and thus "trigger" the Strategic Air Command. The alliance would, indeed, be in sorry shape if joint planning and control of defense had to be coerced by this sort of blackmail. As Secretary of Defense McNamara has said both publicly, in general terms, and to the NATO Council, in specific terms, in order for us to have the best, indeed the only, chance of survival in case the dread nuclear weapon has to be used, it is indispensable that we have unity of planning and unity of command. A scattered sputtering of feeble shots to begin with spells doom for everyone.

An infinitely more important, possibly controlling, "say" would come to Europe from a defense strategy and the forces to execute it to which Europe would furnish the bulk of the conventional power and the United States the nuclear power, as well as very substantial conventional forces. As I have already pointed out, such a policy would give Europe the dominant voice in adopting a political policy of opposition to Soviet demands and threats, in regard to which some Europeans have feared that the United States might be headstrong. It would also steady and strengthen alliance policy by binding the United States firmly to that policy through a most precise prior assurance of the engagement of our nuclear power at the point where an agreed and adopted defense plan would commit it.

In so far as demand for a European nuclear deterrent does not stem from pride or fear, it stems from lack of knowledge of the facts, for which United States policy has been largely responsible. Secrecy, which is desirable, has been rated ahead of understanding by our allies, which is indispensable.

One hears arguments from time to time, often connected with the claimed obsolescence of manned aircraft, that there should be stationed in Europe, under the command of the Supreme Allied

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Commander Europe, strategic nuclear weapons adequate to cover sources of threatened attack upon Europe. If those charged with high responsibility among our allies could share with us knowledge of the nuclear disposition made for their defense, it would be clearer to them that Europe could not produce weapons adequate for the purpose, and that to transfer from present locations outside Europe weapons now assigned for this purpose, and others available for it, would not strengthen but would greatly weaken the defense and security of Europe. They would know, too, the degree to which the nuclear defense of Europe and that of America are inseparable, and that a comprehensive plan and unified command can provide infinitely greater effectiveness both in the power and versatility of the defense and in the security of the weapons involved. Our partners could then see clearly that participation in devising the master plan and making the force dispositions most desirable for its execution are of the essence of a common defense. Splintering the strategic weapon and its military command would utterly destroy it.

Furthermore, this understanding and participation are the best, and probably the only, way of meeting a divisive and weakening diversion of allied effort into "independent" nuclear forces. Strong-willed persons are not going to be persuaded or beguiled into abandoning cherished plans; nor will other nations long accept an "Uncle-Sam-knows-best" attitude. But, over time, knowledge and intelligent self-interest often mitigate determined courses, or influence others not to join in them.

What is involved in devising and putting into effect a comprehensive plan for the defense of Europe is much more far-reaching than current talk of multinational nuclear forces and other proposals for "nuclear sharing." For the comprehensive agreement proposed here is not merely agreement upon a sound theoretical blueprint of a plan of operations, with a list added of the forces, including reserves, armaments, supplies and logistics necessary to execute it. To accomplish this much is difficult enough to have defied achievement up to the present. It is, of course, an essential prerequisite. Nor does the proposal stop with allied agreement to execute such a plan, nor with the provision of the funds and legislation (military service, etc.) needed to do so. A NATO civilian defense establishment is necessary to coördinate and see that it is carried out. The NATO Secretary General's office, suitably staffed and empowered, might lend itself to this task.

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At the very heart of the problem will lie the creation of real intimacy and confidence between the nuclear and non-nuclear components of this combined force and combined operation. Though much has already been done, still more can be done toward allied participation in coördinating the targeting for NATO defense, both European and North American. This has already produced both knowledge of nuclear realities and mutual confidence in those who have experienced it. Selected European personnel could be brought into United States operational units. Already proposals have been made by the President to allocate to the defense of Europe Polaris submarines, armed with intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and kept on station. The plan proposed here would commit all of the United States Strategic Air Command to the same duty. Out of the arrangements, over time and with experience, a real NATO nuclear command could develop.

The great point should be to avoid grandiose proposals and to make progress step by step and with care. Done in this way, the security risks, which would be real, would be far outweighed by European knowledge of the nuclear strength of the United States and confidence in our commitment to Europe's defense.

These tasks, hard enough in all conscience, are enough for the immediate present. If we are successful in performing them, we shall come face-to-face with even greater ones which already loom through the mist around us. I have already suggested them. They involve agreement upon common policies for the Atlantic allies in a number of fields on which judgments are presently divided. After agreement upon policies, there remains the most perplexing problem of all—how to execute policy as tensions rise, how to make the final, critical decisions which are essential to vigorous action. This is hard enough for a national executive. It is much harder for an alliance. But, plainly, the task is made simpler, not more difficult, if a master strategic plan and the forces to carry it out are ready at hand.

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STRAINS ON THE ALLIANCE

By Henry A. Kissinger

IN a major address on July 4, 1962, the President called for a partnership between the United States and Europe. With the passage of the Trade Bill this "great design" seems to have come a step closer. To many, the Atlantic Community beckons as the great hope of the 1960s. The possibility of establishing a vital Atlantic system is indeed one of the great opportunities of our time. It may well be that to future historians it will appear the distinctive feature of our decade, far transcending in importance the crises which form the headlines of the day.

Yet the lustre of the ultimate goal should not hide the obstacles in the way. Too often, there is a tendency to speak of an inevitable development toward greater cohesion in the West. The fact is, however, that the West's opportunity has come at a time of serious internal division. After nearly two years of intensive debate, our views with respect to strategy are treated with skepticism by many of our allies. According to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, the disagreement about nuclear matters has impaired the United States' line of communication with France.[1] Despite repeated protestations of unity, there have been periodic expressions of distrust in both Bonn and Paris about our conduct of the Berlin negotiations. The smaller European nations are torn between their worry about Franco-German hegemony and their eagerness to play a role in Europe greater than their individual resources and influence permit. At the same time, our policy in colonial areas, notably New Guinea, has disillusioned some staunch friends and reduced their traditional enthusiasm for giving priority to Atlantic, over European, relationships.

Of course, not every criticism need be taken at face value; some of it reflects a tendency to use us as a scapegoat for painful decisions which may be privately recognized as inevitable. But equally many European leaders have refrained from expressing publicly the full extent of their uneasiness. Many of them have built their political careers on close ties to the United States. Their domestic opponents would surely construe a public criticism of U.S. policies as an admission of failure.

[1] *Foreign Affairs,* October 1962, p. 16.

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Were the Europeans to express their real views they would admit varying degrees of disagreement either with our estimate of the Communist danger or the means for dealing with it. The merit of these views is not at issue. Their existence has diverted attention from constructive tasks and absorbed energies in debates about short-range purposes. Indeed, the specific criticisms hide a deeper reality: the emergence of a new Europe—dynamic, powerful and self-confident. In many ways, this Europe represents the culmination of a farsighted American policy consistently pursued since World War II. But the fact that the first priority of our effort had to be given to economic assistance may have blinded us to the political consequences of our success. It was always likely that nations with the traditions of our European allies would sooner or later attempt to assert their own political view of the world. The dynamism and sense of mission which projected Europe overseas for a period of five centuries have now been turned first toward the reconstruction of Europe and then toward enlarging its influence in world affairs. This effort is all the more energetic because, for the first time since the carnage of World War I, Europe has an intact young generation eager to assert its own ideas and vision of the world.

To be sure, the ways in which Europeans have expressed their new self-assurance have not always been fortunate. Questioning the good judgment of the United States is one thing; attacking our good faith is another—even granting that we ourselves have a tendency to confuse the two. To construe U. S. reassessments of policy as *a priori* proof of our inconsistency is to discourage any Western initiative. Obviously, too, not all measures taken by our European allies are in response to our policies, and many will be unaffected by what we do. Whatever our course, President de Gaulle will seek to assert his leadership of Europe, and basic differences of policy will continue to be aggravated by his indifference to causing personal irritation.

It is legitimate to inquire, however, to what extent U.S. policies have exacerbated the divisions of the West, especially as the Cuban crisis has created conditions in which such a reëxamination can be particularly useful. The fact that we acted decisively yet selectively has done much to restore confidence in our leadership. On the other hand, it has underlined some of the differences in outlook between us and Europe. On balance, the impact of the Cuban crisis has been highly beneficial to us, but the credit we

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gained will prove fleeting if we do not make an effort to understand recent European attitudes toward our policies.

II

The perspective of nations differs with their obligations, their geography, their history and their power. No alliance can perfectly reconcile the goals of all of its members, particularly if one ally has world-wide responsibilities while the others focus their attention on regional or national concerns. But the minimum condition for effectiveness is that the requirements of the alliance should not clash with the deepest aspirations of one or more of the partners.

These considerations are especially relevant to what has come to be called the "German problem." The reason the Berlin issue has been so sensitive is not primarily because the city is physically vulnerable, but because all Germany is psychologically vulnerable. To many in the West, the crisis over Berlin seems to turn primarily on an effort to find new modalities of access to that beleaguered city. To these Western observers, conditions in Germany as a whole seem more or less tolerable. Not everyone accepts the division of Germany and some might prefer a unified Germany; but none of Germany's allies makes reunification a major goal. Underlying many attitudes toward Germany is distrust—particularly in Great Britain—based on the experiences of two world wars. Thus there are many voices in the West arguing that the logical solution is to negotiate new access procedures to Berlin in return for accepting the "fact" of a divided Germany. To concede the continuance of a status quo which is not intolerable seems a small price to pay for a promise of stability.

However, stability gained in this manner would upset the domestic equilibrium of the Federal Republic; indeed, this is what makes the Soviets so anxious to secure recognition of the status quo. If the West tacitly or explicitly abandoned the principle of national unity, the Germans would consider it a sacrifice of their basic interests. Whatever stability might result from the settlement would seem to have been purchased at their expense. No German political leader can accept as permanent the subjugation of 17,000,000 Germans by Communist guns. His minimum goal must be to ameliorate conditions in East Germany—a goal which he will be under increasing pressure to pursue independently if the allies prove indifferent to it.

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This is why the building of the Wall in Berlin and the hesitant Western response to it gave such a shock to the German public. Many in the West looked on the Wall primarily as another unilateral abrogation of a treaty obligation by the Soviets and an act of inhumanity to the people of Berlin. In Germany the Wall symbolized the difficulty if not the end of the previous hopes for unification. For better or worse, the policy of the Federal Republic had been based on the premise that there was no inconsistency between Germany's national aspirations and its Western orientation. In fact, the Western Alliance had been sold to the German public with the argument that it represented the best method to achieve these aspirations. This belief was badly shaken by the Wall. The psychological basis was thus laid for a German reassessment of policy, and this has barely begun.

This difference in perspective has been at the heart of the disagreement between Bonn and Washington regarding the negotiations over Berlin. The United States has held the unexceptionable view that a showdown cannot be faced until the West has demonstrated that all honorable means of negotiation have been exhausted. It was widely assumed that the primary Soviet goal is to stabilize conditions in Central Europe. The United States was therefore inclined to seek some way to deal with the immediate irritant—the problem of access to Berlin—by making concessions which might enhance the status of the East German authorities without impairing the physical means of access. Progress on the national question would be achieved by increasing the contacts between the two parts of Germany. In these contacts, it was supposed, the superior strength of Western Germany could not fail to make itself felt.

All of these elements were contained in the United States plan leaked to the press in April 1962. It provided for an International Access Authority in which East Germany would enjoy the same status as the Federal Republic; a number of East-West German commissions to deal with German problems; a nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.

The position of the Federal Republic has been extremely ambivalent. Conscious of the danger of being accused of bellicosity, it has accepted the need for negotiations. But Chancellor Adenauer and his associates have been very uneasy about the way we have posed the issue. They have held that Soviet "salami tac-

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tics" had already so sharply curtailed West Berlin's margin of safety that any further concessions were likely to undermine its viability. They have been torn between the desire for initiatives on the German question and a suspicion that any proposals we made would only mask further concessions on Berlin. They still remember that in 1959, at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva, the Western powers first coupled a proposal on German unification with some concessions on Berlin. When the Soviets refused even to discuss unification, the West refrained from pushing the German plan, but still kept possible modifications of Berlin's status on the agenda.

Chancellor Adenauer and his associates, having based their entire postwar policy on close ties with the West and especially with the United States, have chosen not to bring into the open the full extent of their disquiet. Similarly, the Administration has preferred to stress German agreement to specific formulas in order to maintain the appearance of allied unity. However, nominal German agreement has frequently depended on the Chancellor's knowledge that President de Gaulle would exercise his veto in allied councils. At other times, the Federal Republic has gone along not because it considered our course desirable but because it felt that it was the least undesirable of the available options.

One result is that part of the polemic between Washington and Bonn has been conducted by means of inspired leaks to the press. During the summer and fall of 1961, many American newspapers pointed out that Germany's bills for World War II would be coming due. We were said to be delaying proposals until after the German elections so that a new government would be able to bear the brunt of the inevitably unpleasant decisions. There were demands for "initiatives" and "imagination" from the Germans.

On the German side, the suspicion has frequently been voiced that sooner or later the United States would confront Germany with a *fait accompli.* Planted stories have expressed doubt about the validity of our nuclear guarantee. The frequent demand that the Germans undertake "initiatives," it was said, really masked our desire that they should offer unpalatable concessions which we were reluctant to make ourselves. Repeated comments about the vulnerability of Berlin were said to be proof that the reliability of our nuclear guarantee was decreasing. Otherwise, Berlin would be no more vulnerable to military attack than Hamburg.

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A more important result of the misunderstanding between Bonn and Washington has been the emergence of France as guardian of the Federal Republic's interests. France's role is not without its own ambivalence. French leaders are not likely to have transcended their historical reflexes so thoroughly as to have become passionate believers in a united, powerful and self-confident Germany for its own sake. But President de Gaulle has understood that France by itself can no longer have a determining voice in world affairs. Its future influence depends on its ability to lead Europe and this in turn presupposes close ties with the Federal Republic.

President de Gaulle has grasped the fact that if Germany feels itself an outcast it cannot remain a willing partner of the West. He has realized that an irredentist, dissatisfied Germany would be a menace to the security of all of Europe. He has therefore deliberately flattered German self-esteem. In his view, devising negotiating formulas on Berlin is less important than making the Germans feel that when under stress they do not stand alone. He has seen that there is no permanent solution to the Berlin problem as long as it is considered in isolation. To accuse the French of cynicism is irrelevant. They have pursued the policy appropriate for their objective.

As a consequence, the French position sometimes reflects German feelings more accurately than the German one does. French intransigence would, after all, have served no purpose—and it could not have been so effective—if French views had not been closer to the true convictions of the Chancellor than ours. That President de Gaulle has used the United States' nuclear umbrella to pursue his "tough" policy adds to the irony of the situation and to the irritation of some of our policy-makers. But, as President Kennedy has recently remarked, "Life is not fair."

These motivations and misunderstandings created a diplomacy which combined the disadvantage of allied disunity with the inability to gain any real benefit from the negotiations. France refused to negotiate. The Federal Republic approved diplomatic contacts with the Soviets only with great misgivings. The "exploratory talks" were first conducted by Secretary Rusk and later by Ambassador Thompson with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Thus, the Federal Republic, on an issue affecting it most immediately, stood on the sidelines in a position to criticize the unfavorable features of specific proposals without having to weigh

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them against alternative courses. By assuming the role of chief negotiator, we played into the hands of the French and disquieted the Germans, and all without being able to bring about a settlement. Since we could not commit the West as a whole, the Soviets were in a position to treat our offers as fishing expeditions or to engage in fishing expeditions of their own. If they considered allied discord a feint, this gave them an incentive to be rigid. If they took it seriously, they could in effect bank every concession and use it as the starting point for the next round of talks.

Moreover, our desire to "stabilize" conditions in Central Europe turned the conversations into an effort to find something in the Soviet catalogue of demands which could be conceded without destroying the freedom of Berlin. Instead of using the talks to define the West's conception of the future of Germany and of security in Central Europe, American spokesmen concentrated on what change in the status quo in and around Berlin might prove barely tolerable. They did not advance a program either for eventual German unification or for ameliorating conditions in East Germany. Such schemes were considered "non-negotiable" and therefore likely to undermine any chance of a settlement. The impression was thus created that only the issues which the Soviets chose to raise stood between us and lasting peace. This set up a pattern of negotiations in which, in return for Western concessions, the Soviets would withdraw the threat which they themselves had initiated.

The more negotiations were conducted in this manner, the more relations between Bonn and Washington suffered. The mere fact of bilateral negotiations raised the spectre of a U.S.-Soviet accommodation at the expense of our allies. Our tactics thus encouraged the Franco-German entente. The French inclination to create a Third Force would probably have been pursued in any case; but it was given impetus and opportunity by German uneasiness about our course. In the resulting atmosphere of distrust, even our determination not to diffuse nuclear weapons to our allies could be represented as further proof that we were collaborating with the opponent against our friends.

By focussing the negotiations on access rights and modalities, we stressed an issue most likely to lead to misunderstanding. A city divided by a wall, surrounded on three other sides by barbed wire, and existing as an enclave in hostile territory is not ideally placed for the exercise of so-called "flexibility." This is illustrated

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by the original U.S. scheme for an International Access Authority which the Germans leaked to the press in April 1962, as a means of torpedoing it. It provided that the Authority to regulate access to Berlin was to be composed of five Western and five Eastern nations and three neutrals, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. The Eastern nations included East Germany and East Berlin. The Western group included the Federal Republic and West Berlin. This implied the tacit recognition of East Germany, as well as a different political status for West Berlin, which lent color to the Soviet claim that it should be a free city. On the narrower question of access, the determining vote would have been in the hands of three neutrals, two of them living in the immediate shadow of Soviet power. The people of Berlin are not likely to believe that their security has been enhanced by substituting the judgment of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland for the responsibility now exercised by Great Britain, the United States and France. Of course, if an international authority actually manned the check points on the access routes with its own personnel, the current situation would be greatly improved. If, however, the authority merely supervised the East German police, three small nations would be in the position of having to defend current Western rights and in effect to decide questions of peace and war.

There are indications that we are rethinking our policy toward Germany—and in doing so it is important that we understand the proper priorities. Access to Berlin can be the subject of various face-saving formulas if the Soviets ever genuinely want a settlement. But the issue will not depend on our ingenuity in devising these formulas, but on whether the Soviets decide to settle for real stability and to envisage a comprehensive settlement of the issues in Central Europe.

Any more comprehensive program comes up against several obstacles. The West, remembering two world wars and the atrocities of the Nazi period, does not find it easy to accept that for the third time in 50 years international tensions should focus on Germany. But the West must rise above its memories, keeping in mind that the disasters of this century arose in part because Germany strove to assert its own narrowly conceived interests against both East and West. Whatever the difficulties of the alliance with Germany, they pale before the alternative of an embittered Germany basing its policy on resentment.

Ten years after the decision to rearm Germany it is too late to

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invoke Germany's past transgressions as a justification for policy. The younger generation in Germany will not be forever content to pay for the sins of its fathers by being considered morally second-class. It is possible to argue that other choices should have been made a decade ago. Today, the sole hope for having Germany be a responsible member of the Atlantic Community is to treat her like one.

The fate of the 17,000,000 people in Eastern Germany is one of those intangible issues that can remain quiescent for many years, only to erupt suddenly and dramatically. Although few West Germans expect to achieve unity rapidly, fewer still are prepared to accept as permanent their country's division and the present fate of their compatriots in the East. Growing prosperity in the Federal Republic only magnifies this uneasy feeling of guilt and responsibility. Any determined, perhaps demagogic, group could suddenly bring the issue to the fore. Coupled with setbacks in other fields, this could severely shake the political stability of the Federal Republic.

It is not even necessarily a question of nascent nationalism—though this too could recur. Nationalist feelings undoubtedly exist in the older generation. For younger people, the motivation might be to ameliorate the conditions of life for their compatriots in Eastern Germany. Many of the new generation who are most European or Atlantic in their outlook will measure the West by the concern and understanding it shows on this issue. If the West should appear indifferent or treat Eastern Germany entirely as a tactical object, the present undoubted Atlantic orientation of the younger Germans may be undermined.

To the degree that the Western Allies seem to abandon interest in the future of Germany, German political leaders are likely to become more active in pressing the issue of unification. The flexibility so often demanded of the Federal Republic will not necessarily be exercised on the issues most dear to the heart of those who advocate flexibility. It may take the form of separate dealings with the Communists to change conditions in Eastern Germany. A so-called Rapallo policy—a change of fronts toward the East—is extremely unlikely; but the transformation of the Federal Republic into a sullen, reluctant ally would be serious enough. The Soviet Union would then be able to appeal to it on a national basis and to the other Western countries on the basis of their fear of Germany.

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In its own interest, the West should see to it that Germany faces its future within the framework of the Western Alliance and not apart from it. We and our allies must remember that a people which has lost two wars, undergone three revolutions, the trauma of the Nazi era and two periods of extreme inflation is not likely to be as stable as its prosperous economy and the policy of a leader born in the last century make it appear at present. Contemporary Germany's chronic sense of insecurity is not removed by lectures on the drawbacks of a too legalistic approach to policy. The best hope to prevent a latent nihilism in Germany from again menacing the West is to give the Federal Republic a stake in something larger than itself. The future of the Federal Republic depends on two related policies by the West: (1) recognition of the psychological and political dilemmas of a divided country, and (2) the ability to make the Federal Republic part of a larger community. These policies are interdependent; to pursue one without the other is to defeat both.

For its part, the Federal Republic has an obligation not merely to affirm its ultimate goals, but to assume responsibility for indicating at least some intermediate steps for achieving them. Theoretical discussions about the right of self-determination cannot substitute for facing issues which must be settled if there is to be progress on the national question: the frontier with Poland, for example. If the West is to deal with the future of Germany seriously, Germany must define its program in an atmosphere of less distrust of its partners.

In short, since the issue of the future of Germany must be faced, it would be wisest to do so within an Atlantic framework. The purpose should be to show reasonable elements in the Soviet leadership group and in the satellites that neither security nor economic advantage requires the maintenance of a Communist régime in a divided country. Failing that, it should demonstrate to the Federal Republic not simply that the Soviets reject the West's optimum program but that they reject any scheme consistent with even the loosest definition of self-determination. For example, it might be possible to accept the notion of a German Confederation and thereby the existence of an East German state. But recognition should be made conditional on a degree of internationally supervised self-determination in Eastern Germany. To make the proposal symmetrical, it might be proposed that any party operating in any part of Germany be permitted to function

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in every part. A confederation so constituted would permit special security arrangements to be made for Eastern Germany—including its neutralization—and if necessary, the maintenance of existing economic ties with the East for a specified term of, say, 10 to 15 years.

Beyond any specific program it is crucial to keep in mind what is really at stake in Germany. One of Chancellor Adenauer's most notable achievements has been to bring about the optical illusion that conditions in the Federal Republic are as firm and stable as his policy. This is not the case. The problem of succession in Germany is therefore of vital significance—though not necessarily in the sense often mentioned. Whatever one may think of Chancellor Adenauer, he stands for a principle which it cannot be in our interest to undermine: Germany's Atlantic orientation.

Chancellor Adenauer knows that long-range policy, moderation and political acumen have not been the outstanding characteristics of his compatriots in this century. Many of those in Germany who support particular American initiatives do not necessarily share our over-all views. Those who extol flexibility in the abstract, the political realists whose expertise consists in finding ways of adjusting to immediate pressures, are not always the most reliable allies in time of crisis. We must take care lest in the effort to achieve short-range objectives we encourage a political style which in the long run may prove demoralizing for the West. It would of course be desirable if Chancellor Adenauer's staunchness could be combined with greater diplomatic adaptability, but if a choice has to be made, the former is preferable. If we are equally consistent, the Atlantic partnership will still endure after the latest negotiating gimmicks have been forgotten.

III

Since 1958, much of the discussion within NATO has taken place against the backdrop of the somewhat out-of-scale figure of President de Gaulle. Determined to achieve a dominant role for France, distrustful of doctrines of collective security which seem to him to submerge France's national identity, he has played a lone hand apart from NATO. He has pursued a tactic of announcing a goal and then moving toward it without further discussion—regardless of the views or feelings of his allies.

Such methods are, of course, irritating. But a sense of outrage is not a good guide to policy. To be sure, we have not provoked

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President de Gaulle into his course. Throughout his career he has not been amenable either to pressure or persuasion. The concerns raised by our relations with France are different. Granted de Gaulle's motives, our tactics may well have eased his task by strengthening him with his own bureaucracy, both diplomatic and military. Our German policy has undoubtedly aided his effort to organize Europe. We have failed to take full advantage of the strength of character and vision which are the reverse side of de Gaulle's difficult personality.

The dispute with France has focussed on defense policy, where France has taken skillful advantage of European doubts and uneasiness. Perhaps the basic difficulty has been that we have treated what is essentially a political and psychological problem as if it were primarily technical. Thus, the speeches of Secretary McNamara at successive NATO meetings have been generally hailed as extraordinarily brilliant, yet they have almost invariably been followed by periods of intense restiveness in Europe. This is because our approach was generally to demonstrate a military capacity, which was not primarily in question, while ignoring or brushing aside the political or psychological considerations which were the real core of the uneasiness. Moreover, our somewhat schoolmasterish approach, while perhaps inevitable in view of our relative sophistication on nuclear matters, compounded the irritations. No responsible minister likes to be told that his close concerns arise, in effect, from ignorance.

The full extent of the schism became apparent in the aftermath of Secretary McNamara's speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16, 1962. Though he used arguments reported to be similar to those that had gone unchallenged at the NATO ministerial meeting in Athens only a month before, the public reaction in Europe was intense and unfavorable. Freed of the restraints imposed at formal diplomatic meetings, many Europeans gave vent to their frustrations. The Pentagon's shocked surprise at this response only emphasized the extent to which Europe and the United States had been acting at cross-purposes.

The disagreement has concerned two related problems: the United States' view of the nature of nuclear strategy, and an increased reliance on conventional weapons for the defense of Europe. On the purely strategic level, these issues have bedeviled NATO for years. Those who advocate a major emphasis on deterrence—and this includes most Europeans—urge us to invoke the

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direst threats. Those who emphasize credibility advocate a more graduated response. The former argue that if our threat is sufficiently grave it will never be challenged and that an emphasis on "tolerable" strategies may actually invite aggression. The Kennedy Administration on the whole holds the view that credibility is attained by posing a challenge one is willing to implement and that deterrence which is based on the threat of suicide must prove demoralizing in the long run. Thus, the issue depends on a psychological assessment, not merely on a technical analysis. One need not agree with the way many Europeans have stated their case in order to deplore the impatience with which we have brushed it aside.

Beyond the strategic problem looms a political one: the restiveness of many Europeans due to their complete dependence on the United States in nuclear matters. Here assurances of our overwhelming power are simply irrelevant and our insistence on the "self-evident" nature of our nuclear guarantee seems to many self-righteous. Europeans do not believe that any single guarantee can reliably cover all contingencies. There have been too many allied disagreements, from Suez to the Congo to Berlin, to make it inconceivable that in a crisis we and they might see things differently.

The technical issues have been dealt with previously in these pages.[2] Emphasis here will be on the political implications of the nuclear controversy within NATO.

Perhaps the most creative policy of the United States since World War II has been to foster European unity. We have consistently held that a strong and united Europe would be of benefit to freedom everywhere. We have recognized that when it was strong economically it would be more difficult to bargain with, but we have always considered this a reasonable price for the long-term benefits.

Having made this wise choice, however, we have recoiled before one of the necessary implications. It was inevitable that countries with the historical traditions of our European allies would not be content forever to depend entirely on the protection of our nuclear power. Even if we believe the Europeans are wrong in their technical arguments, we must allow that their desire to play a greater role in matters affecting their survival is a healthy sign of restored vigor.

[2] See "The Unsolved Problems of European Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1962.

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The irony of the dispute between us and our continental allies, particularly France, is that in essence they are using a script learned from us. Throughout the 1950s the United States strongly urged on them the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. We insisted that our nuclear weapons compensated for the massive conventional forces of the East. When the growth of a Soviet nuclear capability threw some doubt on this thesis, we advanced the "uncertainty" theory: to be effective, so the argument ran, our threat of nuclear retaliation did not need to be perfectly credible; it was sufficient if it produced enough uncertainty in the minds of the Soviet leaders to make adventure seem unattractive. From this point of view, there was even some advantage in exaggerating the threat of nuclear retaliation. The more dreadful the consequences of aggression could be made to appear, the greater would be the deterrent effect of the threat. Almost all these arguments were advanced first on behalf of our own strategic forces. Then they were used to justify the British retaliatory forces. Now these doctrines have crossed the Channel.

Leaving aside the validity of this theory—which this author for one never accepted—we should have had some compassion for the reaction of our European allies to the Kennedy Administration's change of emphasis. A change of Administration is, of course, bound to lead to a thorough reëxamination of foreign policy. But our allies have a stake in the continuity of American policy, thinking of it as a guarantee of American reliability, regardless of their views of the correctness of individual measures.

To our European allies, the shift in emphasis in American defense thinking after January 1961 was a cause of profound concern. Ideas about conventional warfare which we had derided as outdated not three years previously were suddenly resurrected. The tactical nuclear weapons which we had introduced with the argument that they would offset Soviet superiority in manpower were now sharply downgraded. In this context, many of the technical devices which were introduced to assure political control over the nuclear weapons in Europe were taken as designed to prevent their use altogether.

The impression grew—and not only among people with questionable motives—that the United States was envisaging a completely conventional defense of Europe; that it was seeking a way to withdraw its tactical nuclear establishment from the Continent; and that, in order to control completely the decision to

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engage in nuclear war, we preferred that all strategic weapons be based either in the United States or at sea—the latter only three years after we had made strenuous efforts to locate intermediate-range missiles on the Continent.

In the light of this record, it is curious that so many of our officials should be outraged at the doubts expressed about our constancy. Europeans may thoroughly believe the solemn commitments made by President Kennedy. But they have had too many demonstrations of the changeability inherent in our political system not to consider providing themselves with a more direct form of assurance.

The attempt to build up conventional forces, downgrade tactical nuclear weapons and retain a monopoly position on strategic nuclear weapons reflected a carefully thought-out military policy. To be sure, it has ambiguities which have been obscured by the fact that those most responsible for developing it belong to a single school of thought and through years of association have come to take for granted some assumptions which are not really so self-evident as they have tried to make them appear. But whatever its technical merit, the policy forced us into positions which, while not irreconcilable, at least *seemed* contradictory. In order to justify the conventional build-up in Europe we sometimes talked as if a completely conventional defense of Europe was almost within sight. The estimate of Soviet conventional strength was sharply reduced. The goal of 30 well-trained and well-equipped NATO divisions, it was now argued, would correct the imbalance of NATO strategy. Finally our insistence that we were still capable of carrying out a counterforce nuclear strategy implied a degree of strategic superiority which seemed to support the suspicion that the real objective of our defense policy was to reserve nuclear retaliation for attacks on our own territory.

In the field of conventional defense, it was probably unwise from the psychological point of view to choose as a target the number of divisions deemed necessary in 1957 in order to implement a nuclear strategy. Then again, the notions of "pause" and "threshold" were bound to appear to Europeans a euphemism for our reluctance to face the risks of nuclear war. We maintained that the conventional build-up would enable NATO to conduct a conventional defense until the Soviets appreciated that they were running an intolerable risk of nuclear war. But our European allies were not simply shortsighted and selfish in considering

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that during protracted conventional operations *both* sides might reconsider the risks of nuclear war. Many European critics overstated their case when they maintained that a conventional build-up might invite Soviet attack; but we have considerably exaggerated the benefits to be derived from increasing the NATO shield forces from 23 divisions to 30. For example, it has been argued that 30 divisions could stop the Soviet field armies now deployed in Eastern Europe. But it has not been explained why the Soviets should attack only with those forces, without reinforcing them. In case of a massive attack, the issue of when and how nuclear weapons might be used becomes crucial.

Moreover, it is clear that the choice between nuclear and conventional war is no longer entirely up to the West. The conventional build-up of NATO at any level could be made irrelevant by a Soviet decision to introduce nuclear weapons. In order to deal with these ambiguities we have been forced to repeat our nuclear guarantee so often as to raise doubts about the need for a conventional build-up. In short, it simply was not possible to combine a strategy which depended for effectiveness on a credible and certain interplay between conventional and nuclear capabilities, with an effort to retain nuclear hegemony.

The dispute about the conventional build-up has been sharpened by our inept approach to the nuclear question. We have shown little understanding for the concerns of some of our European allies that their survival should depend entirely on decisions made 3,000 miles away. Instead, our tendency has been to lecture Europeans about how unreal those concerns are. We have asserted the indivisible community of interests in the Western Alliance, but when our interpretation of this has been questioned by the French, we have shown an unwillingness to take them seriously. We have to all practical purposes ignored not only France's nuclear program, but also French thinking on strategic questions of all kinds.

France has responded with intransigence of its own. Our nuclear weapons have not been allowed on French soil. Coöperation even on such matters as European air defense has been grudging. France has kept aloof from all negotiations on Berlin without suggesting an appropriate alternative. Washington's unhappiness over these matters has not been diminished by the difficulties France has placed in the way of British membership in the European Common Market, by which the Administration has set great

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store. Further, some of our other allies have coupled a reluctance to increase their defense contribution with a demand to share in the control of our nuclear arsenal.

That we have had the better of the technical arguments should not blind us to the fact that the French position has been more closely attuned than ours to the psychological realities in Europe. It was simply not in the cards for us to maintain a special relationship with Great Britain on nuclear matters without arousing the resentment of France. No theoretical arguments could overcome the issue of prestige involved in the implication that, as put by Raymond Aron, it was proper for nuclear weapons to cross the Atlantic but not the Channel.

Then again, the proposals we have made within NATO to provide an alternative to national nuclear forces have tended to magnify the motives which gave rise to these forces in the first place. "Assigning" U.S. submarines to NATO could be represented, and not without justice, as simply shifting control from one U.S. headquarters to another. We have made proposals about a NATO submarine force manned by crews of mixed nationality. But by arguing that such a force was militarily unnecessary we discouraged our friends from supporting it. By retaining an American veto and suggesting very complex conditions for the composition of the crews, we gave rise to the suspicion that we were really advancing a subterfuge for continued U.S. hegemony.

Finally, our opposition to national nuclear forces in Europe has focussed on a problem which is at best peripheral. We have sought to demonstrate that national nuclear forces could not be used independently of ours. Counterforce strategy, we have said, requires central planning and larger forces than those in prospect for any European country. And any other strategy would lead to the complete devastation of the country concerned. Notions of a Third Force ascribed to France are therefore alleged to be chimerical or dangerous; chimerical because they cannot be realized, and dangerous because they may lead to a split in the alliance.

However, even technically, our arguments tend to be overstated. Even if a counterforce theory is accepted, European nuclear forces are not without significance. While these forces could not be decisive against the U.S.S.R., they might substantially weaken it relative to the United States and thereby exercise a deterrent effect beyond their actual strength. Second, the Soviet Union could not unleash the full force of its retaliatory power

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against a European ally without running an unacceptable risk of a counterblow by the United States. This triggering effect is one of the incentives for the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal and one of our reasons for opposing the spread of nuclear weapons within the alliance.

In short, European national forces are not designed for independent action. They are a device to gain an influence on our planning. In seeking to provide reassurance on that score, we have made a great deal of the fact that all targets of interest to Europeans are already covered by our forces. However, our allies do not so much doubt our ability to conduct a nuclear war as our willingness to engage in one, at least for some issues which they consider vital. Or else they fear that situations may arise where our attention will be focussed elsewhere and the U.S.S.R. will see in this an opportunity for blackmailing Europe.

The question then becomes how we can avoid being forced into nuclear war against our will. Is it wise to engage our prestige in seeking to delay the physical acquisition of a nuclear capability by our European allies? Or would it be better to use our influence to guide what we cannot prevent? Is it really true that the spread of nuclear weapons within the alliance is likely to weaken the cohesion of NATO? A great deal turns on the significance of the concept of Europe as a Third Force and what that term means.

It is important that we distinguish between strength and the purpose it will serve. In the sense of being powerful, Europe is bound to be a Third Force, partly because we ourselves have sought to make it so. This fact is now beyond our power to reverse. Whether Europe will use its new-found strength for short-term objectives of its own or for larger ends depends on whether the leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have the vision to develop common purposes and a structure to give them effect. If a political framework can be created, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Europe need not be disruptive to Atlantic unity.

One of two things can happen with the growth of European nuclear power: (1) Europe will in fact become strong enough to defend itself. This should not be a source of concern to the United States; quite the contrary. (2) Or else it will learn through hard experience that the security of the Atlantic area is in fact indivisible. If the American strategic analysis is even approximately correct, the latter is by far the more likely outcome. There is therefore no need to show so much concern over a development which

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may well tighten Atlantic bonds whatever the motives of individual leaders. Even a purely national French program should make France more eager for integrated planning than we are, since France has a great deal more to lose by its absence.

If Europe is determined to behave irresponsibly, the best we can do is to delay the time when it is able to do so—but not by much. If Europe wishes to have a nuclear capability there is nothing we can do to prevent it. And the effort to obstruct it may bring on what we are seeking to avoid. Once Britain has joined the Common Market, moreover, the nuclear issue will confront us full force. It is extremely unlikely that Britain can insist on a special position within Europe on nuclear matters or that it would wish to do so if it truly aspires to the leadership of Europe.

Our opposition to a development that we can only impede but not prevent has the practical consequence of depriving us of bargaining power with respect to the build-up of forces which could provide a practical alternative to exclusive reliance on nuclear retaliation. This is shown by our relations with France. At first we refused any assistance to any project even vaguely related to the French nuclear program. We then sold KC-135 tanker planes for aerial refueling of French bombers. Recently we have offered to sell an atomic submarine. Had we pledged these steps at the time of President Kennedy's visit to Paris in return for stronger French effort in the conventional field, many of the schisms in the alliance might have been avoided. At least, we could have demonstrated that France was placing its own short-term interests above the common concerns of NATO.

Rather than obstruct the development of European nuclear strength, we should seek to channel it in the most constructive direction. Rather than expend energies and prestige on proving that a European nuclear establishment is militarily senseless, we should try to define purposes for it which meet European concerns. Europe might well view the problem of local defense differently if it could feel that it had resources of its own by which to retaliate should the Soviets embark on a strategy of devastation. Even if our nuclear guarantee is as obvious as is often claimed, it does not follow that it will lose its effect just because Europe shares some of the responsibility for nuclear defense. Central control of nuclear weapons, which we correctly consider crucial, can then become a device by which to tie the Atlantic nations together politically.

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There are signs that this has been recognized by the Administration. In an important speech in Copenhagen, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, has stated: "It would be wrong to suppose that our aversion for individual weak and non-integrated nuclear forces would automatically be extended to a unified and multilateral European force which could be effectively integrated into joint NATO defense planning."

A great deal depends on how we interpret such words as "unified," "integrated" and "multilateral." Heretofore, when applied to a NATO force we have taken this concept to mean that a multilateral force had to be seaborne and that the crews had to be of mixed nationality. Mixed crews seemed to imply that one means of control was to be the threat of mutiny. As for the multilateral political control mechanism, neither we nor our allies have ever defined it.

The danger in these proposals is that we have stressed a technical solution for the composition of the crews at the expense of the political problem of control. And we have created the wrong psychological climate by implying that we would support only one particular solution. We must be careful to take our stand on fundamentals. There is no need to commit ourselves to so rigid a pattern with respect to a European nuclear force. It is not wise for us to use up our credit by insisting on patterns we cannot impose. We have every right to indicate our preference for a European force rather than a multiplication of national ones and we are correct in extending fuller support to the solution we prefer. But our primary goal should be to define the relation of this force to ours rather than to prescribe its internal characteristics. We should be more concerned with political coördination than with technical safeguards.

For the immediate future, it may not be practical to merge the national forces in Europe into a completely integrated force. The more useful step would seem to be to urge a European political control mechanism for its national forces and then to coördinate them with our strategic force. Such a control mechanism could become a spur to closer European political integration.

Our efforts should be exercised not in defining the internal mechanics of particular solutions, but in developing an over-all strategy for the alliance. The best way toward partnership is not so much to devise safeguards against irresponsibility as to afford

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the maximum incentive to responsible common action. A generous approach to our allies will in the long run prove the most productive.

IV

What matters most in our relations with Europe is the degree of confidence which can be generated on both sides of the Atlantic. In the absence of confidence, unity amounts primarily to a technical coördination of policies confined to specific issues. In such a framework agreement is limited by the short-term nature of particular crises. Disagreement is magnified out of proportion to its real significance and the alliance wastes its energies in recriminations. The creation of the Atlantic Community, which should be the next step forward in Western policy, depends to a considerable extent on the ability to define what Atlantic relationships should be like five or ten years from now. Many technical questions which now divide the alliance can be dealt with only in a larger framework.

It can be argued, of course, that the Atlantic partnership is basically healthy. The current difficulties can be ascribed to the obstinacy of two old men who will soon disappear from the scene. Adenauer's successors, so this argument runs, will prove more flexible in the conduct of diplomacy. De Gaulle's heirs will either stop the French nuclear program or turn it into an appendage of ours. Britain's entry into the Common Market, the argument continues, will give us a voice in European councils where presently are heard only the voices of two lonely figures whose policies are unlikely to survive them. With the assistance of Great Britain we can rally the smaller European nations and Italy into a bloc to prevent the Franco-German axis from dominating Europe and transforming it into a Third Force. The new Trade Act will enable us to forge Atlantic links similar to such institutions as the Coal and Steel Community which ushered in the Common Market.

These arguments have a certain plausibility. Yet to base policy on the expectation that historical evolution will do our job for us is to abdicate statesmanship. A policy which sees in two great national leaders an obstacle rather than an opportunity runs the risk of making us prisoners of events. The time for creative action is at a moment when old patterns are disintegrating, not some time in a future which is problematical and when the challenges may prove quite different.

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In any case, it is quite unlikely that the succession in Germany or in France will have the consequences many expect of it. If Adenauer's legacy of Atlantic partnership is undermined, a more flexible German policy may be concerned primarily with national issues rather than with European or Atlantic ties. This tendency can be prevented only by forging now Atlantic relationships which may to an extent serve as a substitute for thwarted national aspirations. In France it is highly unlikely that the nuclear program which preceded de Gaulle will end with him. The consensus behind the program is too wide, the vested interests back of it—bureaucratic, political, industrial and military—are too firmly established.

It would be a mistake to consider that our natural allies in Europe are all those who oppose the Franco-German partnership or de Gaulle's nuclear aspirations. Some of them, true, are friends of long standing. Others are more favorable to the Third Force idea than President de Gaulle. The American nuclear umbrella, now sometimes exploited by France to gain a reputation for toughness, can also be used—and more dangerously for the West—to support policies amounting to neutralism. Some leaders who are now most critical of the relations of Bonn and Paris to Washington were urging precisely such a course three years ago.

It would be dangerous to assume that the direction of Europe toward greater cohesion is foreordained. A post-Adenauer Germany may lack the Chancellor's degree of dedication to the ideal of a greater community. A post-de Gaulle France may be rent by internal schisms. An Italy dominated by the "opening to the Left" may seek to confuse manœuvring with statesmanship. After the death of its aged dictators, the Iberian peninsula could descend into chaos. None of these events is within our control. But the shock of any of them could be mitigated by a stronger Atlantic Community.

Nor should we assume that present strains in the Atlantic Community will disappear automatically if Great Britain enters the Common Market. To be sure, her political maturity will weigh heavily in European councils. With Britain playing a leading role, Europe's policy may be more subtle, more skillful and, at least in form, less demanding. Yet the direction in which Britain's influence will be exercised is still far from clear. Will Britain try to organize a grouping of the smaller powers and Italy against the Franco-German axis? Will it be a spokesman in Europe for a

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British-American view on international affairs? Will our problems with Europe necessarily be eased?

There are many who would answer each of these questions affirmatively. Yet there is reason for doubt. Prime Minister Macmillan has chosen his difficult path in order to revitalize Britain's claim to greatness. This vision implies a Europe led by Britain and playing its own specific role in international affairs. The great-power status which Great Britain has so tenaciously sought to sustain throughout the postwar period can now be achieved only through the closest association with the Continent. But to do this effectively Great Britain may have to adopt views similar to France's, ameliorating them with its own subtle style. One ironic result of Britain's entry into the Common Market might well be that Europe will henceforth conduct de Gaulle's policies with British methods.

Similar considerations apply also to the view that the new Trade Act passed by Congress will offer the means to transcend many of the differences here described. In a new era of Atlantic economic relationships, it is expected, the structures will be built for an eventual Atlantic partnership similar to those which preceded the foundation of the European Community. However, the two situations are not comparable. In 1947, Europe's economy was shattered. Economic integration promised benefits to everyone. It is far from clear that a prosperous and dynamic Europe will see its relations with us in the same light. Across the Atlantic, the Trade Act has been treated not so much as the inauguration of a new era as a commercial measure whose benefits will have to await the outcome of detailed negotiations. Even if lower tariffs prove to be the ultimate outcome, we would do well to prepare ourselves for some hard bargaining. In any case, it is quite possible that the economic integration of the Atlantic area will follow and not precede Atlantic political partnership.

In short, we cannot wait—either for the political succession in Germany and France, or to observe the effects of Britain's entry into the Common Market and of the Trade Act—to begin building the political structure of the Atlantic partnership. Its nature will have to be defined. If we wish to shape events, we can no longer rely on time to do our work for us.

The aftermath of the Cuban crisis provides us with an improved environment for putting forward creative ideas. Many doubts about our capacity for decisive action have been removed,

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and we have shaken the myth that in every crisis the Soviets are willing to run greater risks than we are. To be sure, we have had to pay a price as well. Some critics will probably ask why 40 missiles in Cuba should threaten our vital interests while the potentially larger French force has been declared by us to be useless. Our unilateral action which faced Europe with the risks of nuclear war without prior consultation probably strengthened the hand of those who argue that only by being powerful in its own right can Europe insist on an equal voice in allied councils. We must be careful in coming months not to feed the suspicion that we have purchased the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba by concessions of European interests.

However, on balance the Cuban crisis can turn into a net gain provided both we and Europe draw the correct conclusion from it. It demonstrated the power of a united Atlantic Community—despite the fact that this unity was forged by unilateral U.S. actions which our allies had no choice but to support. Also, the Cuban crisis has illustrated how a powerful Europe can complement our strength. When we become involved in other situations where European vital interests are not immediately at stake, a strong Europe can remove Soviet temptations to hold it as a hostage.

The choice we made a decade and a half ago in favor of a strong and self-confident Europe is as wise today as it was then. Real partnership is possible only between equals. Europe as a Third Force can become a step toward an Atlantic Community if a framework for common policy is created. We can best counteract plans for a Third Force based on a form of neutrality by conducting ourselves so that most of our allies will always consider the advantages of an Atlantic partnership greater than those that could be gained within the narrower conception.

Given the extraordinary importance of creating a political framework for the Atlantic area, this may be the occasion to implement the proposals for some form of Atlantic coördinating body put forth in various forms by such men as Dean Acheson, Lord Avon and President de Gaulle in his scheme for a Directorate. A great deal might be said for having this group composed initially of senior and highly respected private citizens charged with making recommendations to the governments concerned. The objective is to give the "great design" of Atlantic partnership more concrete form.

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It may be argued that the model of the Common Market demonstrates that it is preferable to move step by step without abstract discussion about ultimate ends. However, the lessons of history cannot be applied so mechanically. Today we stand in danger of being mired by the prudent, the tactical or the expedient. What is needed now is an assertion of our future goals to give us perspective.

Indeed, excessive realism may well be the chief obstacle to realizing the opportunities before the West. On both sides of the Atlantic, affairs are conducted increasingly by experts of high technical competence, superior intelligence and great skill in exercising power. Problems that are recognized are treated with considerable adeptness. But many opportunities are not recognized. The expert has a vested interest in the existing framework; doing the familiar as well as possible, after all, has made him an expert. His temptation is to confuse creativity with a projection of the present into the future. He respects "facts" and considers them something to be adjusted to, perhaps to be manipulated, but not to be transcended.

The unsatisfactory nature of much of our dialogue with Germany and France derives from the fact that their current leaders are a very different sort. Whereas many of our officials look on the daily flow of cables and the tactics for dealing with them as the essence of policy, this is what seems most ephemeral to men like Adenauer or, even more, de Gaulle. Their reality is their concept of the future or of the structure of the world they wish to bring about. The overly pragmatic approach of many of our policymakers seems to many Europeans to involve the risk of latent unsteadiness, just as the European's conceptual tendency appears to our officials as overly legalistic and theoretical.

In the decade ahead, the West will have to lift its sights to encompass a more embracing concept of reality than that which is today fashionable. In many ways this problem will be even more acute after Adenauer and de Gaulle have disappeared from the scene. For the generation which follows them stands as much in danger of exalting technique over purpose as do their contemporaries in the United States. But on both sides of the Atlantic we should remember that there are two kinds of realists: those who manipulate facts and those who create them. The West requires nothing so much as men able to create their own reality.

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NUCLEAR POLICY AND FRENCH INTRANSIGENCE

By Malcolm W. Hoag

OUR refusal to aid France in developing her nuclear strike force has never lacked American critics. Should we not seek an accommodation with General de Gaulle, trading missile technology and components for coöperation in another military or political field? Increasingly, it is said that we should. Proponents argue that France is well on the road toward acquiring her *force de frappe,* despite our opposition which has embittered French officials and made their program slower and more expensive. The bitterness and higher cost leave France both less willing and less able to support common enterprises, including the provision of modern French divisions to NATO and toleration of American-controlled nuclear weapons on her territory. It is said that these are unpleasant consequences of American policy, especially as they are felt by one honored major ally and not another. If we should supply Skybolt missiles to the United Kingdom for its Bomber Command, should we not assist France in some comparable way? Especially if France pays for it and eases our troubled balance of payments?

So the critics argue, and with considerable force. But far more important than the effect of America's arms policy on Franco-American relations is its broad objective—to arrest the proliferation of nuclear powers, not to speed it. Therefore, we have persisted in one message to would-be aspirants: "If you go toward independent nuclear capabilities, you go it alone. The road promises to be long and costly. And for what?" The painfulness of the French experience may, we hope, be a forceful example to others. We regret the burdens to France, and we seek to lessen their impact by any compromises that can be accommodated within our basic arms policy. But we are not prepared to abandon this policy. To do so would give evidence to the cynics who say that stubbornness pays and would encourage other nations to undertake similarly expensive nuclear programs in the expectation that we would bail them out with military aid. The real test of our policy toward France will be measured by whether or not others are deterred from emulating her.

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II

It cannot be maintained that American arms policy has been ideal, or that its many spokesmen have always expressed a consistent philosophy toward NATO and nuclear arms. Probably we have affronted France more than we needed to, and now we should do a better job of articulating a single coherent set of policies. Since some of the implications of these policies are unpleasant to our allies, it is all the more important to show these implications within the full context of Western defense. Where we seem inflexible, we must show that our resistance is not merely thoughtless or stubborn. Thus we need to hunt for constructive alternatives that, unlike an independent national deterrent, meet legitimate French needs without an unacceptable compromise of what we believe are our deeper mutual interests.

Many critics seem unaware how much of our policy for the defense of Europe is coherent and consistent. The public expressions of our nuclear philosophy may be incomplete, but there is more to it than is commonly recognized, as one who reads the defense statements and speeches of President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara must perceive. Responsible critics of our resistance to the spread of nuclear weapons can no more neglect this doctrine than they can the stated or implied French doctrine. The relevant questions are: What makes a strike force a deterrent force? How is nuclear force to be used, under what circumstances, in order to dissuade what nation from doing what?

One prominent feature of American doctrine is that nuclear force should not be used save in direct retaliation in kind or where the defense of the free world leaves no feasible alternative. We have not forsworn the nuclear initiative; our policy does not in all circumstances forbid "first use," as some strategists have proposed. But the change from the simplicity of the 1954 concept of "massive retaliation" is as unmistakable as it is natural. It is not cowardly to shrink from unleashing nuclear violence where an alternative defense is available; it is prudent when retaliation and counter-retaliation can spiral easily to excessive levels of damage; and it is politic when even those whom we propose to defend may look upon nuclear weapons as instruments of their destruction as much as instruments for their defense. Hence we have emphasized strong conventional arms to raise the "threshold" of violence at which we are driven to use nuclear weapons first. Yet conventional arms are not to be viewed exclusively as

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an alternative to nuclear weapons, for an enemy is likely to find our threat of nuclear retaliation more credible when he must crash through a thick shield of conventional forces in an unmistakably major attack.

Thus the United States favors a complete deterrent for NATO rather than one confined to the upper reaches of violence, and this means a strengthening of the conventional component of defense. When our allies plead scarce resources, we suggest concentration upon the neglected Shield forces. To divert resources to a series of national nuclear forces seems to us a serious mistake when Shield deficiencies are glaring. France, for example, appears to be spending about 1 percent of her gross national product to develop her *force de frappe*. None the less, the financial aspect is distinctly secondary. If the military function of the French strike force promised to harmonize with that of our own strategic retaliatory forces, we would be able to do less of the same strategic job as they did more. But in fact the *force de frappe* promises acute disharmony. Militarily, it threatens to interfere with the functioning of our nuclear deterrent; politically, it erodes the basis for allied trust in this deterrent.

NATO members must have confidence that their allies will honor their pledges to defend any one of them that may be attacked. The greater the threat, the greater the need for confidence. Yet France openly expresses doubt that the United States can be relied upon to invoke its retaliatory power in response to a Soviet attack that is confined to Europe—no matter how aggressive and destructive it may be. The dread logic is familiar: because a big nuclear strike involves the risk of suicide, it is not credible that a nation will launch it unless its own homeland has been attacked. Hence, a bold enemy will not be deterred from attacks upon our allies. Clearly there is something in the argument, but as formulated it is misleadingly simple and cannot be allowed to stand. For if "defense of one's homeland" is the only circumstance in which nuclear retaliation is credible, then a French nuclear force does not, for example, provide a credible defense for attacks on Germany, or Turkey, and so on. Thus, NATO members are driven back to self-defense where it matters most, while enjoined somehow to preserve collective defense in the conventional field where it matters a great deal—but less.

West Germany is commonly cited as the next likely claimant for help in achieving a national force, because she is an exposed

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and major power. No prospect arouses greater passions throughout Europe than this. Memories of two world wars counsel the opposite course, and so do apprehensions about inevitable Soviet reactions. Moreover, it is always possible that the unresolved problems of Berlin, unification, boundaries and unrest in East Germany may trigger violence whether deliberately intended by the Soviets or not; and violence can grow, especially in situations of threat and counter-threat. In view of this, should control over strategic nuclear arms be put in the hands of Germany, the area where the East-West confrontation is most direct and threatening? If the United States agreed to a German nuclear capability, it would be tacitly acknowledging that the big deterrent in its own hands is no longer sufficiently credible. Even if such a course made strategic sense, it would certainly arouse a storm of protest throughout British and Scandinavian political parties and peoples; nor would it be confined to them alone. If one wants to help the Soviets in their aim of splitting NATO, here is a way to do it.

And what about lesser powers in NATO who might find national nuclear strike forces more abhorrent or less feasible to create—even with generous help? How are they to be defended? Moreover, if we appeared to agree with the French claim that a *force de frappe* is needed for first-class status in the alliance, we would stigmatize the others. In an alliance where all the members are proud, could anything be more divisive?

III

What we are primarily concerned with here is the case where an attack restricted to Europe is so overwhelming that NATO Shield forces are crushed, and the American strategic nuclear deterrent would be needed. Would an American strategic response then be credible, assuming, as we are, that the American homeland had not been simultaneously attacked? Actually an overwhelming Soviet attack confined to Europe is one of the least likely contingencies, but it is the one that evokes the most dreaded apprehensions in Western Europe. Hence it poses the acid test for our nuclear policy.

To those who doubt the credibility of our deterrent under the circumstances described, we must first and foremost point to our pledge—that we view ourselves as part of NATO, and not apart from NATO; and our deeds back our words. Our military presence in Europe is not a mere token. An effective Soviet surprise

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attack upon West Germany would probably kill more American than German soldiers, and certainly many more Americans than Frenchmen. Our nuclear capabilities in Europe could hardly escape being brought to bear forthwith.

Of the greatest importance in assessing the credibility of an American nuclear response is the fact that we can employ the strategy of a rich nuclear power, not a poor one; and contrary to popular belief, there remains a vast difference between the two.

The difference lies not so much in the greater numbers of retaliatory instruments available to us, although the numbers matter. More important still are the facts that they are better protected and that the planning for their use and continuing control is more sophisticated. We obviously could and might launch the all-out strike that fits the usual image. This strike would be designed to minimize Soviet capabilities to retaliate, which implies that Russian civilians in large numbers would be killed as a by-product of smashing Soviet retaliatory capabilities. But in self-interest, as well as moral revulsion, we might well choose to do otherwise. What our strategic plenty gives us is the ability to choose among alternative tactics, each of which poses so formidable a threat to Soviet interests that it is a compelling deterrent even where we impose severe restraints on ourselves. Smaller and less sophisticated nuclear systems can be presented as a serious deterrent only by promising to retaliate in as blunt and bloody a manner as possible. Since "city-killing" is commonly assumed to be relatively easy, the small independent national deterrent force must be directed to that purpose. The idea of sparing cities in a full-scale general nuclear war may be considered heresy by many, but it can in fact be entertained by a big nuclear power.

Here lies the novelty of an American policy that members of NATO, above all, need to understand. At Ann Arbor on June 16, 1962, Secretary McNamara stated bluntly that "principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population."

Why spare Soviet cities in an American nuclear attack prompted by a massive attack upon Europe? The answer is as simple as it is upsetting to established patterns of strategic thought. Our ultimate deterrent power is that we hold enemy cities as hostages and the enemy knows it. The bargaining power over him

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that these hostages give us is an asset that we should be loath to throw away. We surely want to compel restraint in whatever retaliation he is capable of after our attack, and the way to compel restraint is to bring home to the enemy that most of his civilization remains hostage to us, and that it survives contingent upon his own restraint. With great and secure strategic power, we can withhold enough from an initial counter-military attack to keep his cities always under an over-riding threat.

If it be asked what restrains the Soviet Union from launching its attack on European cities at the very outset of hostilities, the answer is (a) that it is almost inconceivable that the Soviet Union would run the risk of a wholesale, indiscriminate nuclear attack on Europe without also trying to knock out the United States (in which case the whole premise of this discussion is altered); and (b) to be willing to run the risk of any attack, the Russians must look upon Western Europe as a prize to be won, not a target to be turned into rubble.

For us to leave untouched those military control facilities that are situated in cities does, of course, entail risks because it permits the enemy to retaliate; on the other hand, it may be the only way to permit enemy political leaders an opportunity to stop or restrain retaliation. We do not have to determine the relative gain or cost of this policy in advance by choosing only one retaliatory plan. But we can preserve the option to try, by adopting a policy of city-sparing, to maintain the power to deter, rather than deem deterrence wholly to have failed if nuclear war occurs. That we are serious about this element of American policy is demonstrated by the fact that we are spending billions of dollars to purchase the necessary capabilities to give it effect.

In describing this novel possibility in our nuclear policy, we had best avoid the term "counterforce." Traditionally this term has implied the all-out strike, with city destruction regarded as a bonus rather than a disadvantage. The opponents of traditional counterforce forecast dimmer and dimmer hopes that it would be effective, and because it cannot confidently be expected to be nearly 100 percent effective, they dismiss it as an acceptable strategy. But as the enemy's retaliatory capability becomes less vulnerable to the classic counterforce strategy, city-sparing becomes more important, not less so. If a nation is sure that hitting the enemy all-out will lead to intolerable retaliation, then it must aim to induce restraint in the enemy rather than to reduce his capa-

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bility. It may well choose to do so by restrained counter-military attack—even when many enemy forces are thought to be invulnerable—as the best of bad gambles in a situation that is almost by definition desperate.

The novel aspect of possible American nuclear strategies rests on the concept of what *not* to hit. The estimate of what, specifically, it *is* feasible to hit may change, although common sense suggests that no collection of military targets is likely to be composed entirely of targets that are either very difficult or very easy to destroy. At any moment of time there will be a mix. Consider the strategic retaliatory program that we know most about—the American. Now and in the foreseeable future it contains some soft, fixed elements that are expected to be vulnerable, as well as some that are hard or mobile; and no doubt it contains some elements that are not expected to be vulnerable but will unfortunately turn out to be so. Unless the enemy is in magically better shape, a city-sparing attack against him will not lack for important targets.

Given our ability to affect both the enemy's capability and his intent, it is Khrushchev, not President Kennedy, who then faces the decision whether to exercise restraint or "to commit suicide." The possibility that the Soviets might face such a paralyzing choice is itself a great deterrent to an attack upon Europe in the first place. Barring always the possibility that the Soviet leaders are blind or mad, this makes a massive attack on Europe alone exceedingly unlikely. Yet even if it happened, an American response that spared Soviet cities would offer the best remaining chance of preserving some measure of deterrence after hostilities had started. Thereby we could bring tremendous restraining influence to bear upon the Soviet government to keep the Red Army and their missiles in check in order to preserve their society.

If America supplies the best ultimate deterrent (a secure threat of unlimited retaliation), plus the last best hope, should nuclear war come, of stopping short of a holocaust (the capacity to coerce the enemy by exercising restraint in selecting targets), then Europeans more than anyone should wish to make sure that this deterrent is able to perform. But could our strategic forces fulfill their promise if concurrently a *force de frappe* were doing what it will presumably be designed to do—namely to destroy Soviet cities —while American forces are taking pains to spare them? Would Soviet political leaders then have reason to be restrained? In their

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rage and dismay would they, supposing they were still alive, have time to reason? The success of the strategy outlined above depends crucially upon tight operational control of all striking forces, designed and coördinated to supply maximum leverage to a concurrent offer of terms. The nuclear policy of NATO, both politically and militarily, requires what General de Gaulle so publicly despises—integration. A world with such terrible weapons is too small for anything else.

General war is improbable; it is also possible that some time in the future a French *force de frappe* might coöperate in NATO operations, might even have become formally integrated to ensure coördination, or might be simply inactive or ineffective. The worst situation is unlikely to arise. But where the fate of all NATO may hang in the balance, even very small probabilities need to be taken seriously. Independent nuclear operations have become anachronisms; they should be consistently opposed, not subsidized. This proposition applies as much to the British Bomber Command, of course, as to a *force de frappe*. But with the Bomber Command we have operational coöperation through the same unified target planning that coördinates our own services, and Britain's 1962 White Paper on Defense speaks no longer of a British deterrent but of a British "contribution to the Western strategic deterrent."

General de Gaulle speaks otherwise, and surely we should accord him the honor of believing that he means exactly what he says, especially when he takes such pains to be clear and is so eloquent. And we should respectfully disagree. About our nuclear aid to Britain, which is so galling to France, we can try not to exacerbate matters in the future and we can give a reasonable explanation of the past. The origins of Anglo-American coöperation are found in the shared wartime nuclear and bomber programs, and this coöperation was nurtured by the earliest postwar governments. It flourished at a time when integration in operations appeared easy and desirable, rather than hard and imperative. The Anglo-American relationship has always been reciprocal, free from the distressing spectacle of an ally conspicuously withholding needed facilities until the United States has been coerced into giving the kind of assistance demanded. Hard bargaining there undoubtedly has been, but bases in Britain have been continuously available to our airplanes, complete with nuclear storage; and more recently we have obtained the Polaris base in

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Scotland and the use of Christmas Island. For these reasons, our past aid to the Bomber Command can be rationalized as a special case. Yet continuance of special status for Britain now is undesirable. Our policy toward the United Kingdom should be made compatible with our global arms policy.

IV

The same reasons that cause the United States to oppose national deterrent forces should also constrain us from acting independently or without due regard for the interests and sensibilities of our allies. We cannot simultaneously preach Atlantic community and practice unimpaired sovereignty on life-and-death matters. To try to satisfy proud and militarily vulnerable allies with vague and secretive reassurances will increase anxiety and resentment rather than produce coöperation. We must somehow reconcile the operational need for unitary nuclear control with allied political participation and partnership.

To repeat, the most important step is the one we took a long time ago in pledging ourselves to a common defense in which, for example, a nuclear bomb on West Germany would provoke an appropriate American response no less than would a bomb on Maine. We are now taking other steps to reassure and inform our NATO allies about our defense policies and capabilities, and these could be very important. For instance, if our allies do not have sufficient data to enable them thoroughly to review and criticize in detail our strategic capabilities relative to the Soviets, they may well have doubts about Western superiority. If they are to trust one globally integrated force as the ultimate custodian of their interests, they surely are entitled to know that it is ample and securely protected.

Yet even this minimum of reassurance involves providing information not only about what we have but about what our intelligence says the Soviets have, as well as estimates about how Soviet forces might be used most effectively against the West. Such information is not to be given lightly, even with appropriate security safeguards; but to give it would fulfill a deep political obligation. Our allies are also entitled to be convinced that we are not skimping in our strategic budget at their expense—for example, by failing to cover a known Soviet medium-range missile site in our target planning while we do cover a known intercontinental missile site. Such information is still more delicate, but

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even worse from a security officer's point of view is the fact that our allies ought to know and influence the general outlines of our plans for various contingencies, so that the intellectual core of our policies is as reassuring to them as knowledge of our capabilities will be.

How much is being done about sharing such information is not known publicly, but the communiqué after the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens last spring indicated that progress has been made. Secretary McNamara's policy statement last June at Ann Arbor is explicit: "We want and need a greater degree of alliance participation in formulating nuclear weapons policy to the greatest extent possible." The United States has shared knowledge with its partners about the "what" and "how" of our nuclear power, and is open to counsel about the "when."

At this point arises the dilemma: each ally desires to possess both a trigger and a safety catch, while denying them to other allies for fear that strategic power either will be too loosely controlled or will be paralyzed by multiple vetoes. Perhaps this dilemma is best resolved along the lines apparently now being attempted—that is, to avoid diffusion of physical control but to try to achieve a consensus about the general circumstances in which nuclear weapons will be employed. A foreign critic may find the United States cast here in the role of an overbearing secretary of a committee who jealously guards his prerogative to write what the "sense of the meeting" is. Nevertheless, the United States is serious about these consultations, for it knows that the issues matter deeply to all. Even where a full consensus in NATO cannot be achieved, participation in the search for the greatest possible measure of agreement should satisfy some national desires and clarify matters for all.

An "Atlantic deterrent" requires no less than this, but does it require more? If more is needed beyond shared understanding and the fullest political consultation possible, actual physical participation by our allies is possible, even in the most sensitive area of all—command and control. A component of the Atlantic deterrent could be European, and could be organized as a symbol of unity in the West. Any one of many alternatives is possible for this component in terms of various combinations of bases and delivery vehicles. One combination was suggested by President Kennedy in May of 1961 when he spoke at Ottawa about "the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO sea-borne missile

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force which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies once NATO's non-nuclear goals have been achieved."

Clearly this suggestion is conditional, as it should be. The West does not need such a force for any over-riding military reason, and the test of its need should be European enthusiasm. If the members of NATO are satisfied with new assurances and a greater political voice in nuclear strategy, so much the better. Or if, even though dissatisfied, they disagree more than they agree about further steps, it is only prudent for us to push for measures that breed more discord than harmony. But if there are deep-seated pressures in Europe for a nuclear force that is not wholly American, President Kennedy has suggested a way to meet them. Though necessarily cautious, the American offer is unprecedented, and Europeans need only agree among themselves in order to give it effect.

Unlike a *force de frappe,* such a force would symbolize interdependence rather than national dependence, especially if the meaning of "truly multilateral" were made clear. A sea-borne force could be made international in ownership and operation, perhaps down to and including mixed ship crews of different nationalities, so that not even one ship with its missiles could revert as an operable force to any nation in time of crisis or internal unrest. People worry little today about "Ultras" gaining the power to unleash SAC or the British Bomber Command. But if the number of national nuclear forces grows large, the specter of irresponsible action cannot be ignored, any more than can the heightened risks of accidental and catalytic war. If there is to be an increase in the number of nuclear powers, better a safeguarded collective addition than many national ones.

It is even possible that the creation of a European force could lessen the number of nuclear powers rather than increase it. Today Great Britain has V-Bombers, and in 1963 France will have some Mirage IV fighter-bombers. On the other hand, the Bluestreak missile has been cancelled and the British speak only of prolonging the life of the V-Bombers for a few years with air-to-surface missiles. What then follows? France says that she will have an operational missile force before the decade is out, but even so, this is some years away. Perhaps French governments will persevere in seeking missiles of their own, perhaps not. Surely their future choices will not be made wholly without regard for costs

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and available alternatives. Is it beyond the ingenuity of such experienced powers as France and Great Britain to devise a political compromise in terms of a NATO deterrent acceptable to all, while they gracefully phase out outmoded airplane forces?

If they try, the awkward question will, of course, be that of control, and here we are back to the multiple-trigger and safety-catch dilemma. The problem of control over the firing of missiles of a multilateral force is so difficult that many find it insoluble. Yet it can be solved, if necessary. What most worries some Europeans is that there might be no American nuclear response after a Soviet attack on Europe that had overwhelmed its non-nuclear defenses. If, to meet this contingency, we let a multilateral NATO force be designed to ensure European control over some nuclear response, we give them a trigger for the case where we already expect to respond. Consequently we give nothing away *if* the nature of their response fits our global operations. This vital proviso can be observed by keeping the missiles of the European force aimed at key vulnerable Soviet military installations. These installations are almost certain to be included among the targets we select—unlike the less vulnerable military targets that we may not be able to hit and the very vulnerable population centers that we may not want to hit. So the requirements for integrated operations can be met, although doubtless far more complex variants for targeting and other operational aspects would be required than this crude illustration may suggest.

The political essentials are more troublesome. Assured response implies that the North Atlantic Council will give advance authorization to the commander of a multilateral force to retaliate against an overwhelming Soviet attack, for time will not permit consultation then and the enemy must not be allowed to expect that the most reluctant among 15 nations would prevent retaliation. Do Europeans really want control made so grimly explicit, so entirely automatic, that there is no place for subsequent political judgment and restraint? If they do not, their public admission of the fact will help to clarify their own parliamentary debates. If they shrink from automatic response in the worst case of Soviet attack, what are national deterrents credible against?

Debate of these matters in NATO should also be illuminating, for the more restrictions our allies want to place on any nuclear response, the more they must admit the utility of non-nuclear alternatives to meet Soviet challenges. Facing the issue will be

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unpleasant but educational. Probably restraints upon any automatic response that NATO might authorize will be severe, which is right. But the restraints cannot be so severe that extinction of our top political echelons can promise immunity to the Soviets. What could safely be allowed (although it should be left to the Europeans to advocate) would be an advance firing authorization that precludes response based either upon fallible radar warning systems or too sweeping military autonomy, but does ensure against paralysis of the NATO multilateral force by any single one of 15 nations.

Constructive alternatives to a proliferation of national nuclear forces are thus possible for NATO; they include a militarily meaningful NATO deterrent, if it be necessary to go this far. The United States has made these alternatives available, perhaps not fully, clearly or consistently, but none the less publicly, and at the cost of renouncing any narrow interpretation of purely national interests. We have a policy, and it is a good one. Now is not the time to abandon that policy to please France. The task is to improve and solidify it as we move toward greater Atlantic partnership.

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ATLANTICA

By Christian A. Herter

IT is interesting that, with very few exceptions, even the most enthusiastic supporters of the idea of an Atlantic Community have not clearly defined what nations are embraced within it; nor have they been willing to commit themselves to what they believe might be its best form of political organization. As of this moment, it seems to me both natural and prudent to avoid a dogmatic approach to both questions. However, I believe agreement on certain principles is now possible; and I am convinced that in a comparatively short period of time specifics may be possible as well. A discussion now of both principles and possible alternative solutions is therefore desirable. Whether the eventual answers will evolve from the quiet type of leadership shown by Jean Monnet in his highly successful sponsorship of the European Economic Community, or through a wider discussion, with public pressures forcing decisions, it is impossible to foretell.

With regard to the principles which should govern the organization of the Atlantic Community, it seems to me that the following are essential. First, the Community should comprise those nations of Europe and North America which are willing to accept the benefits and responsibilities of maintaining close political ties. Second, these political ties and the instrumentalities for making them effective should be minimal in character, yet should be strong enough to act as a cement in holding together and giving a degree of permanence to the economic and military agreements which may be reached. Third, the formation of an Atlantic Community should in no way preclude a closer political affiliation of all the free nations, and indeed should open the way toward it. It should not take on the aspect of an exclusive society of rich industrial nations, but should be so framed as to be of maximum benefit for nations in Asia, Africa, and South and Central America which desire to see a more closely knit international society based on common principles. The nations of Latin America have every reason for close association with the Atlantic Community, or even membership in it, for their heritage is Western and the Organization of American States is based on the same principles as NATO. Fourth, the Community should present a common front against Communist aggression; and while it should preserve all those ele-

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ments of diversity which enrich a free society, its members should nevertheless be in substantial agreement with regard to such principles as the dignity of the individual man, the role of the government as a servant of the people rather than their master, and the respect for an accepted body of law to regulate international disputes that might lead to serious tensions or war.

The Treaty of Rome, signed in March 1957 and in force by January 1958, brought into being the European Economic Community, consisting of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Its sponsors envisaged specific political agreements which would make of the new Community a strong political entity. It is not yet clear how many of the nations of Europe will become full adherents to the E.E.C., nor just how far it will advance toward political unity. However, it has in existence institutions directed toward the determination of economic questions which might well be broadened so as to be suitable for dealing with a limited number of political questions. In accordance with Western democratic traditions, these institutions parallel the political institutions of most democratic nations in providing for an executive, a legislative and a judicial component. Just how the respective weight of each nation in the Council may be changed by the adherence of new nations is still problematical. At present, the legislative branch is created through the selection of legislators by the national parliaments, much as Senators used to be selected in the United States by state legislatures. The Treaty of Rome, however, provides that at an unspecified future time they will be elected by direct suffrage in the six states acting as a unity. The legislative body, the Assembly, can ask for and receive reports from the executive, discuss those reports and make such recommendations as it sees fit.

Talks with European political leaders and others who have studied the problem of how to achieve greater unity have shown me that the great majority feel that Europe must settle its own political integration before discussing with Canada and the United States the specific constitutional character of any greater Atlantic Community. They all recognize that as Canada and the United States are members of NATO (with the United States obviously playing the leading role in that military alliance), they are already committed in large measure to assuring the military security of Europe; they nevertheless feel that the political relationship of these two countries of North America to Europe (out-

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side of the military alliance) should not be discussed until the principal European nations have themselves integrated to a point where they can speak to that question with a single voice. The same is true in the economic field, even though the terms of their trading partnership will have to be defined at once, regardless of what form the eventual economic association of North America and Europe may take. Canada and the United States are both members of the O.E.C.D., but that body's power is generally limited to making recommendations.

The feelings of the Europeans in this respect are quite understandable. They think that as a unit they will be in a position to negotiate with the North American countries on a basis of equality, and that in such a manner a much more lasting type of partnership can probably be achieved. I believe the present Administration in the United States holds the same view, which has come to be termed the "dumbbell" concept—meaning that an economic or political alliance is stronger if it has been agreed to by partners of equal weight on each side.

It is my own belief that the integration of Europe and discussions for the formulation of a true Atlantic Community can proceed along almost parallel lines.

Should the present efforts toward political integration in Europe become stalled, a new appraisal would of course be required. At present, the danger of this happening lies in the very real differences now existing within the E.E.C. itself. General de Gaulle has made clear that he will support only what he calls the *Union des Patries,* which presumably means a loose type of confederation in which each nation remains completely sovereign and there is no recognition of the right of any supra-national body to make binding determinations by a weighted vote. There is some support for this position in Germany and Italy, and there surely will be in Britain if it joins the E.E.C.; but it is not in line with Chancellor Adenauer's basic policy and is opposed by the Benelux countries, which believe that a stronger federalism is essential.

Just what the eventual position of France will be in this respect is difficult to predict, but it is interesting to note that in May 1962 five members of de Gaulle's cabinet resigned because of their disagreement with him on this specific issue. In addition, when the French Foreign Minister presented to the National Assembly an outline of France's foreign policy in June 1962, the government then refused to permit a vote of either approbation or cen-

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sure. Thereupon almost one-half of the members of the legislature walked out. That walkout has been generally interpreted as representing a widespread legislative disagreement with President de Gaulle on the matter of closer European political unity.

Since Canada is our largest trading partner, her relationship to the whole problem of an Atlantic Community is of very real importance to the United States. The recent elections have thrown little light on Canadian thinking on this subject. It is my hope, however, that nationalist sentiment in Canada, which in recent years has often found expression in strong currents of anti-U.S. feeling, will not prevent our two countries from reaching substantial agreement with regard to the role which we can best play together in the development of an Atlantic Community.

A similarly difficult point arises with respect to Japan, which must be convinced that the development of an Atlantic Community will not affect adversely her legitimate hopes of being included in such trade arrangements as may eventually evolve from negotiations between the members of the Common Market and the United States.

It is absolutely essential that we make clear to the less developed areas of the world how valuable closer unity among the industrial nations of the Atlantic Community can be to them. They will be hearing, as they have already heard, continuing attacks by the Communist powers on the Common Market and on the countries of the Atlantic Community, just as 15 years ago Stalin was inveighing against the Marshall Plan. While it is often said that we are oversensitive to the opinion of small nations with negligible influence, their opinion in this kind of matter cannot be ignored, supposing it were to be based on discriminatory actions by the Atlantic Community toward them. This is a real danger.

On the other hand, if our negotiations with the Common Market should be successful, and if an Atlantic Community is created, this development should prove of tremendous assistance to other nations. However one may define an Atlantic Community, it cannot become an exclusive organization. Political and military factors may, indeed must, draw the Atlantic nations closer together in order to increase their own strength and their own well-being; but they must not become a means of economic pressure, deliberate or involuntary, on weaker nations. The Atlantic Community must be so constituted that its own increasing trade and prosperity will be reflected in reciprocal benefits for all the less devel-

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oped nations of the world, not alone in enlarged assistance but also in the even more important field of increased trade. I cannot emphasize too strongly how important this consideration must be for us in our own negotiations with the Common Market.

Support for the United Nations remains an axiom of American foreign policy, and this is backed by a very strong body of public opinion. For this reason, the public reaction in this country to the idea of a closely knit Atlantic Community will hinge in considerable measure on whether the American people feel that the development of such a regional community might injure the world body's effectiveness. In my view, there ought not to be any basic conflict of interest on policy.

Actually, I think, an honest appraisal of the role of the United Nations in world affairs would indicate a growing skepticism on the part of the American public as to whether it can fulfill all the high hopes held out for it in 1945. This skepticism seems to me justified. The structure of the United Nations as first created presupposed that the nations then identified as the great powers—the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China—would continue to live in sufficient harmony to be able to maintain peace, and that they would act collectively in requiring the smaller nations to observe certain standards of international conduct. The Charter gave to these five powers special rights, including the veto power in the Security Council which was given the principal responsibility for the maintenance of peace. This concept was shattered at an early stage when Soviet Russia began exercising its power of veto in a manner that vitiated any constructive efforts of the Security Council; and within five years the China sitting in the Security Council had control only of Taiwan and a few smaller islands, while a separate Communist government controlled the whole mainland of China. These two factors led to placing a greater and greater reliance for effective action upon the General Assembly.

This second body, in which every nation admitted to membership in the United Nations has an equal vote, with no consideration of geographic, economic or population differences between them, has changed its character completely in 17 years. During that period the number of member nations has more than doubled, and blocs within the membership, such as the Afro-Asian group, now on occasion can exercise a controlling vote, or at least can prevent the Assembly from deciding any matter of substance

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for which a two-thirds majority is required. Although they rarely speak with one voice, the less developed nations of the world have the ability, with the help of the Communist votes that are generally available, to force through resolutions when they see fit regardless of the views of the much stronger nations in the Atlantic Community group from whom the principal financing for United Nations activities comes. As a result, resolutions are adopted by the Assembly which are ignored in some instances by the countries most affected by them.

The experiences of the United Nations in Korea, Suez and the Congo show that effective action involving large commitments and large financial expenditures is at best a hazardous undertaking, and that these operations in particular would have been impossible if it had not been for the staunch backing of the United States. It is interesting to note that while in 1960 the General Assembly voted unanimously (70–0) for military action in the Congo, by July 1962 only 19 nations had paid their share of the assessments to carry on the operation. Over 50 have paid nothing at all. This record inevitably creates a degree of skepticism as to just how effective a role the United Nations can play.

Nevertheless, the United Nations provides the only forum in which free discussion of international problems affecting every area of the world can take place. It is still the greatest safeguard for maintaining the independence of the newly created and insecure nations which make up so large a part of its membership. It is still playing an extremely important role through its specialized agencies in such fields as technical assistance, public health, child welfare, education and the care of refugees.

The development of a strong Atlantic Community need not be in conflict with the United Nations, nor should the less developed nations view it with anxiety. The fact is that the development of the Atlantic Community into a closely knit group might well strengthen the existing machinery for the maintenance of peace. I think this is coming to be recognized by the American people.

I am quite clear in my own mind that the development of a true Atlantic Community must come through a process of evolution. As a prerequisite, there must be agreements with regard to the use of nuclear power and the respective roles of the European nations and the United States in the over-all military field. In addition, the trade partnership with Europe envisaged in the Administration's trade policy must advance substantially beyond

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where it now stands before common political institutional mechanisms can usefully be discussed. Throughout, however, the long-term objective must constantly be kept in mind. I am convinced that neither military alliances nor trade partnerships can of themselves be enduring without the essential cement of political institutions. Yet I am equally convinced that the former are prerequisites for the formulation of the latter. There are those who feel that there should be a reversal in this order of priority, and that we should be working to assure political unity at once, on the theory that the military and economic problems are more likely to fall into place if a federal mechanism is first set up. With these views I disagree.

Timing is of primary importance. The urgency of moving ahead is insufficiently appreciated, particularly in this country. To be sure, the danger exists that the whole concept of a true Atlantic Community could be wrecked by pushing too fast while the integrating processes are still under way within Europe itself, while our trade partnership with that integrated movement is under discussion and while we are still searching for a solution of the problem of nuclear sharing. Yet creation of a true Atlantic Community within the next decade is a realistic and attainable goal. While so many matters hang in the balance, it seems a somewhat futile exercise to try to work out an exact timetable. At the same time, unless there is a consensus that early action is desirable, the sense of urgency may well be lost and the present momentum may be checked.

With respect to the specific steps to be taken now, there obviously can be differences of opinion. I personally favor four lines of action, although I hesitate to say that they alone provide the full answer.[1]

The first recommendation is that the governments of the NATO nations be asked to appoint at the earliest practical moment a special governmental commission charged with the responsibility of drawing up plans for the creation of a true Atlantic Community, suitably organized to meet the challenges of this era. I recognize that proposals for governmental action which such a committee might make could well take some time to work out. That is all the more reason for getting started without delay.

Second, I favor the creation, as an indispensable feature of a

[1] These proposals were among the recommendations of the NATO Citizens' Convention, held in Paris in January 1962, of which I had the honor of being elected Chairman.

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true Atlantic Community, of a permanent High Council at the highest political level, to concert and plan, and in agreed cases to decide policy on matters of concern to the Community as a whole. Pending the establishment of this Council, the North Atlantic Council should be strengthened through the delegation of additional responsibilities. The precise make-up and character of the High Council could be left to negotiation, but the purpose is quite clear. It is to try to create a decision-making body which could resolve a number of knotty and long unsettled problems, especially the military problems revolving around the sharing or usage of nuclear military capabilities as well as the degree of conventional military strength which should be maintained by NATO.

Establishment of a High Council would enable the Atlantic nations to confront together those great issues which touch their vital interests. The controversial question of sovereignty would fall into perspective. The words of Sir Winston Churchill, in his historic plea for European unity at The Hague in 1948, apply as well to the choice before the Atlantic nations today:

> It is impossible to separate economics and defence from the general political structure. Mutual aid in the economic field and joint military defence must inevitably be accompanied step by step with a parallel policy of closer political unity. It is said with truth that this involves some sacrifice or merger of national sovereignty. But it is also possible and not less agreeable to regard it as the gradual assumption by all the nations concerned of that larger sovereignty which can alone protect their diverse and distinctive customs and characteristics and their national traditions all of which under totalitarian systems, whether Nazi, Fascist, or Communist, would certainly be blotted out for ever.[2]

Third, the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference should be given additional functions, as a consultative assembly (possibly embracing both NATO and the O.E.C.D.), without specific additional powers. That body is the creation of the legislatures of the NATO states, which send delegations drawn from their own membership to periodical meetings. There they discuss NATO's problems and its future and often make recommendations to the NATO Council or to the member governments. But the Conference is not now a part of the formal institutional structure of NATO. Whereas in Europe each successive step in the setting up of European machinery has been accompanied by the creation of some form of European legislative assembly, to act as a forum for

[2] Winston Churchill, "The Grand Design," a speech at the Congress of Europe, May 7, 1948 (London: United Europe Movement, 1948).

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open discussion of policies as well as to exercise a watchdog function, no such body is in existence with respect to NATO or O.E.C.D. or any other Atlantic Community mechanisms which might be established. This recommendation obviously needs to be spelled out, particularly with respect to additional membership where the O.E.C.D. is concerned.

My fourth recommendation is for the establishment of an Atlantic High Court of Justice, to decide specified legal controversies which may arise under the treaties. This step, of course, would have to await the adoption of specific agreements or treaties, since the Court's competence would have to be limited to the resolution of differences arising from the interpretation of those agreements.

All of these recommendations, with the exception of the first, follow more or less the accepted pattern of executive, legislative and judicial components, with the respective roles none too clearly spelled out. The third one, however, is worth some added comment. The role of the proposed consultative assembly follows the pattern of those already set up in the European institutions, and while no powers are presently recommended for that body, it none the less is important to note the historical development of parliamentary influence and responsibilities, as described by Woodrow Wilson many years ago in his book on constitutional government in the United States:

> We speak now always of "legislatures," of "law-making" assemblies, are very impatient of prolonged debates, and sneer at parliamentary bodies which cannot get their "business" done. We join with laughing zest in Mr. Carlyle's bitter gibe at "talking shops," at parliaments which spend their days in endless discussion rather than in diligent prosecution of what they came together to "do." And yet to hold such an attitude toward representative assemblies is utterly to forget their history and their first and capital purpose. They were meant to be talking shops. The name "parliament" is no accidental indication of their function. They were meant to be grand parleys with those who were conducting the country's business: parleys concerning laws, concerning administrative acts, concerning policies and plans at home and abroad, in order that nothing which contravened the common understanding should be let pass without comment or stricture, in order that measures should be insisted on which the nation needed, and measures resisted which the nation did not need or might take harm from. Their purpose was watchful criticism, talk that should bring to light the whole intention of the government and apprise those who conducted it of the real feeling and desire of the nation; and how well they performed that function many an uneasy monarch has testified, alike by word and act.
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> It was as far as possible from the original purpose of representative assem-

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blies that they should *conduct* government. . . . Their function was common counsel; their standard of action the ancient understandings of a constitutional system,—a system based on understandings, written or implicit in the experiences and principles of English life. They were expected to give their assent where those understandings were served, and to withhold it where they were disregarded. They were to voice the conscience of the nation in the presence of government and the exercise of authority.[3]

There is no doubt that an Atlantic Assembly, even though it were limited to talk and deliberation, without impinging on the power of decision resting with the individual nations, would have a vital role to play in giving common counsel and in voicing the conscience of the Atlantic Community.

Any discussion in this country of the concept of a true Atlantic Community must of necessity venture into the highly speculative field of assessing American public opinion. Will it act as a drag on governmental moves in that direction, or as a goad to action? One cannot be sure, but certainly there has been a remarkable awakening of public interest in the subject.

Some 18 months ago, little attention had been given in this country to the European Common Market and to its far-reaching implications. It was not until Great Britain applied for entry that we began to awaken to the fact that the movement toward European integration had progressed much faster than we had expected. Suddenly a great stir of interest was aroused in civic groups, in colleges and in high schools throughout the United States. The E.E.C. became the leading topic for discussion. The President's recommendation to the Congress with regard to a new foreign trade policy heightened this interest and brought home to the American people that what was happening in Europe had a direct bearing on our own economic and political future.

It is often said that public opinion moves ahead of official opinion in a matter of this kind. Obviously an assessment of opinion can be only conjecture until actual votes are counted in legislative halls. However, it is heartening in this regard to note the tremendous vote which carried such an advanced piece of legislation as the new Trade Expansion Act through both branches of the Congress. That was, in effect, a reflection of American public opinion. In the testimony given before the Congress, the voices in favor of greater protection and in opposition to the legislation filled many more pages of recorded testimony than did the voices

[3] Woodrow Wilson, "Constitutional Government in the United States." New York: Columbia University Press, 1908, p. 10–12.

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of those who favored the legislation. However, the views of important individuals and important segments of the press, radio and television came from all corners of the country to give this legislation strong support. The trade bill itself was limited to negotiation with the Common Market and other nations in order to achieve a higher level of trade; but in my view there was no illusion as to what the vote on this measure meant. It was a definite vote in favor of what President Kennedy declared to be an interdependent relationship between the United States and an integrated Western Europe, a partner "strong enough to share with us the responsibilities and initiatives of the free world."

The development of a trade partnership between the United States and the Common Market will not be easy to achieve, nor if it is achieved will we be able to hold our own competitive position without increased effort. We will have to bring under control the continuing spiral of increased prices, and this means greater responsibility of labor unions in their demands for higher wages which, unless geared to a corresponding increase in productivity of labor, can only lead to continually higher prices. The business community must likewise gear itself to increased competition. We shall have to use all of our ingenuity and powers of innovation in order to take full advantage of the technological improvements of which we are capable. Somewhat painful adjustments are inevitable. No matter how effective may be the adjustment assistance which Congress has provided in the current trade legislation, we must be prepared none the less for a certain degree of sacrifice.

In the evolutionary process which I envisage, the Congress of the United States will inevitably have to play an important and, in fact, a controlling role. In the economic field, the two branches of the Congress alone can give to the President the powers to negotiate agreements. In the political field, the President can act only to a limited extent since binding commitments of true importance must be made by our constitutional treaty-making process and not by executive agreements. This means the assent of two-thirds of the Senate of the United States to whatever treaty or treaties the President might propose. This in turn means a very considerable measure of public acceptance, since inevitably individual Senators are greatly influenced by public reaction. Hence the very great importance of public understanding of the point in history at which our nation finds itself, and of the direction in which we must go.

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A MARRIAGE OF INCONVENIENCE

By Lionel Gelber

EUROPE and America are like a married couple who cannot live happily together yet cannot live apart. Their marriage, so far as it derives from mutual interest rather than a romantic attachment, might, in the old days, have been described as a marriage of convenience. A marriage of inconvenience would, however, be a more apt description of a union in which partners who are incompatible in many respects yet are welded indissolubly together. It is comforting that wedded bliss is not conspicuous in the Sino-Soviet household. There is solace in the fact, too, that when the West is challenged from without, domestic friction diminishes. But it is not only against a chronic threat from the East that it has had to close ranks. There are new developments within the West, and as it tries to adjust itself to these it may be thrown into a vexatious disarray.

Two of the recent stages in the marriage of Europe and America are familiar enough: Europe spurned by America between the wars; America striving so bountifully after World War II to bring Europe back to life. But now another stage has been reached. Europe, having been restored, feels less dependent on America than before; separation if not divorce from its consort is in the air. Will the European independence that America itself fostered go too far? Further, is the new relationship more likely than the old to drag everybody into nuclear war? Independence at what price? That is, for both Europe and America, one of the great unanswered questions.

To check the disruptive and stress the cohesive—such is the task confronting the United States as leader of the West. President Kennedy, borrowing a theme from Eisenhower and Macmillan, has therefore suggested a Declaration of Interdependence. When, moreover, he remarked on July 4 that the United States will be ready to discuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, he also envisaged it as not only fortifying the defense of the free world but as looking outward to coöperate with all nations in meeting their common concerns. He did not add that an inward-looking Europe might aggravate rather than allay current perplexities. But it well might.

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II

Defense may not be the sole realm in which the destiny of free nations is decided, but unless they prevail there, others will. Isolationists and appeasers yesterday, pacifists and neutralists today, have been reluctant to admit this basic truth; but it is not by evading the realities of power that free societies can perpetuate themselves. In how good a position is Europe now to fend for itself? Will it be more able than it has been to set the terms for Atlantic interdependence? Peace-keeping in the postwar world has been mainly the duty of the United States. To what extent will a unified Europe be prepared to take this duty over?

How is peace kept? There would have been no major wars if the one over-riding aim of the Atlantic peoples had not been, at turning points in the twentieth century, the preservation of a free world order. In World War I that free world order could still best be preserved by maintaining the balance of power in Europe. But since Pearl Harbor, the area of wartime conflict has been enlarged, and since World War II so has the scope of peacetime competition. Peace has been maintained by a global balance of power underwritten for the West by the United States. Europe, while still a most crucial sector, is but one among others. During the nineteenth century the *Pax Britannica* profited from Britain's world-wide command of the seas and a favorable balance of power in Europe. Now in the second half of this century, however, Europeans have not been able to uphold by themselves the European segment of a global equilibrium. That is why a North American presence in NATO Europe has served as more than a symbol and supplement. What makes it so formidable is the fact that it is part of a global power structure of which the nuclear sea and air power of the United States is the world-wide prop.

That, moreover, is not the whole story. Although nobody in the nuclear missile age can win a major war with arms, the free world without arms would lose its freedom. Peace by power is thus still the watchword for the West. But as East and West deter each other in the military sphere, they vie all the harder with each other in the non-military sphere. Furthermore, the distribution of power between the rival camps has not merely brought forth an East-West equilibrium. Interior forces within each camp get from it a certain latitude for asserting themselves. Where would a unified Europe be, where would Adenauer or de Gaulle be, without it? Where would be those in Britain who have equated Soviet

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offensive missiles in Cuba with NATO missile bases? Where would its Afro-Asian critics and detractors be?

The neutralists might have been courted less assiduously if so much of the struggle between the antagonistic concepts of world order, the free one and the Communist one, had not shifted to the non-military sphere. As it is, some of the relatively powerless states acquire a chance to speak as though they possessed substantial power. And within the West itself a redistribution of power is rendered feasible by global power guarantees to which the United States still contributes most. Nor is the East untouched by change. Russia and China have been reshuffling their cards, and the manner in which they adapt themselves to each other must also impinge profoundly on the prospects of the West, just as will the manner in which Europe and America adapt themselves to any Atlantic redistribution of power.

III

The command of the deterrent is above all in dispute. Can Europe be embroiled without America or can America be embroiled without Europe? They cannot. Such immunity is ruled out by war plans; by modern war technology; by the world-wide range of the East-West contest itself; by a strategic interlock; by the fact that an adversary will regard the defense system of the West as a single mechanism and mount his assaults accordingly. Europe cannot remove itself from the line of fire simply by reconstructing its economy; to do that it would have to contract out of its alliance with America and submit to Moscow. The degree to which the allies of the United States were meshed with it in a strategic interlock was what worried them during the Korean War and subsequent events in the Far East. They began to fear that those in charge of American policy might become trigger-happy. Now some Europeans nourish the opposite fear; they wonder whether the United States will expose itself to nuclear retaliation on their behalf. Perhaps it is in Bonn and Paris that the trigger-happy may now be found.

Is it really likely that in a European emergency the United States would do too little rather than too much? Britain did not wish to be "caught short," and that was one of her motives when she built her own deterrent; but she did so in coördination with the United States. The French may protract their "sit-down strike" in NATO until they extract from the United States the

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same sort of nuclear information to use in building their own deterrent as Britain has been getting. And it may be imprudent for the United States to withhold this nuclear information from them much longer. But the French themselves cannot tell what kind of a régime it will be to which they ask that the United States entrust nuclear secrets, so vital for the defense of the West. With their flair for invoking reason to mask unreason, they demand that the United States and Britain have more faith in them than they, before, during and since Vichy, have had in each other. In a unified Europe the French may or may not share the direction of their nuclear deterrent with others. It can be a vehicle not only for achieving equality for Western Europe but for ensuring their own preëminence in Western Europe. The budgetary costs for France will, however, be astronomical. And, if Europeans beggar themselves to attain a full complement of nuclear arms, it might well be that they could not attain parity in other respects.

Europe and America are bound to argue over these differing estimates of future contingencies so long as the East-West contest lasts. In dispute is whether a unified Europe, regional in ambit, should have equal access to the levers of a global power apparatus that, among the nations of the West, only the United States has had the means to create and keep up. There may be no room on the trigger for more than one finger. What if there is more than one trigger?

There might, in fact, be more than one trigger if there is a European deterrent which is not coördinated with the over-all American deterrent. An alternative would be to assign the European deterrent to NATO where it could, perhaps, be run by Europeans and Americans together. If a NATO deterrent was so coördinated with the over-all American deterrent, the United States could still exercise ultimate control over the nuclear defense of the West. But if it was not so coördinated, how safe would be the West as a whole? It is of course possible that in time a unified Europe may discover how its demand for equality of status can be reconciled with its supreme need to avert any fateful mismanagement of the strategic interlock. That discovery is not in sight.

As for uncertainty about the American course, there should be less of this after the latest phase of the Cuban crisis. More uncertain are the influences to which, as a nuclear equal, a unified Europe might be subjected. The all-encompassing range of the East-West contest itself would remain, at any rate, a potent

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compulsion for the United States to act. Western Europe has from the outset been the chief prize of that world contest. If the Communist East were to acquire sway over Western Europe—with its human resources, its physical plant, its central strategic position—the global balance of power would shift irretrievably against the United States. Europeans might recall that during World Wars I and II Europe was nearly lost before the United States came to the rescue. American leadership and the present global balance of power are not alone in having altered all that; the very nature of nuclear weapons themselves has altered it also. To be held, Europe must be held now.

Twice, in a phrase more prescient than Canning himself could appreciate, the New World has been called into existence to redress the balance of the Old. Now the New World has called the Old World into existence to redress a balance that extends to the limits of the earth. No reversal of roles could be operationally more significant, and it is in this light that Europeans must assess it.

How, it will be asked, is the European sector of that global balance still to be held? There may be less and less need for American air bases overseas as intercontinental missiles pile up and as Polaris submarines, invulnerable with their second-strike capacity, are deployed around the Sino-Soviet imperium. However, the American presence in Europe is a special case, since in addition to being part of the over-all deterrent it has a specific local purpose. That is why, though there is bickering across the Atlantic as to how best to man the ramparts in Europe, an American withdrawal from Europe is not in the cards. For the United States voluntarily to leave Europe in the lurch would be against the American national interest.

But there are other interests involved. An East-West arms agreement might become impossible if the Western powers were to disregard the prohibition on nuclear arms for Germany. To enforce this ban, Russia, with the wholehearted support of her own East European captive states, will do her utmost. A NATO nuclear deterrent would have the advantage in the view of the West Germans of permitting them to participate in decisions over the use of the deterrent; and, secondly, it would enable them to avoid making a choice between Paris and Washington prematurely. If, however, such a choice has to be made, and if the upshot is a European rather than a NATO deterrent, the West Germans will be able to work chiefly through Paris, while Paris,

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having an eye to the European hegemony of France, will be glad to work chiefly with them.

The conclusion of all this is that no one can escape from the strategic interlock and that the United States will cease to be the sole manager of that interlock if there comes into existence a European deterrent which by the reprisals it would invite can set the American deterrent in motion. It is not only in the West, of course, that nuclear controls will, for weal or woe, be decentralized. Decentralization in the East could make things as difficult for Russia as decentralization in the West does for the United States. The omens for getting Communist China to sign a nuclear arms agreement will be no better than the omens for getting France to sign one—at any rate until the political ends of the Chinese and the French respectively have been attained. And it is unlikely that a world in which their political ends have been attained will be more secure.

IV

Time has thus brought another of its strange revenges. Two antithetical theories impel the organizers of a unified Europe, and in both they may be ill-advised. They contend that, in the long run, they cannot count on the United States; conversely they are tempted to believe that, in the short run, whatever they do the United States is bound to back them up. But it is so bound and it isn't. A unified Europe would suffer if it drove the United States in upon itself. Europeans should remember that the American political system is not geared for the kind of leadership that the United States has of necessity had to exercise since the last war, and that there are elements in it which would be glad to take advantage of opportunities to diminish the burdens of that leadership. The United States, to be sure, might have done even better. It is a miracle that, with key elements in the Congress hankering for a protectionist and isolationist past, it has done so well.

Meanwhile, in any attempt to form a concrete Atlantic partnership attention will be centered on its economic rather than its strategic features. When the Common Market comes to negotiate lower tariffs with the Kennedy Administration it will boggle at the "Buy American" act; escape clauses will not escape attention; Europe will ask that discriminatory taxation and unfair customs practices be abolished. But in return Washington can remind Europeans that a disproportionate American expenditure

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on foreign aid and overseas defense has heavily contributed to a balance-of-payments deficit and the drastic outflow of gold. And now, after further Russian triumphs in space, the United States may feel it must spend more on the race to the moon. Can the United States whittle down its military expenditures in Europe and its aid to the underdeveloped countries without asking that a bigger share be shouldered by flourishing European beneficiaries? If they insist upon equality of status, NATO costs might be a test case. Equal is as equal does.

On both sides of the Atlantic the broadest perspectives will be required. Washington has often been highhanded, but Europeans must remember that American blunders do not erase from the record those greater European misjudgments that brought the United States, at once so brash and so reluctant, to the fore. Have American booms not been permanent? Far from eternal is the European boom. A recent American setback may tempt Europeans, not without a hint of malicious glee, to cut their own American benefactor down to size; but, unless the European stake in American prosperity has evaporated, any such vindictiveness would be self-frustrating. Jeshurun having waxed fat may kick, but care must be taken lest he also injure himself. The way in which the United States exercises the leadership of the West may not always be predictable. But as Americans try to imagine what a unified Europe will be like and how it will behave in the mooted Atlantic partnership they encounter many unknowns also.

It may be a more highly integrated Europe than most Europeans themselves yet realize. Resting upon a customs union and an economic union, the new European edifice is to be rounded out by a political union. And that is not surprising, since the modern politico-economy is not separated into watertight compartments. What happens where barriers still constrict? Quite pragmatically, and without resort to doctrine, the state's powers to integrate may come into play. If state powers are needed to get things done across the length and breadth of Western Europe, then a larger statehood may, under one label or another, swallow up component states.

And this is why European federalists can wait with comparative serenity for President de Gaulle to vanish from the scene. A union of states such as he has proposed may not long withstand the pressure for closer integration that a unified Europe must generate of its own accord. The adoption of supranational powers

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might be delayed by squabbles like those between French and West German agriculture. To overcome these it could also be speeded up.

An American prototype has shown the shape of things to come. But trade is not the only sphere in which the example set by the United States may prefigure the future of Europe. The Common Market does what the United States did when it organized a customs union in a semi-continental expanse; when, removing tariffs among insiders, it made them uniform against outsiders. By the same token, however, a unified Europe might have to do what the United States did in all other branches of the American economy. Among free societies it is the most successful pioneer of bigness. So with the the Common Market—the greater the flow of European trade, the tighter the grip of bigness on the European economy. But it cannot tighten its grip on the European economy without deepening the general pattern of European integration.

Trade and bigness interact, and when they do so the ground is cleared for that federal merger through which alone the full potentialities of the entire venture can best be fulfilled. The paths taken may be diverse, uneven, circuitous, without the usual signposts; the European Communities might provide novel modalities. It may be that within a political union there could be no outright pooling of sovereignty without the consent of members. What members themselves cannot do is delimit the energies which a customs union will have released and which an economic union will have quickened on an ever-enlarging scale. Deep-seated particularisms in language and culture might still impede, but even if these are not swept away they may be bypassed as a unified Europe consolidates itself indivisibly.

The United States has given its blessing to the closest integration of Europe, economic and political. But would it be pleased if, as the many are replaced by one, particularism is not banished? If, as applied to defense, diplomacy, world trade and international finance, European particularism is merely projected on a larger screen? The irony of that for the United States would be evident.

It is expected that a unified Europe will have the ability to say "no" in unison to the United States as well as "yes." The desired unison may be achieved on an American model. In other words, the more American techniques are assimilated, the more capable Europeans will be of resisting American counsels. Today it may not only have been the postwar subsidies from the United States

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that will have helped a unified Europe, if it so wishes, to diverge from America. The processes by which America itself was, as it were, Americanized will also help.

This paradox should be understood. The United States could never have Americanized others by its own unaided efforts. But when others emulate America in the American style of life, based as it is on mass production coupled with a free movement of trade, people and classes in a semi-continental area, they may Americanize themselves. A unified Europe will give bigness a greater chance in a region that historically has prided itself on its rejection of bigness. And self-Americanization might enable a Third Force, under the nuclear protective shield of the United States, to go it alone.

V

Let us now look at the political auguries as the unification of Western Europe moves ahead. Whatever it is that results in the burying of the hatchet between the French and the Germans deserves the thanks of mankind. But the underlying goals of the two peoples are not the same. France is a satisfied power, while the Bonn republic, like Germany between the wars, is a dissatisfied one. From Bismarck to Hitler, the two Germanys now in existence were a single state for less than 75 years; and for their partition between East and West the German people have only themselves to blame. Yet, in order to keep the Bonn republic well disposed toward the West, the West has had to champion its claims for German reunification. This objective could be achieved only on terms that would undo the pending unification of Western Europe and conflict, in the global equilibrium, with the West's own defense of its European sector.

For what, then, is Moscow waiting? A neutral Reich, in which the Soviets had permitted a satellite to rejoin the Bonn republic, could deny the West strategic access to German soil and deprive it of economic access to the heavy industries of the Ruhr. But it could also mean that Russia would again have to cope with a greater Germany; and among Russians as well as in the captive states of Eastern Europe the memory of German invasions is still fresh. After Moscow's experience with its Chinese ally it may prefer to have fewer and not more major powers seated on the rim of the Russian imperium. Nor can the Soviet realm be integrated economically if it relinquishes East German resources.

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The prewar Reich could not be restored without resurrecting the spectre of German domination in Western minds. This fact raises critical questions. Will Western Germany try to utilize the world-wide apparatus of power with which the West, under American leadership, has warded off the East? So long as Western Germany pursues irredentist aims, should it have even indirect access to the deterrent? Do the French in this regard know what they are doing?

It took courage for postwar France to forgive and forget. Through NATO the Bonn republic was bound to the West strategically; through the European Communities it would be committed economically and governmentally. These measures, especially if there were a federal merger to clinch them, are expected to bar West Germany from accepting Russian terms for all-German reunification. But even if the two Germanys were reunited under Western auspices the French would be swamped. France could support German reunification as an objective so long as its fulfillment appeared remote; and, in return, France gets Bonn's assent to realignments within the West through which France supposes that its own status will be enhanced. A greater Reich might, in accordance with tradition, play East against West. Will Bonn first play off Paris and Washington against each other? It will not be easy for the United States, as leader of the West, or for the West as a whole, if the Bonn republic or France or the two together try to manipulate a unified Europe for their special purposes.

There are two problems here, that of fitting Western Germany into a unified Europe and that of fitting a unified Europe into a more concrete Atlantic partnership. These two problems cannot be treated apart. It may be noted that defeat and occupation by Germans seem to have left less of a scar on official France than the ill will exhibited by the American ally—a recent liberator—during the Suez crisis. A deterrent of their own might now embolden the French to talk back openly to Washington. But a global balance is what made them secure as they extricated themselves from Indochina and North Africa, staged their sit-down strike in NATO and let the Fourth Republic be overthrown. It is a question, then, whether the American guarantee, with or without a European deterrent, has outlived its usefulness.

The French have resented Anglo-American solidarity and have wanted to combine with the United States and Britain in a sort

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of three-power directorate for the West. But what confidence can they have inspired in Washington and London? Who, when the Gaullist régime comes to an end, will speak for France—the Army, the extreme Right, the extreme Left? President de Gaulle may dream his dream of a tranquil Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. But since this entails a basic shift in power alignments it implies that a European Third Force, over which the French will preside, can make its own settlement with the Soviet Union. But *sauve qui peut* was a Napoleonic cry that the French, above all, should remember; before a Third Force deserts the United States the United States might desert it. A bilateral settlement with Washington is what Moscow, cognizant of global power realities, has long sought. Western Europe should be the last to push the United States into that kind of a settlement.

It is in these circumstances that the United States, torn between hopes and fears, has urged that some room be found for Britain in the new unified Europe. If this were done it would not only ensure a more outward-looking attitude by the Common Market toward questions of trade and economic policy; it also would reduce the element of political risk. The Belgians, the Dutch, the Luxembourgers, the Italians (together with Britain's own cosignatories of the European Free Trade Association) have been apprehensive over the prospect of West German, French or Franco-German predominance. A British counterweight might avert that danger. A European Third Force, moreover, would be at variance with American leadership of the West, and here again Britain could do the most to stabilize. Britain, however, is not as strong as it was and it could not act as a European stabilizer if, as a component unit of a European federal merger, it were cut off from overseas sources of strength. One of these overseas sources of strength is the Commonwealth. Anglo-American friendship is another. And indeed they have long been interconnected.

On strategic issues, *e.g.* regarding the disposition of the deterrent, it is imperative that Britain and the United States should keep in step. For the time may soon come when, as a nuclear power, Britain will wish to chart a new course. Will it be safe if it amalgamates the British segment of the Western deterrent with that of France? How could Britain belong to a European political union and not do so? What view will Washington take?

Washington will feel less anxiety if a unified Europe does not cling to the command of any joint deterrent of its own but as-

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signs it to NATO. For, through such an arrangement, the United States might still have the last word. But what if other deterrents in the West are not assigned to NATO? Then, if the British segment of the over-all deterrent must be transferred anywhere, it should be, surely, to the United States. For in every aspect of policy, and not just in one as momentous as this, Anglo-American friendship remains, acknowledged or unacknowledged, the mainstay of the West.

To restate that truth today may be to run against the tide. It nevertheless must be restated, and on both sides of the Atlantic. A free world order might never have survived if, at the gravest junctures in the twentieth century, the Anglo-American link had not pre-existed. Since World War II it has had—from the Far East to the Congo and Cuba—its characteristic ups and downs. But so rooted is Anglo-American friendship in the national interests of Britain and the United States that even the tragic Anglo-American divergence over Suez could not destroy it.

And now it is because the United States relies on Britain that it wants Britain to play a part in the unification of Europe. In the American approach to Europe it is not only assumed that the United States will persist as leader of the West but that, as it does so, Britain will march with it. It will be asked whether most of the British people still want to march with the United States. Two recent B.B.C. talks, published in *The Listener*, depicted Anglo-American friendship as an unhistorical myth.[1] But then truth is always a myth for those who have myths of their own to purvey.

As Europe and America re-group, what will be the British role? Opponents and proponents of its entry into the Common Market have both often taken it for granted that what confronts Britain is a choice between Europe and the Commonwealth. That, however, is a false antithesis. The real issue is Britain's status. If Britain retains an independent status, the Commonwealth fellowship, despite any quarrel over trade agreements, may still go on; if Britain cannot retain an independent status—if it is converted into a mere outer island province of a European Union—the Commonwealth will dissolve automatically, and so will an Anglo-American factor that has been another overseas source of British strength. Britain in the twentieth century has been like a tripod with a leg for Europe, a leg for the fellowship of the Commonwealth, a leg for ties with the United States. Conditions may alter.

[1] October 5, 1961, and August 23, 1962. *The Listener*, September 20, 1962, watered down a letter of protest.

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It is on the three legs of its tripod, and not on any one or two, that Britain must still stand.

It will be complex to make that unified Europe which, as the United States has conceived it, will be one of two equal pillars in the Atlantic edifice. The nature of the pillar on the American side of the Atlantic is not certain. Is Canada, for instance, to be included? The European pillar is to be cemented by close integration. But Canada, seeking to keep a national identity of its own, has long resisted close integration with its giant neighbor.

It is a question, too, where the Latin American countries will fit in, for in a hemispherically unified America they would be liabilities rather than assets. Europe as well as America must do what it can for Latin America. But Latin America has little with which to reciprocate, and it is only on a basis of reciprocity that a concrete Atlantic partnership, as advocated by President Kennedy, can function.

VI

Two points arise, one negative and one positive. The accent is on the negative when Europe and America do not pull together. But fortunately their rivals in the East labor under even greater disabilities. Russia and China are assuredly no mere laths painted to look like iron; but Communist economies will have to do better if they are to continue to mesmerize some of the neutralist nations. Moreover, though Europe and America might differ over the common defense, the two main sections of the Sino-Soviet camp may yet have to defend themselves against each other. Thus where the West cannot by its own exertions save itself, the East, by its dissensions, may help save the West.

The West will stultify itself if its frame of reference is too narrow—if European issues are not put in an Atlantic setting and if Atlantic issues are not put in a setting that, as with the Commonwealth and Anglo-American friendship, is actually world-wide. Peoples that are underprivileged or newly emancipated may be expected to be confused as they make their bow on the world stage; for Europeans and Americans there is less excuse. As long as they uphold freedom and order on a world-wide basis the values of civilized society will be sustained. In upholding them Europe and America may forge new unities. Old-established ones must, at the same time, also be preserved.

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MOSCOW, PEKING AND THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ASIA

By Robert A. Scalapino

NEVER before have we seen such an extraordinary display of disunity in the Communist world. Moscow's policy of rapprochement with Tito is regarded by Peking and its supporters as further proof of the fundamentally revisionist, anti-Marxian character of "the Khrushchev group." Peking views the indecisive Soviet policy regarding the Sino-Indian conflict—Moscow's precarious attempt to carry water on both shoulders—as a typical failure of Khrushchev to give full support to a "fraternal socialist ally." It brands the Soviet decision to withdraw missiles from Cuba as appeasement of American imperialism, a clear manifestation of the pacifism and fear that it now regularly describes as the trademarks of Russian diplomacy.

The Soviet Premier and his friends have answers to these charges. To them, the foremost enemies of Marx-Leninism at present are dogmatists who pursue a narrow nationalism, emulate Stalinism in its worst aspects and follow adventurist policies that risk global war. In Khrushchevian circles, the tendency is growing to divide the Communist world into its "advanced" and "backward" components, into categories of "friendly" and "unfriendly" socialist states or factions.

Clearly, the strenuous efforts of Communist intermediaries during recent months to bring about some understanding—or at least a *modus vivendi*—between Russia and China have borne little fruit. Thus the events that followed immediately after the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) acquire additional significance. For five months after October 1961 the Communist bloc quarreled publicly among themselves before the world. The era of open struggle was inaugurated when Chou En-lai departed from Moscow in a huff at the height of the Congress, having earlier left a wreath on the tomb of that "great Marxist-Leninist," J. V. Stalin, and having upbraided Khrushchev in stinging fashion for his public criticism of Albania. There followed the steady development of the Sino-Albanian alliance in the face of withering Soviet blasts against Albanian leaders and the severance of Russian-Albanian diplomatic relations. And throughout this period, although the Soviet Union

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and its allies repeatedly proclaimed that their position had the support of "the overwhelming majority" of the Communist parties of the world, most Asian Communist parties firmly refused to give Moscow their support on the crucial issues.

Even after Khrushchev had denounced Hoxha and Shehu as false Marxists and vicious tyrants, fraternal greetings flowed to Albania from the Communist parties of such countries as North Viet Nam, North Korea, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand and Malaya. Pictures and statues of Stalin could still be found from Pyongyang in North Korea to the Djakarta headquarters of the Indonesian Communist Party, even after Khrushchev had finished reciting the catalogue of Stalin's crimes.

History may well record that the truly significant aspect of this great crisis in the Communist world has been the attitudes and policies of Asian Communist leaders—not just those of Peking, but those of Djakarta, Pyongyang, Hanoi and Tokyo as well. If Khrushchev had hoped to isolate China on the issue of Albania, he failed. And nowhere did he fail more resoundingly than in Eastern Asia where only the parties of Outer Mongolia and Ceylon came quickly to his side. Elsewhere he called for full support in vain. A new phenomenon emerged—neutralism within the Communist bloc. The great bulk of the Asian Communist movement chose to remain non-aligned between Moscow and Peking, and this was in itself a defeat for Khrushchev, especially when, as in many cases, it was non-alignment that leaned toward Peking.

II

Khrushchev garnered two allies in the Far East at an early point, the parties of Outer Mongolia and Ceylon. On October 21, 1961, two days after Khrushchev's famous October 19 speech to the 22nd Congress, Premier Tsedenbal, head of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party delegation, spoke in firm support of the Soviet position. He congratulated the Congress for its "decisive struggle" against the harmful cult of personality and openly condemned the Albanian party leaders for their divisive "anti-Marxist" activities. These views were subsequently extended and sharpened in Ulan Bator. In late November, Chairman Tsend of the Great People's Hural (Mongolian People's Assembly) bitterly attacked Premier Hoxha of Albania and his stooges for sliding into the bog of nationalism. Nor did he ignore China, but bluntly commented that Chinese insistence upon han-

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dling the problems privately was a futile approach "deviating from the truth," since the cleavage was public knowledge. The party position was made official in January 1962 when Tsedenbal reported on the 22nd Congress to the Central Committee. He again rigorously censured Albania and, following the Khrushchev lead, called for a liquidation of the cult of personality that had formed around former Premier Choibalsan, dead since 1952. Clearly, the Outer Mongolian leaders had gone all the way.

The actions of the Ceylonese Communist Party must also have been gratifying to Khrushchev. On October 25, 1961, Mr. Pieter Keuneman, Secretary-General, addressed the Congress as a leader of the Ceylonese delegation. His remarks were brief, but included adverse comments on the personality cult and on Albanian party leaders who were accused of taking a position "incompatible with proletarian internationalism." A lengthy party statement, issued April 8, 1962, sustained and expanded these remarks. The Ceylonese Party regarded it as "inconceivable" that Hoxha could "basely accuse the C.P.S.U. and its leaders of revisionism and fawning upon imperialism; justify and extol some of the worst features of the personality cult; openly challenge the agreed conclusions of the international Communist movement on such basic questions as peaceful coexistence and the importance of the decisions and course of the 20th Congress; and try to split the international Communist movement by seeking to draw invidious distinctions between various fraternal parties." This was as full a recital of Hoxha's "crimes" as Khrushchev himself could have given.

On the Stalin issue, the Ceylonese Communists had in fact a particularly difficult problem, since their primary internal opponents of the left are self-styled Trotskyites who can claim an historic anti-Stalinist position. Taking courage in hand, however, the Ceylonese Communists managed to accept the new stage of de-Stalinization, including the revelation that "certain negative personal qualities of Stalin" had begun to assert themselves as early as 1934. This they did without conceding an inch to the Trotskyites whose theories, they insisted, "had been thrown into the rubbish-bin of history."

III

Nowhere else in Eastern Asia, however, did Khrushchev get this kind of support, setting aside the special case of India with which we shall deal later. The position of other Far Eastern Com-

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munist parties on these and related issues ranged from silence to open disapproval. Let us look briefly at the facts, starting with Indonesia.

The attitude of the Communist Party of Indonesia (P.K.I.) on such issues as Albania and de-Stalinization is of real significance in the Communist world. This party, with some two million members and additional millions in its front organizations, is the most important Communist Party currently existing in a non-Communist nation. When its position was clarified, Khrushchev had little reason to be happy. On the key issues it stood remarkably close to Peking, although the official stance can be described as one of non-alignment. Its views can be summarized as follows:

In the first place, Khrushchev's public criticism of Albanian leadership was a mistake and the P.K.I. has no intention of following suit. That act, taken without prior consultation and without any real attempts at private negotiations between the parties concerned, is a violation of the Moscow Statement of 1960.

Secondly, the question of Stalin and that of the anti-party group within the C.P.S.U. are internal matters to be decided by that party itself. However, Stalin was more than a mere national leader. He was also an important international leader, and in this capacity he remains the property of every Communist in the world. The cult of personality is to be criticized; but for their part, Indonesian Communists will never forget the major theoretical and practical contributions made by Stalin to the world Communist movement in the years between 1924 and 1953. (Note carefully the full sweep of those dates.)

Absolute freedom and equality, the Indonesian Communists say in addition, must be accorded each Communist party. The "socialist camp" is not a republic or a political entity of any type. It is rather a group of completely independent and equal parties, each free to develop entirely in line with its own indigenous conditions. To learn from the experiences of others is important; to be ordered by others is inadmissible. Hence, talk about "greater autonomy" or "polycentrism" is misleading. The only acceptable condition is total independence. Therefore, no state having a genuinely socialist system (Albania) can be read out of the socialist camp even if it has a conflict with another socialist state (the U.S.S.R.).

Fourthly, they indicate, the task of each party is to apply the universal principles of Marx-Leninism to the special circum-

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stances of its own society. Thus for the P.K.I. the task is that of "Indonesianizing" the Marx-Leninist ideology. Currently, this means marching forward under the three red banners of the National Front, Building the Party and Advancing the August 1945 Revolution. (The Chinese Communists, it is to be noted, have three red banners, too: the General Line, the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes.) The P.K.I. also talks of the confrontation between the "new, emerging forces" of the world comprising 90 percent of the world population and the "old, established forces" making up only 10 percent. (Mao, it will be recalled, has long preached unity with 90 percent of the people against that 10 percent who represent "enemies.")

The main danger to the Communist world is revisionism, they conclude, and they cite Jugoslavia as a prime example. Jugoslav support for the 22nd Congress is a trick to sow "the poison of division" within the Communist camp. Jugoslavia is completely outside the pale, "a tool of American imperialism." Albania, on the other hand, is a genuinely socialist society, not to be ousted from the fraternity by Soviet fiat.

Some of these positions are taken from the Moscow Statement of 1960, but the particular themes chosen for emphasis are most revealing, as are the various parallels in tactics and strategy between the Indonesian and the Chinese parties. In recent months, moreover, the P.K.I. has reinforced its pro-Peking orientation by strongly supporting the Chinese position on Jugoslavia, the Indian border issue and Cuba. Aidit called the dismantling of missiles "a regrettable sacrifice" forced upon the Cubans against their will. His statement left no doubt concerning his party's support for a "tough line," and it was widely circulated by the Chinese. For Moscow, non-alignment in any form is difficult to accept, but the Indonesian variety must seem especially grim.

Can Soviet leaders take greater solace from the forms of neutralism exhibited by North Korea and North Viet Nam?

North Korea today is under the iron rule of one man, Kim Il-song. After more than a decade of fierce intra-party struggle, Kim appears to have leveled all opposition. At the top, there is only one significant faction in North Korean politics, the Kim faction, composed mainly of the old partisan fighters who served with Kim in Manchuria; they have one characteristic in common: complete loyalty to the leader. Kim, now 50 years of age, holds the posts of Premier, Marshal of the Korean People's Army and

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Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party (K.W.P.), which claims over 1,300,000 members. North Korea is in the midst of a Stalinist phase of development.

The initial North Korean stand on Albania was that relations between the Soviet Communist Party and Albania were "abnormal," and that if this situation continued it would cause "grave damage" to the Communist movement. The solution, according to Kim, lay in discussions and mutual understanding, using the formula provided by the Moscow conferences of 1957 and 1960.

The questions of Stalin and the anti-party faction were internal affairs of the C.P.S.U. and, as such, not proper subjects for discussion by the K.W.P. At the same time, however, Stalin was a leader whose activities had exercised a great influence upon the international Communist movement, a man well known (and respected) by the people of the world. No picture or statue of Stalin was removed in North Korea.

In the fall of 1962, the North Koreans further exposed their views in public. Following the Sino-Albanian lead, Kim blasted Jugoslavia shortly after Soviet President Brezhnev's visit there. He called Jugoslav leaders flunkies of American imperialism, disrupters of socialist camp unity. And he went on to attack *all* "revisionists" as guilty of "slandering" socialist countries or fomenting plots against them. Taking direct aim at Khrushchev, Kim asserted that no socialist country could possibly intervene against, or impose its will upon, a fraternal ally.

The North Koreans gave full support to China against India and to Cuba against the United States. Significantly, Kim proclaimed that peace could not be begged for, but had to be won through struggle—by dealing the imperialists blows everywhere. Thus North Korean "neutralism" must also have an ominous ring in Soviet ears.

The tactics of the North Korean Communists following the 22nd Congress are also revealing. Selecting two ceremonial occasions, spaced only one day apart, they sought to portray their non-alignment unmistakably. On November 7, 1961, an effusive message of congratulations and praise was sent to Soviet leaders on the occasion of the 44th anniversary of the October Revolution. On November 8, a message of congratulations was sent to the Albanian Workers' Party on the 20th anniversary of the founding of the party. This praised the Albanian Party for hav-

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ing struggled successfully to construct a progressive socialist state and having opposed courageously the imperialists "and their lackeys, the Jugoslav revisionists." Eternal friendship between the Korean and Albanian people was pledged "within the great family of the socialist camp headed by the U.S.S.R."

Before seeking to generalize upon the tactics of Communist neutralism, let us look briefly at the policies of the Workers' Party of North Viet Nam (V.W.P.), which has perhaps achieved the most perfect neutral position in public that was possible. Once again, this is an important Communist party. It is in firm control in North Viet Nam, has extended its cadres deeply into the south, renders "fraternal assistance" to the Pathet Lao and probably has substantial contacts in Cambodia. With about 500,000 members, it is the most significant Communist party in continental Southeast Asia. In Ho Chi Minh, moreover, it has a national treasure. This Communist veteran, now more than 70, can claim to have known Lenin. He antedates both Khrushchev and Mao. And perhaps as much as any Communist leader, Ho has held a dual image as nationalist and internationalist, as Father of the Country and experienced Comintern agent. The Communist world does not possess a better mediator, and Ho's talents have been extensively used in recent months—seemingly in vain.

In its official statement on the 22nd Congress, the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers' Party did not even mention Albania or the campaign against Stalin in the Soviet Union. Instead, the Soviet Party was eulogized for its achievements, and a pledge was made to strive endlessly for complete unity among members of the Communist camp "of which the Soviet Union is the center." Like North Korea, North Viet Nam on November 7 and 8, 1961, embraced both Russia and Albania. *Nhan Dan* (*The People*), central party organ, first published a message and an editorial giving strongest support to the U.S.S.R., the C.P.S.U. and its leaders. One day later, a message and editorial—accompanied by a picture of Hoxha—gave enthusiastic blessing to the Albanian Workers' Party. On November 9, moreover, *Nhan Dan* reported that an important omission had occurred in reporting the telegram sent to Albania and added the following sentence: "Under the principles of Marx-Leninism, your party has always struggled to strengthen its ranks and fought indefatigably against Jugoslav revisionism. The influence and prestige of your party among the masses of the Albanian people have daily grown."

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Recent events suggest that the "perfect neutrality" of North Viet Nam may be in jeopardy. In October 1962, amidst the many crises involving the Communist world, a delegation from the Chinese National People's Congress, headed by Peng Chen, visited North Viet Nam. The speeches that ensued were models of cordiality. Peng asserted pointedly that Chinese-Vietnamese friendship had withstood all tests, survived despite great storms. Vietnamese spokesmen reciprocated by giving unstinting praise to "the correct foreign policy of the Chinese government and people," which, they asserted, had contributed to the strengthening of the socialist camp, the promotion of national liberation movements and the defense of world peace. Subsequently, Hanoi fully supported "the correct stand" of China on the Sino-Indian border conflict and also indicated its complete agreement with a policy of all-out support for Cuba.

Up to date, the Communist "neutralists" of Asia have pursued the following tactics:

1. The Soviet Union and the C.P.S.U. are to be regarded as the *vanguard* or *center* of the international Communist movement. This has reference to an objective fact, namely that the Soviet Union was the first country to pioneer with Communism and represents today the most advanced "socialist" society in industrial, scientific and military terms. (But it does not necessarily follow that Nikita Khrushchev is the proper leader for the Soviet Union, or that Russian policies are currently correct.)

2. Approximately equal space should be given to the Soviet Union and Communist China, and roughly parallel wording should be used in reference to them. It is perhaps permissible to show somewhat greater veneration for the Soviet Union, as a mark of respect for age, experience and accomplishments. In the issues at stake, however, there can be no retreat.

3. All Communist states and parties should be praised in public —except Jugoslavia, which is to be treated as a revisionist, anti-Marxist state.

4. The emphasis should be upon the supreme importance of the unity of the *twelve* "fraternal socialist states" (Albania included); the obligation of every Communist party to assist in promoting that unity; and the employment of the techniques of inter-party relations spelled out in the Moscow Statement of 1960, the new bible of the international Communist movement. Within a single party, decision-making must be based upon "dem-

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ocratic centralism," and the minority must follow the majority. But between parties, decision-making must be based upon consultation, consensus and unanimity—procedures derived from the independence and equality of each Communist party.

IV

Which other Communist parties of Eastern Asia can be placed in the same general category with those of Indonesia, North Korea and North Viet Nam?

Let us first consider the Communist Party of Japan (J.C.P.). None of the parties of Asia has had more trouble than it, and in a relative sense few are weaker, suggesting once again that the Communist movement has its greatest opportunities in the early stages of the modernization process. Normally, the Japanese Party polls less than 3 percent of the total Japanese vote. Moreover, it has been badly factionalized in recent years. But if currently it is weak and divided, it still exists in a nation that is strategically important to the world balance of power.

The evidence suggests that the J.C.P. belongs to the neutralist group, with clear indications that a leaning toward Peking has now developed among a majority of the leaders. In the past, the J.C.P. has been reluctant to take a forthright public stand or has been unable to do so because of internal differences. Official statements have generally been marked by silence on the burning issues or by cloudiness. Sanzo Nosaka, veteran Secretary-General and leader of the delegation to Moscow, did not touch upon Albania or de-Stalinization in his speech before the Congress, and barely mentioned the subject upon his return when he insisted that Communist parties, "linked by the blood of Marx-Leninism," had an indestructible unity which "no imperialist machinations could destroy."

On December 29, 1961, the party organ, *Red Flag,* published an editorial which cautiously implied a disapproval of Khrushchev's public criticism of Albania. It spoke of the "possibility, necessity and propriety" of coördinating views on the basis of the procedures outlined by the Moscow Statement of 1960. It also proclaimed that party members should study *all* relevant materials, indicating that the party intended to follow the Peking lead in publishing the documents of all parties to the dispute. The ringing plea for unity was sounded throughout the editorial, and there was no mention of the de-Stalinization issue.

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In mid-January 1962 a leading Japanese Communist spokesman privately amplified the J.C.P. position.

The Albanian crisis, he said, was unexpected in so far as the J.C.P. delegation to the 22nd Congress was concerned. There had been no consultation or prior notification regarding the public criticism of Albanian leaders. The party was still studying this matter and was planning to issue the views of all parties, including the Albanian Workers' Party. Albania was not in the same category as Jugoslavia because all Communist parties had agreed that Jugoslavia was an enemy, whereas some 30 parties had not expressed any view on the question of Albania.

Further, the Japanese Communist Party supported the criticism of the cult of personality and of Stalin's weaknesses in this respect. With regard to Stalin, it recognized two facts: first, his achievements, especially in the establishment of socialism and in the war against Fascism; second, the dark side, especially in later years. Khrushchev had been very severe upon Stalin in order to demonstrate to his people that the C.P.S.U. would never again make the same mistake. Recently, however, Khrushchev had placed more emphasis than was desirable upon Stalin's faults.

In mid-1961, a small group of Communists left the J.C.P. and formed a separatist movement that took an anti-Stalinist, anti-Peking line. This group has repeatedly charged that a majority of party leaders back Peking on the critical issues. Recent actions and statements of the party, while generally guarded, emphatically support that contention. On issues ranging from the general problems of disarmament and peaceful coexistence to the specific problems of India and Cuba, its pronouncements currently have a pro-Peking flavor. Clearly, Khrushchev is in serious trouble with many Japanese comrades.

The picture within the Burmese Communist movement is even more chaotic. This movement has been openly split for more than a decade. There are the Red Flag Communists, a small group led by Thakin Soe which has been fighting the government since 1946. Mistakenly called Trotskyites, this group in fact represents indigenous Burmese Communists molded ideologically by the purist, creative, egocentric mind of Soe. Soe's theoretical inclinations, however, have long been away from men like Khrushchev. Meanwhile a rival group has existed, the White Flag Communists, led by Than Tun. It is this group that is recognized internationally as the Burmese Communist Party (B.C.P.). Finally,

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there are certain separate Marxist, proto-Communist associations, notably the National Unity Front (N.U.F.).

In the aftermath of the 22nd Congress, Soe's Red Flag Communists have conducted an all-out campaign against Khrushchev and the current Soviet leaders. At the end of 1961, the Youth Front, a group affiliated with Soe, announced that it intended to burn Khrushchev's effigy on January 1, 1962, because he was an "arch-revisionist." Immediately, Thein Pe Myint, veteran Marxist and currently affiliated with the N.U.F., attacked the Youth Front for its plans. Charges and countercharges flew fast. The Youth Front accused Thein Pe Myint of "Browderism," of being a traitor to the Marx-Leninist cause and of becoming a mercenary in the pay of the Rangoon Soviet Embassy. It asserted that as editor of the *Vanguard,* Thein Pe Myint had been given 1,000 Kyat by the Russian Embassy to publish "a highly scandalous article on Stalin" previously rejected.

The Burmese Government prohibited the burning of Khrushchev's effigy, but at its January 1 meeting, the Youth Front submitted a lengthy statement condemning the Russian Premier as a revisionist and "international opportunist." A black paper coffin labeled "The Corpse of Marxist Revisionism" was burned, as was a large box representing "The History of the C.P.S.U." 1960 revised edition. The Front also released a publication, "Marxism and the Traitor, Khrushchev." It supports Lenin and Stalin, bitterly attacks the current Russian leaders, and is also strongly critical of Mao and his associates. The Red Flag Communists, like the main stream of the National Student Federation in Japan, seem determined to be mad at almost everyone.

Both the Burmese Communist Party and the National Unity Front resisted the violently anti-Khrushchev (and anti-Mao) position of the Youth Front, but Khrushchev cannot necessarily count on their full support. The B.C.P. representative in Peking sent a congratulatory message to the Albanians in connection with their November 1961 anniversary. It would appear that they wish to be associated with the neutralist group. The N.U.F., on the other hand, has shown markedly pro-Soviet tendencies. Seemingly, all elements possible within the international Communist spectrum are currently represented in Burma.

Information about the attitudes and actions of the Communist movement elsewhere in Southeast Asia is sparse and often unreliable. However, the evidence generally points to gains for Pek-

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ing. In Thailand, where the Communist movement appears to be growing, primary support comes from two sources: the Pathet Lao-Vietnamese Communist forces in the immediate vicinity—and Peking. Captured Communist leaders have indicated that their tactics and strategy are modeled extensively after the historic Chinese Communist experience: an appeal to the peasantry; the attempt to build a homogenized national-Communist movement, United Front in type; and the eventual establishment of an "independent base" from which to conduct military operations. Similar tactics prevail in the Communist movement of Malaysia. Communist leaders of this area, overwhelmingly Chinese in racial origin, also draw primary support from two sources: the Indonesian Communist Party and Communist China. Both the Thai and Malayan Communist parties, as noted earlier, sent congratulatory telegrams to Albania in November 1961.

V

Soviet losses in Southeast Asia have perhaps been offset to some extent by a recent victory scored within the Communist Party of India (C.P.I.). This victory did not come quickly or easily, nor was it complete. After many months of delay, however, the party finally set forth its official position in such a fashion as to align itself primarily with Moscow. And this was important. Despite its many difficulties, it is a major political force in India. In the February 1962 elections, the party maintained its position as the leading opposition to the massive Congress Party.

Until mid-1962, the Indian Communists had not been able to take an official party position on the issues of Albania and de-Stalinization due to serious internal differences of opinion. It has been obvious for many months that a loose "Center-Right" coalition controlled the party at national levels and that this coalition leaned toward Moscow. Like other Indian parties, however, the C.P.I. has been undergoing a significant change: leadership at the all-India level is giving way to state-based leadership, and this transition represents a strong centrifugal pull upon the party. In some states, such as West Bengal for example, local Communist leadership has been openly and vigorously "pro-China."

Until his death in January 1962, Ajoy Ghosh served as general secretary and moderator between factions. His public speech at the 22nd Congress ignored the burning issues, and there were indications that heated debates were going on within the Indian

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delegation. In the following months the national party organs published many speeches by Soviet leaders attacking the cult of personality and the Albanian leaders. No coverage was given to the opposition. On December 10, 1961, Ghosh published a lengthy statement on the 22nd Congress which was generally favorable to Moscow. It was cautiously worded and did not purport to be an official party position, but it clearly indicated Ghosh's personal leanings.

Meanwhile, Ghosh had become involved in an open dispute with Peking over the border issue. When the Indian Government charged the Chinese Communists with new border incursions in late November 1961, Ghosh issued a sharp demand on behalf of the C.P.I. that the Chinese Government stop such acts and in subsequent statements asserted that the Indian Government should defend its territory against aggression from any quarter. From this point until his death on January 13, 1962, Ghosh was involved in a running battle with Peking in which both sides used sharp words. The Peking radio strongly criticized Ghosh in the course of a 45-minute broadcast on the Indian problem; and in his last party appearance, on January 3, Ghosh firmly held his ground. He asserted that India's seizure of Goa had proven that the Indian Party's assessment of Indian foreign policy was correct and that of the Chinese Party was incorrect. He also bluntly stated that the Chinese charges against the Indian Party constituted an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a fraternal party. Ten days later, Ghosh was dead. It is not surprising that the Chinese note of sympathy was extremely brief.

Though Ghosh undoubtedly spoke for a majority of the party leaders there was strong opposition from the "left," as was illustrated by a number of events. The organ of the Kerala State Communist Party protested angrily against the removal of Stalin's body from the mausoleum. In an effort to reduce tension, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, Left-Centrist Kerala leader and later to become party general secretary, asserted that Soviet criticism of Stalin was not relevant to the Indian scene because the Indian Communist movement had felt only the "positive aspects" of Stalinism. A section of the Gujarat Party also openly condemned the excessive denigration of Stalin. And in West Bengal, a party journal significantly republished the fiery Hoxha reply to Khrushchev's attack. "Left" strength, which represented possibly one-third of the party leadership, was especially pronounced in West

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Bengal and Andhra, with sizable representation also in Kerala, the United Provinces and the Punjab.

The long-awaited meeting of the C.P.I. National Council was finally held at the end of April 1962. After a week of bitter wrangling, a compromise slate of officers was agreed upon. S. A. Dange, "rightist" and critic of China, was given the new post of Chairman, while Namboodiripad was appointed general secretary. But it proved impossible to issue a statement either on the recent elections or on the 22nd Congress. In late June, however, the Central Executive opened a five-day meeting to consider the ideological questions that had arisen. A draft resolution generally supporting Khrushchev was approved after a lengthy and bitter fight. This resolution in turn was approved by the National Council which met in Hyderabad August 14–20.

The official position of the Indian Communist Party on Albania and de-Stalinization can be summarized as follows:

Differences within the international Communist movement as a result of the striking new trends inaugurated by the 20th Congress were inevitable, but the Albanian attack upon Soviet leaders was regrettable and "highly unjustified." Only the imperialists and reactionaries of the world can profit from the present state of affairs in the international Communist movement. Differences should be resolved in accordance with the methods outlined by the Moscow Statement of 1960.

On the second of the two main issues, the cult of personality, the Soviet leaders are said to have acted with exceptional courage. It is necessary, of course, to keep both aspects of Stalin's character and role in mind. He was a great Marx-Leninist who made valuable contributions toward the building of socialism in the Soviet Union and the growth of the world Communist movement. These facts cannot be erased from history. At the same time, toward the later part of his life, the negative side of his character developed and the cult of personality went from bad to worse. Various excesses and crimes took place which had to be exposed. Indeed, more objective and self-critical examinations of this problem than have yet been undertaken need to be made. It was not denied that the struggle against Stalin created "a measure of confusion within the ranks of our party." While not necessarily endorsing every statement or action of the Soviet leaders in this connection, such as the removal of Stalin's body from the mausoleum or the change in names of cities, the party could, however,

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welcome and seek to emulate the basic Soviet trend toward greater party democracy in leadership and organization.

Read carefully, the statement of the Indian Communist Party indicated a tendency to conciliate the "left" and gave evidence of the extraordinary caution used in choosing each word and phrase. For this reason, much of the Indian press referred to the statement as a "compromise." However, it represented a "compromise" clearly leaning toward Moscow, reflecting the general balance of power prevailing within the top party echelons.

Then came the enlarged border conflict. On November 1, 1962, after two days of bitter debate, the C.P.I. National Council passed a resolution appealing to *all* Indians to unite in defense of the motherland against Chinese aggression. The pro-China element in the party had urged a resolution demanding immediate negotiations. But the anti-China faction won, apparently by a two-to-one margin, after a most acrimonious struggle. The Communist Party of India has never been so deeply divided.

VI

Perhaps we are now in a position to formulate some general propositions about the struggle between the Soviet and Chinese Communists for ideological and political leadership of the Communist movement in Asia. In this struggle, Nikita Khrushchev is not at this point doing well. At present, he has the upper hand in Outer Mongolia and Ceylon (though the Ceylonese Communists have been rocked by recent events and appear uncertain as to course). Perhaps he can gain a lasting advantage in India, although the situation there is explosive for all Communist factions, domestic and foreign. But everywhere else—in Indonesia, North Korea, North Viet Nam, Japan, Burma, Thailand and Malaya—he has not been able to get acceptance of his position on Albania, de-Stalinization or various other issues, large and small. In general, the stance of these parties is one of non-alignment, but often a non-alignment that favors Peking.

Many Asian Communist leaders were antagonized by Khrushchev's decision to attack the Albanian leaders publicly and to seek to purge them. This action was privately interpreted as unilateral action on his part, Soviet "big power chauvinism" and direct interference in the internal affairs of another party. Some Asian Communists view Albania as a case of "There, but for the grace of China, go I."

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The tactical answer to Khrushchev on Albania was conspicuous non-alignment. Using ceremonial occasions and cultural-economic missions a number of Asian Communist parties have signified very forcefully that they intend not to line up with either the Soviet Union or Albania (China). Meanwhile, an ideological answer has also been advanced: a commonwealth theory of bloc relations. Relying heavily upon the 1960 Moscow Statement, the neutrals have asserted that each Communist party must be completely free and equal; decision-making within the commonwealth must be based upon consultation, consensus and unanimity; while it is important to learn from others, each party must determine its own tactics and policies, based upon the particular needs and nature of its society.

The C.P.S.U. and its allies do not challenge this commonwealth thesis frontally. They simply maintain that the Hoxha group are false Marx-Leninists who have shown themselves unfit as "fraternal socialist comrades." Moreover, they ignore all signs of support for Albania, insisting that "almost all" Communist parties agree on the iniquities of the Albanian leaders.

The intensified de-Stalinization campaign has also been unpalatable to many Communist spokesmen in Asia. Here again the view was taken that it was an example of unilateralism, crudely executed and harmful to the world Communist movement, whatever its merits and its strategic value in terms of Soviet domestic politics. The tactical answer to Khrushchev on de-Stalinization was to grant the Soviet Union the right to make its own determination about Stalin in his role as a national leader (thereby adhering to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another party), but reserving the right for every Communist party to pass judgment on Stalin as an international leader. In this latter capacity, praise is given to Stalin for having contributed mightily in both ideological and political ways to the Asian revolution.

The Soviet Communists and their allies have resolutely rejected this approach to the Stalin issue. Khrushchev and others agree that Stalin's "positive qualities" should not be ignored, but the campaign of attack upon him continues. Moreover, Soviet spokesmen make it clear that there can be no distinction made between Stalin as national and international leader. His shortcomings at home were transmitted abroad, and caused serious harm to the international Communist movement. Thus the for-

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mula advanced by Communist leaders like Aidit and Kim is not acceptable to Moscow.

When, against the background of these issues, the crises involving India and Cuba emerged, most Asian Communist leaders demanded a policy of firmness and resolution that respected both the "correctness" and the full sovereignty of fraternal allies. The C.P.S.U. has never been under such close scrutiny by its fellow parties.

VII

Four facts in particular help to account for the problem the Soviet Union faces in Asia.

The first is the physical presence of Communist China—a huge, new state, struggling with gigantic problems but doing it with defiant pride and determination. Under any ideological banner, China would cast a shadow over the rest of Asia to the full extent of its physical power. It is natural, things being as they are, that this shadow should fall heavily upon the Communist parties of North Korea and North Viet Nam, countries that share a common border with China. No doubt the Chinese have heightened their influence by an extensive program of economic and technical assistance to nearby states and "fraternal parties." Despite the serious domestic crises of recent years, Communist China has rendered major service to many states. Its aid to North Korea and North Viet Nam may exceed that of the Soviet Union at present, and probably aid of a different sort flows to the Communist parties of Indonesia, Japan, Thailand and Malaya. It is significant that Communist "neutralism" generally follows the contours of the historic sphere of Chinese influence in days when China was powerful.

The degree to which Communist China can be a model for aspiring Asian Communists provides another gravitational pull toward Peking. In their march toward victory, the Maoists developed a serviceable tactic and strategy of revolution for much of the non-Western world: cultivation of the peasantry in order to acquire a mass base; the attempt to combine with the nationalist movement, if possible to capture its charismatic leader, in any case to seek to control it, combining 90 percent—"the people"—against 10 percent—"their enemies"; and, finally, the perfection of guerrilla-war techniques, combining force with politics.

These concepts are not original with Mao, but it was his dis-

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ciples who made them work, and now they are being followed by most of the Asian Communist parties. This combines with the extraordinary ignorance of the Soviet Union concerning things Asian to eat heavily into Soviet influence among the contemporary generation of Asian revolutionaries.

Connected with this second factor is a third—the Chinese world view, which is more closely attuned to the interests and attitudes of most Asian Communists than that of the Soviet Union. Three main issues between China and Russia stand out: decision-making within the bloc; tactics and policies toward the West and toward the emergent, non-aligned nations; and assistance to be given "fraternal socialist allies." Despite the verbal agreements reached in Moscow in 1957 and 1960, none of these basic issues has been resolved.

For the moment, at least, China is cast in the role of foremost challenger of Soviet monolithism. The themes of equality, independence and separate routes to revolutionary success for each Communist party were pioneered both in theory and in action by the Chinese Communists; now they are the common property of other Asian parties. Naturally, these parties are attracted by the concept of decision-making within a party by means of "democratic centralism"; but they favor decision-making between parties by consensus and unanimity because, if applied, it gives them maximum protection—from the Soviet Union and from Communist China, too! And just as naturally, the Soviet Union must resent having to bear global responsibilities for the bloc without having primacy of power or rights, at least under the new legal framework of the Communist Commonwealth.

It is also understandable why Asian Communists who are deeply dissatisfied with the status quo and feel thwarted, directly or indirectly, by American power, would want the Soviet Union to adopt the strongest possible anti-Western policy and give special priority for the "national liberation movement." The Soviet Union can compete with the United States directly, as a nation-state, in economic, political and military terms. Indeed, it must. But the Communists of North Viet Nam, for instance, like those of China herself, can compete only indirectly—as the world revolution is forwarded or as the Soviets successfully challenge American strength in one form or another. In their eyes any Soviet accommodation with the United States—or lethargy toward the emerging world—represents a threat to their own interests.

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The Soviet Union, like the United States, faces the basic question of how to allocate its resources. Internal consumer demands, military competition with the United States, technical assistance to the non-aligned world and demands from the bloc all vie for support. The objective of most Communists outside the Soviet Union, and especially those in Asia, is to get Moscow to spend more and take maximum risks on their behalf. Thus when China twits Russia over whether the Russians are sacrificing enough for their Communist brothers—as, for example, in Cuba—many Asian comrades applaud.

In short, the Communists of China, because of the timing of their revolution and the circumstances under which it has developed, have vastly more in common in terms of world outlook with the Communists of the emerging world than those of the second-generation revolutionary leadership of Moscow—a Moscow, it might be added, that must now assume all of the solemnity and caution that accrue to any global leader.

There is a final consideration, one involving personality or perhaps "national character": Khrushchevian diplomacy is considered crude and overbearing and Soviet knowledge regarding Asia is felt to be inadequate, with the result that the Communist cause is damaged. It is an interesting fact that global power today is held by continental-mass societies—the United States, the Soviet Union and potentially China (perhaps even a United Europe). In contrast to an earlier period, when small countries often had world-wide power because they were buttressed by far-flung empires, the empire of the continental-mass society is largely within itself. Each of the three has a history of isolation, is relatively self-sufficient and hence is powerfully ethnocentric.

In this context, China has one advantage over the Soviet Union in Asia. Despite their ethnocentrism and xenophobia, the Chinese leaders do know much about their neighbors. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is basically ignorant about the non-Western world, and Khrushchev often seems to ignore Asian Communist needs and sensitivities. This problem is magnified by the differences between first-generation and second-generation Communist leadership. The Asian Communist leaders, who are first-generation and intellectuals, find Khrushchev, a second-generation bureaucrat of peasant stock, impetuous and vulgar. The suavity of a Chou En-lai or the classical intellectualism of a Mao Tse-tung is more in tune with the contemporary Communist élite

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of Asia. One must not rule out personal and "esthetic" considerations like these in appraising the roles of Moscow versus Peking in the Communist world. The East-West division within the Communist ranks is in part a division in timing and in culture.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that the Communist leaders of Asia want to establish their independence from Moscow only to fall under the control of Peking. Many of them no doubt hope to make a virtue out of a necessity; they hope to establish a non-aligned position which will give them greater manœuvrability than any small Communist state or party has ever been able to attain. In this, of course, they share hopes with a number of their European comrades. It seems very likely, for example, that Ho Chi Minh and Kim Il-song desire to keep Chinese control at a minimum and if possible to play the classical role of the small buffer state between two major powers.

There is the great danger for the Communist parties in Asia that if Moscow and Peking exert increased pressure—and perhaps even if they do not—the Sino-Soviet cleavage will result in new or widened splits in every Communist movement. The evidence suggests strongly that what has already happened in India and Burma, and is indicated in North Viet Nam and Japan, is occurring almost everywhere. This is the major reason, of course, why the Asian Communists have exerted the greatest pressure to ensure that the tactics of dispute will not create harmful explosions even if the issues themselves cannot be resolved.

Thus Sino-Soviet differences offer one major opportunity for the "small" Communists, and hold out one major threat.The opportunity is to secure greater independence through non-alignment; the threat is internal schism. Both are now apparent on the Asian Communist horizon.

What are the implications of these facts for American foreign policy? In some respects we face significant new dangers. Generally speaking, Communism has succeeded in Asia only where it has been able to capture and use the nationalist movement. It may find greater opportunities to do this under present circumstances. In earlier times when international Communism was monolithic and centered in Moscow it was difficult for a foreign Communist party to take on the image of nationalism and independence or to follow pragmatic and realistic policies suited to local conditions. Asia is strewn with the remains of Communist men and movements that fell in the service of the Soviet Union—only

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to be repudiated by Soviet leaders in the end because they had failed. Now we are in a new era. In many parts of the world Communism is developing a greater rapport with its own society and increased flexibility in tactics and strategy, while at the same time retaining its thorough commitment to internationalism.

There has been much talk about peaceful competition between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. In the political sphere, the competition that may be truly decisive may depend on which side combines most successfully the forces of nationalism, regionalism and internationalism. At times like these both we and the Communists must experiment with new political forms—commonwealths, leagues and unions. Nationalism is still strong; indeed, it is only now reaching its full strength in many parts of the world, and to minimize or ignore it as a continuing political force is to face defeat. Yet the wave of the future is not nationalism, but larger and more complex political and economic forms. Power will lie with those who succeed in unifying, adjusting and manipulating the largest combination of political forces with minimum friction and maximum efficiency. Monolithism will die hard, but die it will. Who will find the most appropriate method of organizing and legitimizing supranational authority in the years ahead? The Communists have not yet found the answers, but no one can doubt that they have identified the problem and are working on it. We must address ourselves to it at once.

A second fundamental issue is how we should respond to the schisms and "heresies" emerging in the Communist movement in this new, transitional era. A sophisticated policy should, it would seem, include two broad elements:

We should expand our communication with the Afro-Asian "left." Not since the Bolshevik Revolution have the elements that want rapid and drastic change in the world been so uncertain of old dogma and so willing to listen to new ideas. The conditions in the non-Western world today are conducive to radicalism, but we can play a major role in making this radicalism more independent, creative and realistic.

We should no longer base our policies upon a theory of the monolithic bloc *or* the monolithic Communist state, but adopt more complex foreign policies based on the fact that not only the Communist bloc but each individual Communist state contains many divisions that can be affected by American and other external policy decisions.

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COÖPERATION IN OUTER SPACE

By Richard N. Gardner

ON September 25 of last year, President Kennedy laid before the 16th General Assembly a four-point program of space coöperation under United Nations auspices. The program called for a régime of law and order in outer space; the promotion of scientific coöperation and the exchange of information; a world-wide undertaking in weather forecasting and weather research; and international coöperation in the establishment of a global system of communication satellites. As a result of this initiative, an effort in outer space coöperation is now under way. The President's program was incorporated in a resolution adopted unanimously by the 16th General Assembly on December 20, 1961. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has finally begun its work—with the Soviet Union on board.

This U.N. effort has built upon the extensive network of bilateral arrangements developed between the United States and other free-world countries. It has gained momentum from the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev following the successful orbital flight of Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Glenn, Jr. In accordance with this exchange, bilateral conversations have taken place between Dr. Hugh Dryden, Deputy Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and A. A. Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. These talks coincided with the meeting in New York last March of the U.N. Outer Space Committee and the June meeting in Geneva of its Scientific and Legal Subcommittees.

What has this effort of space coöperation accomplished? Just how far is coöperation likely to go in the future? To answer these questions we must take a closer look at the four aspects of the program approved by the General Assembly.

II

The first part of the program embodied in the U.N. resolution looks toward a régime of law and order in outer space on the basis of two fundamental principles:

1. International law, including the United Nations Charter, applies to outer space and celestial bodies.

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2. Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all states in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation.

The General Assembly did not seek to go beyond these two principles and to define just where air space leaves off and outer space begins. It has been the general view, not challenged by any nation, that satellites so far placed in orbit have been operating in outer space. There are, in addition, powerful practical reasons why the ceiling on sovereign air space within the exclusive unilateral control of underlying states should be a good deal lower than the lowest point reached by orbiting satellites. In both ascent and re-entry, space vehicles follow relatively "flat" flight paths. Unless there is a realistic boundary to the upward limit of national sovereignty, it will be impossible for some nations to get in and out of space without violating the territorial air space of other nations. It is of little value to speak of the freedom of outer space if men cannot travel freely to that realm and back again to earth. Nevertheless, the drawing of a precise boundary is not a practical proposition at the present time. This task must await further experience and a consensus among nations.

The U.N. program takes international law and the U.N. Charter as the standard for space activities. Mankind would thus be free to use space on the same basis as it uses the high seas—free of any restraints except those on exclusive use and illegal activity such as aggression. This formula is designed to promote the maximum exploitation of space technology in the service of human needs. It is designed to prevent space and celestial bodies from becoming the objects of competing national claims.

The General Assembly Resolution, besides laying down these principles, called upon the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space "to study and report on the legal problems which may arise from the exploitation and use of outer space." When this Committee met in March 1962, it did not attempt to prescribe an agenda for its Legal Subcommittee. The meeting did indicate, however, that there was general agreement on the desirability of proceeding on two subjects: first, liability for space vehicle accidents; and second, assistance to and return of space vehicles and personnel.

When the Legal Subcommittee met in Geneva in May, a third subject was added to the discussion—principles to govern the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space. The

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Soviet Union presented a draft "Declaration of Basic Principles" which was directed more toward casting an unfavorable light on certain aspects of the U.S. space program than toward any real effort to extend law and order in space. The U.S. delegate to the Subcommittee made it clear that, while the Soviet draft was unacceptable, we were not opposed to the elaboration of principles to govern space activities in addition to those set forth in the resolution of December 1961. Indeed, as he noted, these principles were originally drafted and proposed by the United States.

The Soviet draft would prohibit the use of outer space for "propagating war, national or racial hatred, or enmity between nations." The United States is understandably skeptical about the utility of discussing this subject in the context of outer space in view of the fact that the Soviet Union, after initiating a lengthy negotiation on war propaganda in the 18-nation disarmament conference in Geneva, refused in the end to sign the Declaration which was unanimously agreed upon.

The Soviet draft also calls for prior discussion and agreement on any measures to be undertaken by a given state which "might in any way hinder the exploration or use of outer space for peaceful purposes by other countries." While this provision might appear innocent enough at first glance, it is clearly intended to give the Soviet Union a veto over U.S. space projects such as "West Ford," an experiment to place hairlike copper filaments in a short-lived orbital belt around the earth to determine the feasibility of using such filaments as passive reflectors for the relay of communications. This experiment was reviewed in advance by a special panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee and by the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, both of which concluded that it did not represent a danger. The experiment was also discussed thoroughly in advance with a broad range of scientists from other countries. While some of these expressed concern, there was an over-all consensus that the experiment would not impede radio astronomy or other scientific research.

Another plank in the Soviet draft of "Basic Principles" declares that space activities shall be carried out "solely and exclusively by states." This provision, which would rule out the participation of private enterprise in space activities, is a blunt attempt to impose socialist principles on an important sector of human activity —an obvious attack on *Telstar* and our communication satellite legislation.

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Still another Soviet "principle" declares the collection of intelligence from space to be "incompatible with the objectives of mankind in the conquest of outer space." The fact is, of course, that observation and photography from outer space are consistent with international law, as are observation and photography from the high seas. Moreover, space observation can contribute to the reduction of the risks of war by accident or miscalculation inherent in dealings with a closed society. And it is a use of space which may prove important some day in monitoring disarmament agreements.

Despite the Soviet effort to focus the work of the Legal Subcommittee on its "Declaration of Basic Principles," the United States advanced specific proposals at the Legal Subcommittee meeting on both the subject of liability and the subject of assistance and return. With respect to liability, it proposed to call upon the U.N. Secretary-General to establish a small advisory panel of legal experts drawn from various geographic areas whose task it would be to prepare a draft of an international agreement. Its resolution commended a number of principles to the guidance of the advisory panel—*e.g.* that liability for damage caused by space vehicles shall not require proof of fault; that a claim for injury may be presented internationally to the state or international organization responsible for launching the vehicle without the prior exhaustion of local remedies; and that the International Court of Justice should have jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute relating to the interpretation of the international agreement on liability in the absence of agreement between the states concerned upon another means of settlement.

With respect to assistance and return of space vehicles and personnel, the United States proposed a draft General Assembly Resolution which would have embodied two principles: first, that all possible assistance should be rendered to the personnel of space vehicles who may be in distress or who may land by reason of accident or mistake; second, that space vehicles and their personnel which land by reason of accident, distress or mistake should be safely and promptly returned to the state or international organization responsible for launching.

The Legal Subcommittee was unable to reach agreement on either of these proposals. While there was general recognition that agreement on assistance and return was desirable, the Soviet bloc insisted that the subject be dealt with by a formal international

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agreement rather than by a General Assembly Resolution. Its draft agreement also contained a number of objectionable features designed, among other things, to cast doubt on the propriety of space observation and photography.

The Soviet bloc also opposed any advance on the subject of liability. It refused to endorse the various principles on liability contained in the United States Resolution and insisted that government representatives rather than experts should deal with the matter. In an effort to meet the Soviet views, the United States delegation agreed to select a Working Group on liability from among the members of the Legal Subcommittee and agreed to omit any substantive principles of liability from the draft resolution establishing the group. The U.S.S.R., however, refused to accept this procedure in the absence of agreement to proceed simultaneously with its "Declaration of Basic Principles."

The Soviet Union continued to demand negotiations on the basis of its draft "Declaration" when the full Outer Space Committee met in September, just before the 17th General Assembly. It will be difficult to proceed with the orderly consideration of specific legal problems connected with space exploration so long as the Soviet Union maintains its position. This does not mean, of course, that there will be "no law" in outer space. On the contrary, as the United Nations Resolution confirms, international law already applies to outer space, and outer space and celestial bodies are free for use in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation. Beyond these principles, which the United States regards as currently the law, other customary rules of law with specific application to space will develop through the established practice of states. This will happen both as a result of what states do or fail to do unilaterally and as a result of coöperative arrangements developed to deal with specific functional problems.

III

The second part of the U.N. program concerns coöperation in the technical and scientific field. The Outer Space Committee, together with a small unit in the U.N. Secretariat, will serve as a focal point for the exchange of information and for the initiation of coöperative projects.

One measure of information exchange is already under way. Pursuant to the Resolution of December 1961, a comprehensive

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public registry of all objects launched into orbit or beyond is being maintained by the United Nations. The idea for a registry was first put forward in 1959 in the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space—the predecessor of the present U.N. Committee. In the words of this Report: "A regular census of satellites which are circling the earth must be maintained. Their number will become considerable in the near future and they will ultimately be useful to many countries."

The registry has now been established, and the United States makes regular filings listing the international designation of its space objects, the launch vehicles, their launch dates, general purpose and orbital characteristics. The United Nations registry is of interest to all nations which wish to identify space vehicles. It may help to develop habits of coöperation useful for the advance registration and inspection of space launches called for in the Western draft treaty for general and complete disarmament.

The United States commenced submitting information for the U.N. registry in mid-February 1962. We have always interpreted the intent of the Resolution to be that the registry should be a log of all objects in orbit and space transit. Our initial report, submitting information as of February 15, 1962, included all U.S. objects in orbit as of that date. Since then the United States has reported all of its launchings of objects intended to be placed in earth orbit or space transit, including launch failures as well as successes. As a matter of convenience, it has submitted these reports first on a biweekly basis and, since mid-April, semi-monthly. The Soviet Union has also been reporting its launchings.

Our reports do not make a distinction between launchings under the supervision of NASA and those under the supervision of the Department of Defense. They are national reports, not agency reports. The U.N. Resolution did not specify the precise information which should be included; the United States includes the information which appears relevant to the purpose of the U.N. registry. In addition, it reports considerably further detail to the world scientific community concerning its scientific experiments in space through the international Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), as had been the custom for several years before the U.N. registry was established.

Beyond this registry, the Scientific Subcommittee has drawn up plans for the orderly compilation and exchange of scientific and technical information. The space powers are being asked to

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submit information on a voluntary basis about their national programs. The dissemination of this information, quite apart from being of practical value, will encourage openness in the conduct of national space programs and give all U.N. members a sense of participation in a great adventure of mankind.

At the June meeting of the Scientific Subcommittee the United States proposed the establishment of an international sounding rocket facility to be located near the geomagnetic equator under U.N. auspices. This facility would be available to all members of the organization for scientific research. A sounding rocket, as the name suggests, is designed to take soundings of the upper atmosphere, including measurements of atmospheric density, wind, cloud formations and radiation. It is used principally for meteorological experiments above the effective level of operation of weather balloons and, in general, below the level at which artificial satellites orbit. Its guidance system and instrumentation are considerably less complex and less expensive than those of orbiting satellites. A good deal of interest in sounding rocket experiments has been shown by countries which cannot mount full-blown space programs, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has entered into bilateral coöperative sounding rocket programs with a number of countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Sweden.

The 17th General Assembly is being asked to approve the proposal that a U.N. sounding rocket facility be established near the geomagnetic equator. India has expressed interest in having this joint venture of the United Nations located on its territory.

President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khrushchev last March mentioned a number of scientific projects in which coöperation might be desirable, such as mapping the earth's magnetic field, research in the medical aspects of manned space flight and eventually coöperative probes of Mars and Venus. Bilateral discussions of the first subject were held during the recent meeting of the U.N. Scientific Subcommittee. The U.N. Committee provides a way in which bilateral projects of this kind can become multilateral undertakings with wider participation.

IV

The third part of the U.N. space program looks toward a worldwide program of weather forecasting and research.

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The space age has brought revolutionary advances in meteorology. The orbiting of weather satellites, supplementing other advances in meteorological technology such as sounding rockets, radar and electronic computers, will make it possible for the first time to keep the entire atmosphere of the earth under constant observation.

The U.N. program calls upon the World Meteorological Organization (W.M.O.), in collaboration with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the scientific community, to develop two kinds of proposals. The first is for an international weather service program—a global network to receive, process and transmit meteorological information from orbiting weather satellites as well as earth-based instruments. The second is for an international research program to yield information essential for improved weather prediction and perhaps eventually weather control.

The United Nations has made a good beginning in this part of its space program. Following passage of the General Assembly Resolution, the W.M.O. invited the United States and the Soviet Union to send experts to Geneva to help develop proposals for a coöperative weather program. In response to this invitation Dr. Harry Wexler, Director of Meteorological Research of the Weather Bureau, and Dr. V. A. Bugaev, Director of the Soviet Central Weather Forecasting Institute, produced a draft which, with some modifications, was approved by the W.M.O.'s Executive Committee in June. The recommendations in the W.M.O. report have been discussed by the Outer Space Committee and the General Assembly. They will be on the agenda for action by the quadrennial congress of government representatives to be held by the W.M.O. in April 1963.

The plan as a whole is impressive. In the field of weather forecasting, the W.M.O. proposes a system of satellite and conventional observations called the "World Weather Watch" which could bring improved weather services to every country of the world. First steps in the execution of this program would include the establishment of three world weather centers—in Washington, Moscow and a city in the Southern Hemisphere—for the collection and dissemination of data; the establishment of regional centers; and the filling of existing gaps in the network of ground and ship observatories in order to establish global weather coverage.

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More accurate prediction of storms, floods, rainfall and droughts will bring major savings in life and property. Significant increases in farm production will be made possible as the nature and timing of crop planting are adjusted to take account of future weather patterns. The improved weather services which this program is designed to develop could lead to the saving of billions of dollars in the United States alone. They hold special promise for countries in the tropics and Southern Hemisphere where vast uninhabited and ocean areas cannot be covered by conventional techniques.

The research aspects of coöperation in the weather field may be no less significant than the service aspects. Increased knowledge of the atmosphere may lead to new solutions to air pollution above our cities. Eventually it may help us to break up dangerous storms and achieve some control over climate and rainfall. In the words of the W.M.O. report, "it is not unrealistic to expect that mankind will eventually have the power to influence weather and even climate on a large scale." By encouraging coöperation now we may reduce the risk that this power will eventually be used by one nation to achieve selfish military or economic advantage at the expense of others. The report outlines in a preliminary fashion the research that may be undertaken in the weather field. To develop these possibilities we need a collaborative effort involving W.M.O., the U.N. Specialized Agency principally concerned, and the private scientific community operating through the International Council of Scientific Unions.

The cost of both the service and research programs in the weather field will be small compared to their potential benefits. The challenge to the United Nations in the months ahead is to find ways to encourage the necessary coöperation among nations in research, in the training of weather experts, in the financing of weather stations, in the tracking of weather satellites and in the exchange of weather information. This coöperation promises to be particularly valuable in the light of the exchange of views during the Dryden-Blagonravov talks on the coördinated launching of U.S. and Soviet weather satellites. The United States is already making available to other countries the information received from our Tiros satellites. Implementation of the Dryden-Blagonravov proposals would mean that the Soviet Union would also transmit the information gained from its weather satellites.

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V

The fourth part of the U.N. program of space cöoperation looks toward the establishment of a global system of communication satellites.

The dramatic success of *Telstar* has focused public attention on the vast possibilities which space technology holds for world communications. It will be technically possible within the next few years to have in operation a global communication system for television, radio, telephone, telegraph and data transmission.

The communication satellite will have a profound impact on the future of mankind. With the aid of satellites, telephone communication between continents will become immeasurably easier. Communication satellites can offer many times the number of telephone channels available in our existing undersea cables. If intercontinental telephone communication increases sufficiently to fill this huge capacity, it may some day be possible to place a call to any place in the world for approximately the same charge as to another city in the United States.

Intercontinental radio and television open even more dramatic prospects. According to the U.S. Information Agency, there are now some 100,000,000 television receivers in use in 75 countries of the world. By the end of this decade, when a communication satellite network could be operating, there will be double that number. Programs will have a potential audience of nearly one billion people.

This fundamental breakthrough in communication could affect the lives of people everywhere. It could enable people to see and hear news events in other parts of the world at the very moment of their occurrence. It could provide a new means to improve literacy and education in remote areas. It could enable leaders of nations to talk on a convenient and reliable basis.

Some time in the future lies the prospect of direct broadcast radio and television. When this day comes, it may be possible to beam programs from communication satellites directly into people's homes. The satellite system likely to be in use within this decade, however, will be for point-to-point relay between central installations in different countries. This means that the benefits of space communications can be made available to all peoples only through political as well as technical coöperation.

The United Nations program is designed to be a contribution

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to such coöperation. It starts from a principle now unanimously endorsed in the U.N. resolution—that satellite communication should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and nondiscriminatory basis. In the view of the United States, efforts should be made to develop a single civilian system for all nations of the world rather than competing systems between contending political blocs.

A second principle underlying the program is that the United Nations and its related agencies should be able to use communication satellites both in communicating with their representatives around the world and in transmitting programs of information and education. *Telstar* has already been used during the 17th General Assembly for live TV transmission across the North Atlantic of events at the United Nations. From this beginning we hope to encourage a practice by which all members of the United Nations will permit their people to see and hear the organization's proceedings in the interest of international understanding and world peace.

A third principle is the importance of technical assistance and economic aid to develop the internal communication systems of the less developed countries. A country with an inadequate telephone and radio system and no television at all cannot participate fully in a global network of communications.

Like the W.M.O. in the weather field, the International Telecommunication Union has been asked by the General Assembly to report on ways of promoting coöperation in space communications. In 1959 the I.T.U. made assignments of radio frequency bands for research activities in outer space—*e.g.* for tracking and communicating in connection with space experiments. The I.T.U. has now definitely scheduled for October 1963 a special conference to allocate frequencies for use in outer space, including those which will be needed for communication satellite systems. Agreement on the reservation of an adequate part of the scarce frequency spectrum for space communication, and the establishment of ground rules which will assure non-interference of space communications of different countries with each other or with other services on the earth, is an obvious prerequisite to progress. For this reason, the 1963 conference may well be one of the most important communications conferences ever held.

The allocation of radio frequencies is but one of many problems which will have to be solved through international agreement

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to clear the way for communication satellites. In recognition of this fact, the I.T.U. has been asked to consider at the 1963 conference other aspects of space communications in which international coöperation will be required. In preparation for the conference, the I.T.U. has asked members by the end of 1962 to submit information on three matters: their present programs for the development of space communications; the subjects they regard as appropriate for international coöperation in order to achieve global space communications; and which of those subjects, if any, they believe should be included on the conference agenda. The Secretary General of the I.T.U. will prepare a report for the guidance of member states on the basis of these replies.

While the I.T.U. is preparing for the 1963 conference, the foundation for a program of international coöperation is already being laid in the United States. A U.S. communication satellite corporation has been established pursuant to legislation passed by the last Congress. This corporation, under Federal regulation, will be the instrument for U.S. participation in a global satellite system. It is a joint venture of an unprecedented kind. Up to half of its stock may be held by U.S. common carriers, the other half by the general public on the widest possible basis. There will be a Board of Directors of 15, three of them appointed by the President to represent the public interest. No one company can have more than three of the 15 directors. These and other provisions are designed to provide safeguards against domination of the corporation by a single private firm.

The passage of this legislation enables the United States to exercise effective leadership in developing the international arrangements necessary for a world-wide communications system. We do *not* envisage that other countries will satisfy their interests in satellite communications by purchasing shares in the U.S. company. Indeed, existing law would place a 20 percent ceiling on any such purchases made in the public portion of the U.S. company. Instead, we envisage that the U.S. company would participate in a truly international arrangement which would provide for broad ownership and participation on a world-wide basis.

A number of common-sense considerations suggest the importance of developing a truly international venture in the months ahead. Since the satellites will be primarily useful for communicating with other countries, we must agree with those

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sovereign countries on the arrangements for talking with them. Much of the traffic will be between other countries not involving the United States at all. In view of the importance which all states attach to communications, many of them will wish to own and operate their own ground stations as well as participate in the ownership and management of the satellites themselves.

Unless we can work out mutually satisfactory arrangements with the countries principally concerned, we may encourage the development of competing systems involving wasteful duplication and political rivalry. Moreover, we shall have to work out mutually acceptable ground rules with other countries for the ownership and operation of the system if we are to secure the frequency allocations consistent with our own needs. One overriding question is the choice of the system to be established. This will have important consequences on coverage and burden-sharing—the availability of satellites for communication between and within countries, and the costliness of the ground installations which nations will have to build.

The establishment of global satellite communications will require international agreement on other questions, such as participation in ownership of the system, allocation of satellite channels between uses and users, location of ground terminals, technical standardization, assistance to less developed countries and rates to be charged for various services.

Although many of these problems are analogous to those which have been solved in connection with conventional communications systems, others raise questions that are quite new. In seeking solutions we need an approach that is not doctrinaire but functional. Different problems may require different kinds of arrangements—bilateral, regional and multilateral. We shall need to make use of the I.T.U. and other institutions of the U.N. system. New organizations may eventually prove necessary. Over-all arrangements will be sought through diplomatic means. These will be supplemented by business and technical arrangements between the operating entities in the various countries.

In the months ahead we will explore various means of dealing with these problems with other interested countries. During the recent Dryden-Blagonravov talks, the Soviet spokesman expressed interest in discussing coöperation in the field of space communications. Moreover, the Soviet representative to the I.T.U. Administrative Council indicated during the Council's ses-

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sion last May that the Soviet Union would be willing to send an expert to the I.T.U. to study communication satellite questions with experts of other countries in the same manner as was done with weather coöperation in the W.M.O. In such bilateral and multilateral conversations the United States will be seeking to reach the international agreements necessary to promote the objective adopted by the General Assembly in this area—"that communication by means of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis."

VI

It should be apparent from this review that the work of the United Nations in the peaceful uses of outer space serves the national interest of the United States and other countries for at least three main reasons:

In the first place, it provides a way, despite political differences, to exploit the enormous possibilities which the space age opens for all mankind. This approach is not based on faith or on a fuzzy idealism. We recognize that the deep political differences of our time place an upper limit on coöperation. We are not about to send Messrs. Glenn and Titov together on a single spaceship to the moon. But we hope to develop coöperative projects with the Soviet Union, if not in the form of joint ventures, at least in the coördination of activities.

While political differences place an upper limit on coöperation, considerations of self-interest place a lower limit as well. For example, the Soviet Union for years resisted rules for frequency allocation and usage for radio communication facilities; it then accepted the frequency allocations of the I.T.U. for its own broadcasts in order to avoid interference in the operation of its radio circuits. Hopefully, the national interest of the Soviet Union will encourage it to coöperate from the outset in space communications.

It is in the interest of all countries, whatever their ideology, that space and celestial bodies should not be the subject of competing national claims, that coöperative experiments be undertaken and information exchanged, that world-wide weather services be developed and that communications among nations be improved. Recent meetings have emphasized this common interest to Soviet scientists and technical experts. While the United

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Nations and its Specialized Agencies are not the only institutions to promote coöperation, they do help to stimulate affirmative Soviet actions and fit cöoperation between the United States and the Soviets into a broader framework which recognizes the interests of other countries.

In the second place, a program under U.N. sponsorship can help widen and deepen coöperation on a free-world basis even if universal participation is not achieved. The assistance of many nations is needed if our national space program is to be successfully carried on. In weather and communications, for example, the technology of the United States can yield dividends to ourselves and others only if many nations join in allocating radio frequencies, in tracking and communicating with space vehicles and in placing necessary ground installations on their territories. A good start has already been made in bilateral coöperation through the activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which has coöperative ventures with some 40 countries involving tracking stations, exchanges of personnel and joint space experiments. For certain countries and for certain activities, however, coöperative projects may be easier to achieve if they are multilateral and bear United Nations endorsements.

In the third place, the program of space coöperation has deep significance for the United Nations itself and for its Specialized Agencies, which will have new responsibilities for promoting scientific coöperation and information exchange and for assisting in the development of world-wide weather and communication services. Such activities cannot fail to strengthen the United Nations as a force for peace by binding its members together through ties of common interest. This is particularly true of the developing countries, which stand to derive some of the greatest benefits.

It should be obvious that our attempt to build peaceful space coöperation in the United Nations and elsewhere does not eliminate the need for military space programs to maintain the security of the United States and the entire free world. There is no inconsistency in moving simultaneously on both fronts. For the foreseeable future, we shall wish to have military space programs to help keep the peace, and civilian space programs to help us live better in peace. In outer space, as on earth, the achievement of law and order depends ultimately on the power of free nations.

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The test of the legitimacy of a particular use of outer space is not whether it is military or non-military, but whether it is peaceful or aggressive. Russian cosmonauts are members of the Soviet Air Forces, but this is no reason to challenge their activities. There is, in any event, no workable dividing line between military and non-military uses of space. A navigational satellite in outer space can guide a submarine as well as a merchant ship. Thus the United States has military space programs, but all of our space activities will continue to be for peaceful, *i.e.* defensive and beneficial, purposes.

This does not mean that we are unwilling to consider certain specific measures of disarmament in outer space. The Western Plan for General and Complete Disarmament includes as a first-stage measure a ban on the placing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, with effective measures for verification. As a matter of fact, we have no program to place any such weapons in outer space, and we shall not do so unless Soviet actions compel us.

To sum up, our efforts in the United Nations to promote peaceful space coöperation, our disarmament efforts to ban the use of weapons in space, and our space programs which have military aspects are mutually consistent measures in support of a secure and peaceful world order. No Congress of Vienna can promulgate a régime of law and order in outer space. This objective will have to be developed through coöperative arrangements on specific functional problems. The United States will continue to seek such arrangements in the months ahead, not only in bilateral negotiations but in the United Nations and its family of agencies.

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THE RUB OF CULTURES

By Francis E. Dart

THE thoughts that I record here began to take shape three years ago in a small mountain town in Nepal where my trip was interrupted by a three-day festival to Laksmi. I had been walking for eight days and was to walk nearly twenty more without once meeting a wheeled vehicle or any other evidence of mechanized civilization. Through dense tropical forests of sal a hundred feet above sea level, up steep slopes thick with rhododendron trees, along great cedared ridges cool even in the sun at 12,000 feet, I had been traveling in the only way one can in Nepal, on foot trails that are sometimes deserted, sometimes thronged with heavily burdened men and women moving in unison, their baskets weighted with new potatoes or ghee. Occasionally the trail would thread a village animated with the play of naked brown-skinned children, with cheerful old men in woolen shawls and shy dark-eyed girls carrying jars of water from the well—an irregular patch of mud-colored houses on the gold of ripening rice paddies surrounding it. With all its beauty and poverty and its growing desire for new ways, in the familiar jargon of our time, this was the underdeveloped country.

I had been asked to go to Nepal in order to teach science and to introduce new methods and equipment to the science teachers there. Soon after my arrival, however, and before I had started my project, it became clear that this was not really wanted, at any rate not by the teachers who would be most affected by my work. Equipment would certainly be acceptable, but not new methods and certainly not any direct teaching. I soon became convinced that the objections were not directed at me personally nor at American assistance and yet ran very much deeper than mere misunderstanding of words. It was more a matter of the social structure of a Nepalese college, which does not permit a professor to admit that there is anything more for him to learn, and of unwillingness to accept the changes that might result from a different sort of teaching. As a scientist or science teacher I would be very welcome, provided I did not do anything. In growing consternation, I began to see that I was to be more of a symbol than an active scientist—a sort of offering to be laid like a flower at the shrine of a modern deity. I was pretty sure I would wilt.

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In the end I found many things to do, most of them inoffensive and some of them useful. During two years in this delightful country, I learned much about it and its people, but I learned on my own with practically no professional assistance. I was there as one member of a three-man team sent by the University of Oregon under contract with the International Coöperation Administration (the "point four" program of technical and economic assistance). At that time, the total American assistance to Nepal amounted to approximately $3,000,000 per year, about one-tenth of which was spent through the University of Oregon contract. The contract achieved its objectives of establishing a college of education, training Nepalese educators, setting up a press for textbook preparation, etc., and according to both Nepalese and American authorities it was among the best of all American-sponsored projects in Nepal. Notwithstanding this, it was beset as were the other projects with much waste and delay and with much uncertainty as to its long-range effectiveness largely because of discrepancies between American and Asian ways of doing things, and because neither side could easily understand and communicate with the other.

I recount all this because it is substantially the situation in a great many of the underdeveloped countries. American aid is offered and accepted at top government levels and then met with resistance or polite evasion when it is delivered. Particularly is this true when the aid involves changes in old ways or ideas. Yet these very countries are asking for assistance because they want to change. We, in our turn, are puzzled and exasperated, yet in our puzzlement we ourselves doubt the relevance or competence of our own social science. The very development of Western science which should help us the most we are unwilling to use. Bravely we struggle ahead without it, as though to show the world that we can do it anyway—even with half our brains tied behind us.

II

Asia today is a scene of intense and rapid change. Strong winds of economic, political and social innovation are sweeping through every corner of the continent, bringing in new institutions, new industries and technologies and a whole new attitude toward Asia's part in the world ahead. Taken together, these add up to a revolution to compare with any the world has seen. Beneath all

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the turmoil, however, there lies a vast inertia, a great ocean of people and tradition, slow to respond to the storm at the surface, yet moving with deep and powerful currents that are hardly noticed above. The immediate revolution, one which will in time reach down to stir even these depths, is basically the same over all of Asia and is, or will be, in most of Africa too. One might almost say that it started with Marco Polo or Saint Paul; with the Western merchants and the colonial governments that followed them to exploit the rich resources of the East; or with the Christian missionaries who brought with them schools and medicine and a new concept of individual worth. Together, they sowed their seeds of resentment and hope and new knowledge, unable, surely, to guess what might be the harvest of so mixed a planting.

After World War II, these elements exploded into a drive for independence and for living standards comparable, if possible, to those in the Western world. The people of the hitherto underdeveloped countries determined now to have food enough and medicines, and yes, airplanes and wrist watches and nuclear reactors, too, and to have them on their own terms, free from Western exploitation. They wanted, also, to find and somehow adopt the concepts of equal justice, equal dignity, equal cosmic importance for all—concepts that the Westerner enjoys but has been unable to share. It is perhaps well to mention here that, in Asia at least, these things are wanted without Western religion, which is viewed with deep distrust. This is a fact of great significance, because in Asia religion is a vital and necessary part of living which, unlike Christianity, offers no strong motivation toward social change.

Not only are changes desired, they are desired in a great hurry. Generations of Western progress are to be absorbed in a decade or two and it is useless to suggest a slower, sounder pace, for the very continued existence of most political régimes depends upon their delivery of an almost impossible rate of progress; for them the fastest pace *is* the soundest. Many among their citizens know about higher standards and are unwilling to wait longer; and many of us who would help know what is possible (in a way that our forebears did not know for us), and we are eager to urge them forward. Moreover, now that a start has been made, it may well be that a rapid pace has to be maintained just to stay ahead of the expanding population. Thus, while I was in Nepal, the literacy rate was less than 5 percent and yet, with all the nation's efforts

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to provide more schools and teachers, literacy was *decreasing* each year.

One is tempted, nevertheless, to question the wisdom and even sometimes the safety of proceeding so rapidly. The whole thing suggests to me an attempt to present the Bonneville Power System to St. Thomas Aquinas. One wonders just what will come of it. Yet I am sure that there is no practical use in asking whether this is good or safe. These questions are not only very complicated, but also irrelevant. It is not necessary to look very far even in Nepal (which has been isolated until very recently) in order to find convincing evidence that there is no possible turning back. People who have once learned of modern antibiotics will not be willing to go back to the "unspoiled past" with its high infant mortality. The mountain villager who showed me his new kerosene lantern with pride and asked if we had anything as good as that in America will never go back to using pine torches. The man or woman who has once attended a modern school will not be the same again, nor will his village. I met a Gurung woman who knows this. She cannot read or write two words, but she contributed three thousand rupees to her village to build a school and then herself walked five days from her village to meet me and ask if we would train teachers for the school. Shall we tell her it was only an old woman's mistaken dream? Can we refuse to train teachers for her school?

No, the revolution will not be stopped. It is of no use to ask whether it should ever have started or who started it. With or without our help it will come, and it is better by far that America should be involved, for we have much of value to offer. Better to ask how we can be a constructive force in it, how we can help make of it a renaissance instead of a new enslavement. Better for them and also better for us.

III

It is the fruits of Western technology that are most of all wanted. Everything else from America, our literature, art or "culture," could be dispensed with except only these precious apples so long forbidden. It is jeeps and tractors, hospitals and antibiotics, hydroelectric plants and refrigerators that represent the new order of civilization. It is industry (meaning wealth) and education (meaning training) which are to transform life. It is modern weapons which are to ensure national liberty and perhaps

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even allow a part in bigger games among the nations. Modern technology is seen as the liberator of the Western world now coming to liberate the Eastern. To be sure, there is criticism of nuclear bombs and bomb tests and a good deal of apprehension about them, but hardly anyone doubts that the less awesome products of a technological age are primary and indeed are the only primary things to be had from us. (Our interests in Asia and Africa and our fears for them are somewhat different from this view, and it is important therefore that we understand theirs.)

The costs, however, turn out to be unexpectedly high. Capital is a scarce item where the average annual income is less than $100 and the few who are wealthy would rather visit the West than bring it to the East. Where tens of millions do not have enough capital to own a pair of shoes, it is hard to promote investment, whether public or private, in expensive progress. Furthermore, the progress does not run itself and technicians brought from abroad or trained abroad are both scarce and exceedingly expensive. Fortunately, various of the more developed or most developed nations are willing "for certain reasons" (as the Indian says when he does not wish to expand on a matter) to give substantial amounts of capital and equipment and even to send trained technicians and provide training for others. Thus a start can be made.

However, this turns out to be only a beginning, a down payment, as it were, with the real and continuing payments yet to be made. Once the start has been made, of course it is hoped that the normal processes of capital accumulation and development of human resources will follow, and doubtless they will, although there is some reason to be concerned about the time required for this and also about the disruption that would attend any serious international strife. But the most serious and unexpected costs are to be measured in terms of change; the very changes that are so much desired have negative as well as positive aspects.

The introduction of new techniques, new industries and new education into a community is certain to bring far-reaching and often unforeseen changes in working habits, in work hours, in the status within the community of new sorts of workers, and in the distribution of money and power. These soon begin to affect social structures and institutions, family patterns, leadership patterns, etc. Before long, the very cultural foundation of the community may seem to be threatened, its religion called into question, its

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most basic philosophies of man's relation to nature and to God, of the status of women or the training of children, altered and forced to accommodate to new pressures. Of course, such changes took place in Western culture too under the impact there of the industrial-technological revolution, and, even spread over generations, they seemed to be very drastic. One can only imagine what their impact must be, crowded into a few years in an Indian or African village. This is the real cost of the revolution.

It sometimes happens that the changes come too quickly for even superficial accommodation. The failures that then occur seem to be superficial or even trivial, yet they can serve to indicate the difficulty with which innovation comes. In one country steel plows are introduced where previously a pointed stick had served. The farmers accept them with polite gratitude and use them as ornaments but not for plowing. Why? These plows require two hands and the farmers are accustomed to using only one, the other being used to guide the bullock. A more productive variety of rice cannot be introduced in part of Nepal where it is needed and very well suited to climate and soil because the grains cling a bit more to the stalk and a new threshing technique would need to be used. But threshing is a family or community undertaking involving social and ritual as well as mechanical activities. Running water in people's houses is not accepted because the village well is the social center as well as a source of water. Cook stoves designed to conduct smoke out of the house through a chimney are not acceptable to Hindu housewives in place of the open smoky *chula* now in use because religion requires that all parts of the stove (including the chimney if there is one) be cleaned after each meal. It would not be difficult to put together a large list of such minor failures nor to include in it some major ones. If these seem improbable or easily overcome, the reader might review the introduction of an innovation, say the fluoridation of water, into our own technologically highly sophisticated society. He might also consider the willingness with which Christians, out of Christian motives, will help to reduce infant mortality and disease in a distant non-Christian country and how unwilling they may then be to help control the population explosion that inevitably results.

The whole process abroad is like an attempt to transplant cut flowers. Surely the changes to be introduced need to have roots in an indigenous technological revolution that will give them con-

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tinuity and relationship to a whole. In the end this means that the developing nations need to have their own scientific revolutions.

IV

Far back in the hills of Nepal, seven or eight days' walk from any contact with the modern world, iron is mined and smelted and fabricated into tools. The inhabitants of the village of Those who do this use almost exactly the same process of ore-smelting which is employed in similarly remote Chokwe villages in Angola, where, as a boy, I used to admire the native-made hunting knives and arrow points. It is, in fact, the same smelting process which in ancient Greece led to the development of metallurgy and eventually to the science of chemistry. The Nepalese and the Angolans have used the process for generations, perhaps for many centuries, yet there is no hint of chemistry in Those. The men and women who operate the smelter know what to do, but they are not curious about the transformation that converts stone into metal. They do not depend upon any understanding of it in order to keep it going or possibly improve it. For such purposes, they use a different device; into the wall of the clay smelter is molded a small image of a deity who oversees the process and to whom deference is paid before each run.

Technology is not science. Tools and the skill to make and use them are found everywhere, but science is a unique development limited almost entirely to the Western world where it has played an essential part—perhaps the most essential part—in making possible the enormous variety of innovations that collectively make up the industrial-technological revolution. Not only has the scientific revolution given the Western world the fundamental understanding of nature that makes these innovations technically feasible, but it has also fostered an attitude toward nature and natural forces that allows for their manipulation and control. The importance of this latter condition is not often appreciated, for we live and grow up from childhood in an atmosphere saturated with science. Before entering kindergarten, our children play with "scientific" toys, hear about germs, watch television and know all about automobiles and airplanes. Third graders do "research" and their parents can scarcely buy a tube of toothpaste without resort to science. As a result, we accept a scientific, a rational view of nature without question. We take it for granted

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that things which are not understood will some day be understood and that in understanding natural phenomena lies the way to a better life.

Such is not the case everywhere. In Nepal, as in most of Asia and Africa, children grow to adulthood in a world that is saturated not with science but with non-science—with a deep running view of nature that is essentially non-rational, non-objective. It is a world where a cholera epidemic calls for special prayer-flags no less and no more than for immunization; where a new diesel generator for the college cannot be started after installation until a blood sacrifice has rendered it safe; where only a fool would operate a bicycle or jeep without a similar ceremonial sacrifice once each year; where the timing and conduct of every new undertaking is controlled more by astrology than by technology. The important distinction here is not one of religion as such. In both East and West religion may be a mature expression of man's search to know "that of God" in his being. It is rather a question of one's view of nature, a question as to whether nature is subject to rational understanding or not. Across the street from the principal college in Kathmandu is a wall into which is built a narrow triangular window neatly framed and decorated and provided with a small shelf of flowers. One of the professors explained to me that there is a goddess living in the field beyond the wall who likes sometimes to cross the street, and it would have been discourteous to build the wall without providing a passage for her convenience. Any Westerner visiting Kathmandu who is unable to accept this goddess as a real and influential member of the community should, in my judgment, think of himself only as a tourist.

Science in such a setting is likely to be considered as a charm, practiced by the Westerner, but essentially qualitatively like the many older charms used to ward off misfortune or ensure good. The acceptance of science as a charm is clearly illustrated in medicine, where drugs and doctors are eagerly accepted, whereas public health measures are met with great reluctance and little if any understanding. The purifying of drinking water by boiling is more likely to be understood as a ritual purification than as biological. Once the ceremony is performed it may be considered as unimportant what happens thereafter to the water—what may be added, whether clean containers are used, etc. Thus our cook learned quickly that dishes were to be washed and rinsed in

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boiled water and he faithfully complied with this instruction. However, he saw nothing wrong with drying the dishes with a cloth he had just used to mop the floor and he could not understand my wife's distress when she discovered this. Even the native-born scientist frequently finds himself a practitioner of an alien cult uncomfortably suspended between two worlds and not fully accepted into either.

A true scientific revolution which could support technology would profoundly affect the cultures of the underdeveloped nations in their deepest traditions and not merely in the obvious things of roads and tractors and the like. It would be certain to bring about major changes in religious philosophy, ethics and social structure. Surely this is playing with fire. Surely we should stop to consider before undertaking any such program.

Yet, in fact, there is little choice, for events have moved so far and so fast that some kind of technological change is now inevitable. The real questions left are only how it will come and how much disruption can be avoided. Moreover, in the change that is surely coming, very much that is good and needed can be included. If we cannot and would not prevent the growth of science in the developing nations, we can certainly help to better its coming.

In doing so, we might well allow ourselves the luxury of good planning. For reasons of our own that few thoughtful observers would defend, we have for years limited ourselves to a one-year-at-a-time program that had to be concerned primarily with the more superficial aspects of the total revolution. Now we shall soon find that five years' planning is hardly too much, as we help the developing nations with longer-range preparation for wise introduction and use of new things. We should be even more concerned than we are to help them in the improvement and development of education in all its aspects, as distinguished from simple training for specific jobs. Training will not stand long as a substitute for education. We should help, for instance, in the introduction of science in the education of children, whose fresh curiosity and unselfconscious willingness to experiment is the same the world over. We have recently developed in America new and vital approaches to secondary school science teaching which could be of enormous significance abroad. We should urge their trial and help in the considerable work of adapting them.

There is a very great opportunity to help with good science

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films and other teaching aids, an opportunity we have been slow to take up in our foreign aid programs. The techniques of "programmed instruction," still in the process of development in this country, might prove to have important uses in countries where there are not enough teachers and many of the existing teachers have very little training, for these techniques might speed up teacher training and can make it possible for poorly trained teachers to do a much better job than would otherwise be likely. Adaptation of these programs to children and teachers in another culture will involve much more than simple translation and in some cases they will be initially too expensive. Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile to initiate pilot studies, for the potential benefits are quite large.

At a much higher level of scientific development, while continuing and expanding the educational exchanges that have proved so valuable, we should help the developing nations solve what has become a difficult problem to many of them. This is the loss of scientists who go abroad for advanced training—often to the United States—only to find that when they have completed their degree or a period of postdoctoral study they do not wish to return to their home country, or if they do return they do not wish to stay. The research equipment back home does not compare well with what they have been using; there are few qualified scientists there with whom to collaborate; the atmosphere of the country is not conducive to scientific research; international contacts are few; publication is difficult; governments are unsympathetic; and so on. The net effect is that the less developed countries are exporting scientists to the better developed. It will take a considerable measure of international coöperation and investment to find a satisfactory solution to this problem, which, understandably enough, has not disturbed us who gain by it as much as it might.

V

Many proposals of specific foreign aid projects are being made by people who have the detailed information that is necessary for this. I do not intend here a criticism of these projects. My purpose rather is to insist that our assistance to the developing nations, whatever its final form, must originate in clear understanding and genuine commitment. We need to have considerable understanding of ourselves as a scientifically oriented culture and of the

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nature of our science. We need to understand the non-scientific culture of our neighbors and to appreciate better than we now do the interaction of the two. To do so, we must place much greater reliance on our own social sciences in which we have so little faith, at least when it comes to foreign aid. It is silly for us as a scientifically mature nation to ignore our own science at just the point where it is most relevant, and we do so at our peril.

In recent months some concern for this problem has been felt by what is now named the Agency for International Development, and a small amount of research has been started to learn more about the problems connected with the introduction of change. It is to be hoped that this effort will be supported and even expanded into a serious study involving both the social and natural sciences.

When it comes to the day-to-day business of offering assistance, we should insist upon considerable skill in communication, an indispensable attribute of the good foreign technician as of any good teacher and one which we do not emphasize enough. It is never easy to be sure one understands another exactly and is exactly understood; across real barriers of language and culture, this is exceedingly difficult and requires much sensitivity and patience. When we remember that the useful foreign aid technician is not simply an observer, but a participant who must be able to teach and to criticize, with tact certainly, but without equivocation, we cannot be surprised that he sometimes fails; but we must demand a high standard of performance and we should provide him with a high quality of training.

Anyone who has traveled into a country of unfamiliar language and culture has experienced the difficulty and frustration of partial communication and has, no doubt, seen some of the attempts at escape. Many American representatives try to escape by walling themselves off and dealing with the other country only through "official" channels. They thus limit communication to what all parties are willing to have put on the record, and that is likely to be pretty thin fare. All too often those who venture farther can deal only with people who speak English and who may then be a rather special and unrepresentative group. On the other hand, to speak and hear through an interpreter puts one at the mercy not only of his skill, but also of his understanding and good will. I spent two exhausting days once walking in the wrong direction because an interpreter correctly translated the words but

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not the context of my inquiry about the trail to a certain village. (It was really my fault, for I had unknowingly stated my question in such a way that the reply had to transgress either the facts or local rules of courtesy. In that country courtesy takes precedence over facts.) At another extreme are those who try to escape by "doing in Rome as the Romans do," trying thereby to demonstrate their faith in the principles of equality and brotherhood. They want to dress as the native does, eat only what the poorest peasant eats and generally live at the lowest standard that the country and their stamina permit. I respect the motive behind this, but not the judgment. To dress and live like the outcast does not make us like him in anyone's sight, nor do we thus share his joys and his sorrows. It is like limping before the crippled. No, it is better to be what we are without fraud, showing from that position that we can meet, as equals before God, all men whether high or low who share with us something of His divine spirit. I do not suppose this to be always easy to do, but it is possible.

In fact, the whole undertaking is anything but easy, and, like the other great cultural revolutions, only the future can give a true measure of its cost and significance. We who are involved in it, like climbers still ascending the mountain, find that the trail is often enough steep and that perspective has its cost. Yet the effort is necessary to our future welfare as well as to that of our neighbors and we need to give it the best that we can. In the long run, wise and effective assistance to nations that are trying to develop their own scientific revolutions may be no less important than making our peace with automation or being first to reach the moon, for, in the long run, space-age nations and bullock-age nations make uncertain partners. In this century, even the "long run" is over before we know it.

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TRADE AND THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS

By William Butler

HOW important international trade is for the less developed nations is indicated by the fact that it frequently accounts for 20 percent or more of their total economy as against 8 percent for the economy of the United States. Indeed, trade is much more important to them than aid. Total exports of the less developed areas amounted to $31 billion in 1960, while the total flow of financial assistance from the industrial nations (including private foreign investment) amounted to $8 billion.

Despite these facts, very little is being done either within the less developed nations or through various aid programs to encourage their exports. Indeed, there is a disturbing trend toward policies which actively work in the opposite direction. The failure to stress the importance of international trade is serious, since unless these nations can expand it they cannot achieve their aspirations for accelerated development and for a rapid growth in living standards.

Consequently, it is pertinent to: (1) review the role which exports have played in the development process; (2) examine critically the argument that a developing nation should now concentrate its efforts on local industrialization and play down its traditional trade in food and industrial raw materials; and (3) consider what could be done through commodity agreements or other policies to promote exports from the less developed nations.

In recent years there has been a significant change in the composition of the trade between the industrial and less developed nations. The traditional pattern, and the dominant one until the end of World War II, involved an exchange of primary products (food and industrial raw materials) from the less developed nations for manufactured consumer products from the industrial nations. The United Kingdom, many continental European nations and Japan supported their industrial development by trading textiles, flour, shoes and other consumer products for such primary products as cotton, cocoa, sugar, hides, copper and jute. In such a trading system, it was difficult for local manufacturing to get under way in the less developed nations, though a start was made in the 1920s and 1930s.

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The growth of light consumer industries in these nations accelerated during World War II and the early postwar period, when the industrial nations could not meet the world-wide demand for consumer manufactured products and export earnings were high. These facts, plus the natural development of an entrepreneurial class and the spread of various forms of protection, led to a considerable growth of light consumer industries in many less developed nations during the past two decades. Private foreign investment has played an important part in this development, with the emphasis changing from primary-products industries before 1950 to investment in local manufacturing and distribution in recent years. Private investment has also helped to develop local technical and managerial competence.

The result has been a significant shift in the composition of international trade. A major part of the export earnings of the less developed nations now goes to buy the capital goods needed to support their industrialization and general economic development. This process can work to the benefit of all trading nations. The industrial nations gain through the expansion of markets for their capital goods and other manufactured products, as well as through an expanding inflow of primary products which can be produced more efficiently in the less developed areas. These latter gain through their ability to import not only capital goods but the techniques necessary for modernization.

The growing industrialization of the less developed nations through this two-way trade can lead to an expansion in world trade. Experience shows that the greatest and fastest-growing volume of trade takes place among nations where internal development is proceeding most rapidly. The very number of products used by developing nations multiplies geometrically, so that through the process of specialization every nation is able to find exports which can be sold competitively on world markets.

For all these reasons, it would appear that one of the major economic objectives of free-world nations should be to promote an expanding volume of trade between the industrial and less developed nations.

II

Our progress toward this objective in the past decade can hardly be termed satisfactory. There are, to be sure, some exceptions (most of them associated with petroleum); but as a general rule

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the trade of the less developed areas has lagged in recent years. Their share in world exports has declined steadily, from 31.5 percent of the total in 1953 to 24.7 percent in 1960. Since 1956, total exports of less developed areas have been growing only 2 percent per annum as against 6.5 percent for the industrial areas. The lag has been particularly severe in the case of Latin America, where, excluding Venezuela, exports have been rising only half of 1 percent per year.

This slow growth in export earnings of the less developed areas reflects a leveling off in the volume of most food and raw-material exports (there have been actual declines in a few, such as wool and nitrates) and a general weakness in prices. In many cases, the decline in export earnings has more than offset the increase in financial assistance from the industrial nations. Coffee surpluses plague Brazil, Colombia, Central America and many African nations. Prices of nonferrous metals, cocoa, cotton and wheat have been weakening. Virtually all of the less developed nations have found that their export earnings are insufficient to finance the imports they feel are needed to support their development.

These recent trends in markets for primary products have lent support to economic theories which argue that developing nations should turn away from the export of primary products and emphasize local industrialization. The thesis, as advanced by economic theorists in many of the less developed countries, is that the industrial nations have managed to get all of the advantages from the world-wide rise in productivity and have deprived the areas producing primary products of their share; that long-term price trends show much greater increases in prices of manufactured products than in prices of foods and industrial raw materials; and that because the terms of trade go steadily against them in this manner, the less developed areas do not share in world-wide development, and cannot import enough to meet their aspirations.

In addition, it is argued that commodity prices have been widely unstable; hence commodity exports cannot provide a reliable basis for economic development. Out of this line of argument come a number of policy recommendations: (1) developing nations must stress industrialization, since they can find little nourishment in developing commodity exports; (2) the industrial nations have an obligation to share the fruits of progress with the less developed areas through aid and commodity stabilization schemes; (3) investment even in inefficient domestic industries

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will benefit a developing nation more than would the same investment in commodity export lines.

The argument that the terms of trade go against the less developed areas in an inexorable manner has been shot to pieces by many analysts. The price indexes on which it rests are faulty in many ways; they do not properly allow for the improvement in the quality of manufactured exports, nor for the substantial reduction in the costs of transportation. Experience shows that many nations have successfully supported their industrial development by pushing food and industrial raw-material exports—among them the United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia (and even the United Kingdom depended heavily on coal exports for a century or more).

Nevertheless, the thesis of declining terms of trade dies hard. It fits into a superficial interpretation of recent economic history and provides a perfect rationalization for politicians of all parties: they can lay the blame for low living standards and slow progress on world markets.

While there is no evidence of a long-term deterioration in prices of primary products relative to those of manufactures, there are two features of trade in primary products which are significant. Many individual products display: (1) a lower-than-average growth trend over the long term; and (2) wide fluctuations in prices. Exports of many food products are linked chiefly to the growth in population in consuming areas, since there is little evidence of a major upward trend in consumption per person. Since population in the industrial areas grows less rapidly than total incomes, this means that demand for many imported food products lags behind the general growth of the industrial economies. In addition, trade in temperate-zone farm products has been limited by government measures to support uneconomic local production in Western Europe.

Exports of many industrial raw materials are influenced by the tendency of industrial economies to use steadily smaller volumes of raw materials per dollar of output. Measured in constant prices, the United States used 22½ cents worth of raw materials for each dollar of gross national product in 1900. In 1960 we used only 11½ cents of raw materials per $1 of gross national product. This trend has accelerated in the past 20 years. We economized in the use of raw materials at a rate of .1 percent per annum from 1900 to 1940, and at a rate of 1.8 percent per annum since 1940.

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Two factors underlie our ability to get more final production per unit of raw materials. One is the growing importance of service industries, which use fewer raw materials per unit of output than is the case in manufacturing and building. This increase in services is reflected in the fact that only 35 percent of workers are now employed in manufacturing and construction, as compared with 43 percent in 1919.

A much more important factor in recent years has been the increasing efficiency with which raw materials are used. This shows up in many ways: electric utilities produce steadily more kilowatts of power per pound of coal or per b.t.u. of other fuels; auto tires last longer, requiring less rubber per mile; less steel is used per tin can, or per given unit of capacity of a highway bridge. In addition, scrap is used more effectively, and synthetics are replacing natural products in some lines.

While all these factors point to a slower growth in consumption of primary products than in gross national product in the industrial nations, over-all prospects for food and industrial raw-materials exports from the less developed nations are not at all bleak. Consumption of some primary products will rise more rapidly than the average—for example, petroleum, bauxite, aluminum and the newer metals.

Moreover, the price weakness which followed the Korean War boom in commodity prices is gradually being corrected. The major exception appears to be coffee, where production continued to expand even with sharply lower prices. In other markets, the continuing growth in demand, together with measures to restrain the increase in productive capacity, could bring a better balance in the years ahead and reasonable levels of prices for producers.

A second broad characteristic of most commodity markets is the fact that prices fluctuate widely. Demand is not very sensitive to price changes in the short run, and therefore a shortage leads to a more than proportionate increase in price. As an example, the 1949 freeze in Brazil reduced the world output of coffee only moderately, but prices doubled. On the other side, the supply of many commodities is relatively inelastic, so that severe price declines have relatively little effect on the volume produced in the short run.

The wide fluctuation in commodity prices is illustrated by three principal Latin American exports over the past decade: The highest coffee price was 75 percent above the average and the lowest 50

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percent below it; the highest cocoa price was almost double the average and the lowest almost half the average; the highest sugar price was 50 percent above average and the low 25 percent below the average. Obviously, then, a nation heavily dependent on exports of one or two commodities will find earnings fluctuating widely (except where the commodity is oil). Sixteen of the Latin American republics derive more than half their export earnings from one or two commodities.

There has been so much emphasis on the fluctuating nature of commodity prices that it is worth examining the problem in several dimensions.

First, it should be noted that prices fluctuate upward as well as downward.[1] Over the past 60 years the less developed areas have gained more from the upward fluctuations than they have lost in periods of declining prices. In other words, if at any time in that period—except in the 1930s and the late 1950s—a bargain had been worked out to stabilize commodity prices at their average relationship to industrial prices, the less developed areas would have been the losers.

The record shows that export earnings from individual manufactured products have been just about as unstable as those from individual commodity exports. The fact is that foreign trade is a fluctuating business, and apart from the hazards of weather in the case of farm products, there appears to be little to choose as between manufactured and primary-products exports on the grounds of stability. Most of the complaints about commodity prices by suppliers relate to the failure of prices to hold at, or move ahead from, historic highs. It appears to be a natural attribute of sellers to regard the most recent high as a norm.

Secondly, it is frequently overlooked that, while the demand for and the supply of commodities are relatively insensitive to price changes, they are not absolutely insensitive. More coffee will be sold at a lower rather than at a higher price, and declining prices will sooner or later lead to a reduction in supply. Many of the mistakes in dealing with commodity problems stem from a failure to understand the simple economic truth that the law of supply and demand is a peculiarly inexorable law even in the hands of government. This is important, for although it would be possible and even useful to devise a workable mechanism to reduce wide

[1] Many of the ideas in this section were developed by Stacy May in "Folklore and Fact About Underdeveloped Areas," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1955.

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fluctuations in commodity prices—through a buffer-stock mechanism or by an international agreement to limit price fluctuations in any year within a range around the previous year's average—any attempt to hold the price of a commodity above that dictated by supply and demand will be very costly and probably ineffective.

A third point about the instability of commodity prices is that prices of individual products seldom move up and down in unison. Thus, diversification of commodity production and exports can contribute greatly to stability and growth in a nation's export earnings. Mexico, Peru and Canada provide examples of nations with diversified export lists and with both stability and growth in export earnings.

A final point is that misguided domestic economic policies frequently do more damage to export earnings than changes in world market conditions. The most direct way to discourage exports is to tax them—as, for instance, Mexico, while encouraging other exports, taxes exports of most minerals. Multiple exchange rates can also have the same effect as a tax on exports; Brazil's exchange system discouraged cotton and cocoa exports until about a year ago. Of all domestic policies, however, inflation is perhaps the most effective in deterring exports. When domestic prices rise more rapidly than the exchange rates depreciate, domestic costs rise faster than export receipts, exports become less profitable and their volume declines. The best remedy is, of course, price stability. If that is not achieved, a nation must be willing to devalue promptly and repeatedly to maintain a realistic relationship between domestic and foreign prices.

III

What does all this mean for United States foreign economic policy? Our broad objective continues to be that of supporting the sound development and growth of the less developed areas. The burden of the foregoing argument is that one of the most important steps we can take toward this objective is to promote the growth of trade between the industrial and less developed areas. Thus, it is important to evaluate a number of policies which have been advanced in the trade field to see if they would contribute to an expanding volume of trade.

The most immediate question concerns the attitude of the United States toward international commodity agreements. These agreements seek to stabilize prices through the coöperation either

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of producing nations alone or of both consuming and producing nations. In some cases, they operate through a buffer-stock mechanism under which supplies are purchased for the stock when prices are below a minimum figure and sold from the stock when the price goes above a maximum figure. In other cases, export quotas, or a combination of export and import quotas, are used in an attempt to control the supplies reaching markets, hence the price.

Experience with commodity agreements extends over many decades; one of the earliest was a whale-oil agreement almost a century ago. In more recent years, arrangements have been set up in such fields as wheat, sugar, coffee and tin. None of these agreements has been notably successful. Those consisting of producer groups usually try to hold prices at a high level, thereby providing substantial incentives for nations to stay out of the agreement. Some agreements have broken down because producing and consuming nations have been unable to agree on prices, while in the case of farm products, where supply is difficult to control, the attempt to prop up prices can lead only to mounting surpluses.

None the less, I believe the United States should coöperate with less developed areas to see whether workable commodity agreements can be negotiated. If such efforts are directed at limiting short-term price fluctuations while allowing long-term forces of supply and demand to operate, they may serve a useful purpose. In the process, the mechanism of international study groups may help spread an understanding of the mutual problem of supplying and consuming nations, and may perform valuable educational services.

However, the United States should seek to orient commodity agreements in a generally liberal direction in the sense that they should be directed at expanding world trade instead of developing into tight international cartels. The objective should be to facilitate the adjustments required by free markets rather than to replace free markets with rigid controls and high prices.

The International Coffee Agreement, which was signed by the United Nations coffee conference last September, may serve to bring the issues involved in commodity agreements into sharp focus. Coffee is in massive oversupply, with carry-over stocks equal to about two years' consumption and with estimated production for the crop year 1962–63 almost 20 percent above world consumption. While the details have not been fully spelled out,

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the coffee agreement is essentially an attempt to hold up, or increase, prices by imposing quotas on coffee exports from producing nations. The five-year agreement places export quotas for the first year at 45.6 million bags, slightly higher than shipments in recent years. Importing countries are required to hold purchases from non-members at the average level of the past three years. The export quotas are to be enforced by requiring a certificate of origin for each coffee shipment. The agreement also contains provisions calling on producing nations to reduce coffee production to bring it in line with export quotas.

While the agreement may bring stability to coffee markets in the short run, it remains to be seen whether it can work to the advantage of producing nations in the longer run. If the idea that it should be used to raise coffee prices is pursued, the agreement is likely to break down, because prices which are well above the costs of efficient producers will provide a very strong incentive to increase coffee production and exports. The agreement's mechanism for restricting production appears to be weak, as is likely to be the case with a farm product turned out by a great many farmers. If the export-quota mechanism should break down, it might be possible to set up a series of import quotas in consuming nations as a means of bolstering prices. If, as has been the case in sugar, major consuming nations will control imports tightly, prices can be maintained at levels well above those which would prevail in free markets. However, even if the coffee agreement can be made to work in one way or another, a number of basic problems will remain. An obvious one is that of dealing with existing surplus stocks and present surplus productive capacity. Ultimately, exporting nations must take steps to shift from coffee to more useful pursuits.

This highlights the basic problem. If commodity agreements can be used as a device to ease the transition from over-production of certain primary products to expanding production of other things which are in demand, then commodity agreements can serve a constructive purpose. But if they serve merely to pile up surpluses, then commodity agreements will either break down or divert productive resources to unproductive ends. The experience of the United States with its extremely costly farm price support programs should be studied by all those who propose to prop up prices through international commodity agreements.

In stressing the problems involved in commodity agreements, I

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do not wish to leave the impression that nothing can be done. Where supply can be controlled, they may work to the general advantage, provided consuming and producing nations can agree on an orderly development of the world's resources. Where the control of supply is more difficult, as is generally the case in farm products, commodity agreements might still ease the transition from oversupply to a more balanced situation.

However, there is another approach which may be more promising than commodity agreements in certain situations. This is to compensate less developed nations for sharp reductions in exchange earnings due to a drop in the price or export volume of commodities. Our real objective is to maintain the ability of these nations to import, and thus support their domestic development. It seems to me better to do this directly by lending them money to minimize the impact of fluctuating export earnings than to go into the indirect and exceedingly difficult process of stabilizing commodity prices.

A number of schemes for insuring export earnings have been worked out. One would provide long-term loans whenever a nation's earnings from exports of primary products fell more than 5 percent short of the previous three years' average. The loans would cover 50 percent of the export short-fall and would be repayable when export earnings rose above the three-year moving average. Without necessarily endorsing this particular scheme, I think that efforts along these lines would be much more constructive than those devoted to commodity agreements. For one thing, it would allow the laws of supply and demand to operate more effectively in commodity fields.

Trade policies of the United States also have an important impact on the less developed nations. We have tariffs and quotas on a number of primary products which we produce, and we subsidize a number of farm products which are exported in competition with less developed areas. The list of products under some form of restriction includes grains, cotton, wool, tobacco, meats, copper, lead, zinc and petroleum. In many cases, the restrictions on imports of primary products into Western Europe are even more constrictive. We should work to reduce such restrictions as rapidly as possible, for they interfere both with domestic objectives of growth and prosperity and with the flow of trade with the less developed areas. The importance of such action is shown by a study of the National Planning Association estimating that

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removal of U.S. restrictions against primary products coming from Latin America alone would result in increased export earnings for that area of from $850 million to $1.7 billion a year.

The development of the European Economic Community poses new and difficult problems, particularly for Latin America and other less developed areas not associated with Europe. As presently oriented, the E.E.C. would discriminate against outsiders in favor of associated territories, among which the less developed nations of the British Commonwealth seem unlikely to be included. It seems to me that we have a major responsibility to persuade the E.E.C. to eliminate discriminatory arrangements for trade in primary products.

IV

Up to this point, the convenient assumption has been that the less developed areas export only primary products. However, India and Hong Kong are already significant exporters of textiles and apparel. An inevitable result of the modernization process is that the less developed nations will increasingly become able to sell more and more manufactured products to the industrial nations on a very competitive basis. To absorb these products will pose difficult problems of adjustment on the part of the industrial countries.

In dealing with such problems, it has been proposed that the industrial nations should offer what has been termed "one-way free trade" to the less developed areas.[2] The industrial nations should be prepared to accept without tariff or other restrictions both the primary and industrial products offered by the developing nations, at the same time allowing them to set up tariffs and other devices to protect their infant industries. Such actions might provide the most significant support to international development which the industrial nations can offer.

In return for such great generosity, the industrial nations should seek agreement from the less developed areas on two points:

(1) The industrial nations should not be flooded by exports from the less developed areas. They should be allowed time to adjust to the increased ability of the less developed areas to export a specific product so that the impact is not unbearably heavy.

(2) On the other side, the less developed areas should not dis-

[2] See Alfred C. Neal, "New Economic Policies for the West," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1961.

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criminate against industrial products forever. In their own interests, there should be some incentive to make infant industries grow up to the point where they can compete in world markets. I would allow plenty of time for the process to work, say, 15 to 20 years, or possibly longer in certain cases. But I believe it is very important that the United States use its influence to bring about an eventual reduction in tariffs in the less developed areas. Otherwise we face the prospect of a world economy split into autarchic trading blocs.

In advocating one-way free trade, I am fully aware of the opposition it will meet. The recent textile agreement, which quite effectively restricts the growth of exports from certain low-cost producers in the less developed areas, illustrates the problem. If the textile agreement were designed to spread over time the adjustment to increased imports of low-cost products from the less developed areas, it would be satisfactory. However, it proposes to freeze a past pattern of trade, thus insulating producers in the industrial areas from international competition.

While the textile agreement was framed in response to very powerful political pressures which are not easy to resist, I believe we must continue to press for one-way free trade. In the long run, the industrial nations must learn to accommodate the exports of the developing nations, even at the cost of awkward problems of adjustment. Painful though they may be, such adjustments work in the long-run interests of the industrial nations, which will be able to obtain consumer goods at lower costs, while shifting their production to the more highly technical products where their international advantage is greater.

Paradoxically enough, one-way free trade can operate in a two-way fashion. The greater the export earnings of the less developed nations, the more they will buy from the industrial nations. By opening up avenues for the export trade of the developing nations, and making the adjustments required in the process, the industrial nations can advance their own well-being and at the same time provide the support needed to enable the less developed nations to achieve self-sustaining economic growth. In the final analysis, an expanding world trade is the only way to provide markets for the products of both industrial and developing nations, and to support the economic development needed to achieve the broad objectives which the free world seeks.

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JUGOSLAVIA: CRISIS AND CHOICE

By John C. Campbell

THE crisis over Cuba and the Chinese invasion of India have had their salutary lessons for many nations and many political leaders—for none perhaps more than the neutralists. They have spoken up positively, as before, for peace and negotiation, against blocs and power politics. But what they have seen has attested to their relative inability to influence the course of events, or even to maintain solidarity in their own ranks, when the big powers are taking crucial decisions and the global strategic balance is at stake. A more pertinent question is whether, and how, the neutrals can safeguard their own vital interests.

Jugoslavia, in the past half-year, has had ample reason to be reminded that while it may be a prominent leader of the nonaligned group, it is also a small Balkan country whose fate depends in large measure on what happens beyond its borders and beyond its control. In Washington, the United States Congress singled out Jugoslavia as a special target of its displeasure. The new Trade Expansion Act withdrew most-favored-nation treatment from Jugoslav goods, and only the desperate efforts of the Administration and a slim majority in the Senate kept in the foreign aid bill the provision permitting economic assistance. In the nations of Western Europe, where attention is fixed on the shape of the new European community, Jugoslav concerns encountered little more than frosty indifference; and from President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer something akin to hostility. From the other side of the world came the continuing barrage of Chinese Communist invective against "Titoist revisionism." From Moscow, in contrast, the Jugoslavs heard some conciliatory noises, but they were scarcely heartened by the results of the meeting held there in June of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, which laid plans for an Eastern bloc more exclusive and self-contained than ever. At home, meanwhile, Tito and his colleagues found themselves engulfed in a sea of troubles largely of their own making. If they did not call it a crisis, it had all the earmarks of one, in which difficulties on the economic side were accompanied by an evident political malaise.

All these events have combined to raise questions about Jugoslav foreign policy, which seemed in recent years to have attained

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a certain stability. The world has long since become accustomed to Jugoslavia's insistence on full national independence as the foundation stone of its international position. The Soviet Union has come to accept, although not always with good grace, Tito's maintenance of important economic ties with the West, ties which were crucial to his country's survival in the struggle against Soviet pressures during the Stalin era and which still serve both Jugoslav and Western interests. The West, in turn, has accepted Tito's self-righteous neutralism, with some reservations concerning the unneutral way in which, on occasion, it works out in practice. It has accepted as well, though not without feeling uneasy about it, his endeavors to find a new and "normal" basis for relations with the Soviet Union over the period of alternating reconciliation and mutual denunciation which began with Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade in 1955. Western aid in one form or another, particularly American aid, has continued to go to Jugoslavia ever since 1949.

Have recent events called into question these fixed points of Jugoslav policy, and therefore of Western policies based on them? Did Khrushchev's speech at Varna in May 1962, seemingly holding out new prospects for Jugoslav coöperation with the East, signal a new Soviet approach? Has Tito's practice of positive neutralism brought the country to a new and promising position in world affairs, or to a dead end? Thus far there has been no stated change on Jugoslavia's part. But some hard choices have compelled a reassessment of where the country stands.

II

Before commenting on Jugoslavia's dilemmas in foreign policy we must consider the internal situation, for the two are intimately connected.

The country's economic plight is not a happy one. Agriculture, since the bumper crops of 1959, has been a keen disappointment. Neither new investments in fertilizers, in Italian-type wheat and in hybrid corn, nor the indefinite postponement of collectivization and the easing of pressure on the peasants have brought production to a constant annual level that enables the country to feed itself. The weather, this year as in the last two, has struck cruel blows. It would seem to be about time to include bad weather in the calculus of hopes and plans for agricultural production; the good year has become the exception, not the rule.

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In industry there is uncertainty, disorganization and a sharply falling rate of growth: from an annual rate of 15 percent in 1960, to 7 percent in 1961, to less than 5 percent in the first half of 1962. Something has gone wrong with the supposedly happy combination of planning and use of the free market. In some ways, it now appears, the market has been a little too free. Individual firms and local governments have misdirected investment. Needed foreign exchange has been wasted on nonessential imports. Workers' councils have distributed profits in bonuses for themselves at the expense of needed investment. Managers of enterprises have accumulated considerable personal wealth. Consumption has gone up, as have prices and wages, while productivity by contrast has been almost static. On the surface, Jugoslavia in 1962 looks more prosperous than ever before. The greater variety and quality of clothing and the growing number of private automobiles provide evidence apparent to everyone. But some of Jugoslavia's economists had been asking how long the country could keep consuming more than it produced, and in due course the government woke up to the situation.

The worsening international balance of payments reflected the slowdown in production and the general disorganization of the economy. Try as it did, Jugoslavia seemed to make no dent in its trade deficit. If exports went up, imports went up also. For 1961, the adverse balance was a sobering $167,000,000 (not counting imports of U.S. agricultural surplus paid for in dinars), and the foreign debt, in the neighborhood of $800 million, presented a heavy repayment burden over the next few years. Exports have improved in recent months, but without bringing any real change in the situation. The bold exchange-rate reform introduced in 1961, sound as it was in conception, made the situation all the more difficult when the supporting credits from the International Monetary Fund and other sources proved less helpful than was hoped and the controls necessary to conserve foreign exchange were not established.

By the spring of 1962 it was apparent that the Jugoslav economic experiment had produced no magic formula for success; that the country had not reached the point of self-sustaining growth; that, indeed, it might be heading for stagnation and international bankruptcy. President Tito, sounding the alarm in an important speech at Split in May 1962, said that corrective measures would be taken, and that those who had waxed fat at

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public expense—the traders, plant directors and others who had achieved prominence as conspicuous consumers—would be dealt with according to their deserts. His speech, which had in it a note of desperation, indirectly pointed up the political aspect of the crisis. The remedies to be applied were political as well as economic. The people, and especially the Communists, should revive the old spirit and the old discipline, so that things might be set right. If the leaders did not envisage an abandonment of the whole free-market side of the system and a return to centralized planning and the tight party dictatorship of the old days—and it was soon made clear that they did not—the emphasis on new commissions and shifting of personnel, on party control and party discipline, showed the color of Tito's thinking. This was a matter not for professional economists or for bureaucrats but for the Central Committee of the League of Communists.

During the past decade Tito's own reforms have greatly changed the character of Jugoslav society, perhaps more than he himself realizes or can control. At any rate, party spirit will not solve the problems of an economy far more complex than that of 1948, and the role of the party itself has changed both in theory and in fact.

At its Sixth Congress, held in 1952, the Communist Party of Jugoslavia changed its name and its mission. As the League of Communists, its job was to be primarily one of education, guidance and example rather than of direction and control. No one was under any illusion concerning the continuing central role of the party. Yet the fact that, under the stress of conflict with the Soviet Union and in the search for "true" forms of Leninism, the leaders were publicly referring to the gradual withering away of the state *and of the party* could not but have its effect on the attitudes both of party members and of the population in general. Despite uncertainty and confusion over the party's role in the years which followed, the Seventh Congress, held in 1958, confirmed the basic tenets of the Sixth. In 1962 the party is still the ultimate authority, as the latest session of the Central Committee made clear. The new draft constitution calls it "the fundamental initiator of political activity." It can still use arbitrary police power, and sometimes does. It does not tolerate political opposition, as Milovan Djilas can testify. But it is not what it was.

The rise of a new generation is a part of this picture. As the changes of the past dozen years have taken hold, new loyalties

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and new ambitions have motivated Jugoslavia's bright young men. The economic system and political institutions have become more complex. There has been much experimentation, some of it under the influence of ideas coming in through the doors the régime has opened to the non-Communist world. The cement that held the leadership together—the common experience in the pre-war revolutionary movement, in the partisan military struggle, and in the absorbing task of establishing socialism and then defending it against outside threats and pressures—is no longer as binding as it once was. Many of the old partisans are not equal to the different challenges of a new day. Some have only one claim to leadership—the fact that they were partisans—and are neither sympathetic to the new reforms nor qualified to administer them. As the party relaxed the grip of its police power, it did not gain a compensating authority in public prestige. Many party men, as prosperity grew, were comporting themselves like members of the "new class" described by Djilas. Factionalism, drawing on personal rivalries and the old antagonism between nationalities, and fed by uncertainty where the régime was going, appeared within the party ranks.

Somewhere along the line the Tito régime, consciously or unconsciously, took a basic decision on what it was trying to do, namely to build pragmatically a system that would produce goods for the people and provide some measure of economic self-management and political responsibility. Institutions of "social self-government and socialist democracy," such as the workers' councils and the local communes, were gradually brought into being and strengthened over the years; they are enshrined in the new draft constitution now under discussion. The party organs are still very much in the picture, but the fact remains that these other institutions are acquiring a life of their own.

The new institutions have a Marxist label. They are part of the "building of socialism." But the young men and women who have grown up with this system have been more interested in making it work than in party loyalty, party discipline or even party membership. They are concerned with getting jobs that challenge them and reward them; with such matters as science and its practical application, economics, public administration and even artistic expression, rather than with the theory of transition from socialism to Communism or the search for a Leninist rationale for what they are doing. They are beginning to attain governmental posts

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of some importance, though not yet the top positions. As the years go by, barring some wholesale purge or reversion to the past which could conceivably accompany a crisis over the succession to Tito, they are likely to grow in importance.

These political trends, often under the surface and not immediately evident, are bound to affect the present leaders' attempts to cope with the economic crisis. Will they also affect Jugoslavia's international position, immediately or in the long run? Differences that exist on internal policy—centralization vs. decentralization, discipline vs. liberalization, ideology vs. pragmatism—have found some parallel in conflicting or ambivalent attitudes on foreign policy.

III

There is no doubt that Jugoslavia has greatly benefited by Western assistance in maintaining its independence and in building its own version of socialism. There is no doubt either that bitterness against the West today is real, at least so far as those in positions of power are concerned. Jugoslav officials ask why the United States follows no consistent policy toward their country, why it overlooks the fundamental principles of Jugoslavia's position and petulantly criticizes neutralism or the Jugoslav voting record in the United Nations, why it insists on waging cold war against Jugoslavia as it does against the Soviet bloc. They are incensed over the lack of appreciation of their position evident in the acts of the U.S. Congress and its committees, but without giving much consideration to the Jugoslav régime's own share of the responsibility for American attitudes that are reflected in Congressional acts and speeches. On both sides it appears that publicly expressed hostility and misunderstanding have been permitted to becloud the real interests of the two countries.

The great bugbear haunting the Jugoslavs is not America and the possible loss of U.S. economic aid, but the European Common Market and what its mere existence will mean to Jugoslavia. As the Common Market lowers its internal tariffs, outsiders feel the pinch. Jugoslavia has to have markets for its agricultural products in Western Europe, particularly in Italy and Germany, if it is to obtain its necessary imports of capital goods and pay its debts. It needs them during the critical period ahead while it attempts to broaden the base of its exports. Some countries of the Common Market have shown a disposition to make adjustments;

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but with their attention fixed on much broader issues, they seem only marginally concerned with Jugoslavia's plight. If Great Britain and Sweden and Austria are having trouble in getting terms which meet their needs, the Jugoslavs can hardly be optimistic about the consideration that is going to be given to theirs.

Belgrade clings to its alignment with the non-aligned. This has been a useful connection politically, enabling Tito to play on the world stage a role which the size and resources of his country would not otherwise justify. But the conference of unaligned states at Cairo in July 1962 demonstrated, if any demonstration was necessary, that from the economic standpoint the non-aligned countries could provide neither a substitute for ties with the nations of the Common Market nor a serious means of bringing them to terms. Where the Belgrade "summit" conference of 1961 produced a good deal of sound and fury, and Tito's speech there seemed deliberately calculated to please the East even if it annoyed the West, the more modest meeting at Cairo showed a chastened sense of the realities and a willingness to negotiate seriously with the West. Its final declaration reflected the practical approach which the Jugoslav delegation brought to the conference table.

Another Jugoslav worry about the European Common Market, justified or not, is its political aspect. If it were to establish Western Europe as a strong political and military power, would that not create an engine of neo-imperialism, a new and more dangerous form of the policy of blocs against which Tito and his colleagues have inveighed for so long? Unless there is some chance of East-West relaxation, Jugoslavia sees itself squeezed between the two blocs with slight chance of influencing either one. Or is there, perhaps, some possibility of salvation in a decisive turn to the East?

IV

Jugoslav officials frankly say that if they do not get understanding and help from the West they must perforce look in the other direction, purely as a matter of economic necessity. A new long-term agreement for expanded trade with the U.S.S.R., concluded in July 1962, bears witness to the seriousness of the attempt to build up trade with the Soviet bloc, which in 1961 amounted to less than 25 percent of Jugoslavia's total foreign trade. They would welcome loans and look to Moscow to renew

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credits of some $300 million that were suspended for political reasons in 1958. Yet they know that trade with the bloc will be no more than a partial answer to their problem, and credits would be of limited value since what Jugoslavia needs above all is free exchange, not loans tied to Soviet or satellite exports. And Jugoslav "businessmen," those who actually run the enterprises, much prefer German and other Western goods for obvious reasons.

Delegations of one kind or another have been plying back and forth between Belgrade and Moscow to sound out the terrain. They reached the highest level with the Brezhnev visit to Jugoslavia in the autumn of 1962; and Tito is scheduled to pay a return visit. But how far can the rapprochement go beyond some increase in trade? Jugoslavia has expressed an interest in getting closer to the activities of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, in which it would like observer status such as it has in the West's Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development. What Tito wants is to learn what is going on and how Jugoslavia may profit by it, not a commitment to coördinate economic plans with those of the bloc, involving a loss of the power of independent decision. Thus far, the Soviet response has not been encouraging. Khrushchev, one may guess, is merely waiting in the wings until Jugoslavia's situation grows worse and Tito will pay a higher price. But he may overestimate what Tito will pay, even *in extremis*.

Does the prospect of more and closer economic relations with the East represent a danger to Jugoslavia's independence? Jugoslav leaders say "No": first, because they have no intention of taking any gamble with that independence; second, because they are confident that Khrushchev, having finally learned the lesson he should have learned years ago, now realizes Jugoslavia would never accept satellite status. He has won his fight with the Stalinists at home, so runs the argument; he has repudiated Stalinism in his relations with other countries; he has stood his ground against the Stalinist doctrines and policies of Peking; he is, therefore, ready for normal state relations and increased economic coöperation with socialist Jugoslavia. Jugoslav leaders were gratified when Khrushchev stretched out the hand of friendship in his Varna speech of May 1962. It was an act of courage, they say, for him to send Gromyko to Belgrade on a mission of reconciliation at the same time that he was trying to patch up or paper over the dispute with China. These acts seemed to confirm their view that a new day was dawning, that rapprochement was possible on their

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terms, not on outworn Stalinist concepts of domination. There is no question, presumably, of special relations between the two Communist parties or of Jugoslavia's "return" to the Soviet bloc.

One may find such a view of Khrushchev's intentions to be quite naïve, without concluding at the same time that Tito is likely to put his head in a Soviet noose. He and his colleagues have personally experienced both the struggle with Stalin and the ups and downs of Jugoslav-Soviet relations since his death: the understandings that turned out to be misunderstandings, the reconciliations followed by denunciations, and the bitterness of the still unsolved doctrinal disputes over revisionism and separate roads to socialism. At present the atmosphere is one of friendliness and coöperation. The trend is up rather than down. But the basic pattern of the past eight years is not likely to change. The Jugoslavs have resisted Soviet pressure for total solidarity on major international questions. They never accepted the "troika" proposal for the United Nations; even on Germany they have not endorsed the Soviet position, as is evident from the non-committal communiqué issued at the close of Brezhnev's visit. The conflict over theory and over the interpretation of Marxist terms has been in reality a conflict of national policies and national interests. The Jugoslavs are not likely to become so fascinated by the lure of economic help from Russia or by the mirage of fraternal socialist collaboration that they forget those interests. But precisely what they decide to do about the immediate choices before them depends on how they judge the prospects in the West as well as in the East.

Jugoslavia is faced with a situation of great difficulty. If the European Common Market has not shown an inclination to make notable concessions to help Jugoslavia, neither is the Soviet bloc, which has many prior demands on its resources, likely to offer any great benefits just to help Tito make revisionism work. The two blocs are hardening. Jugoslavia's role as a member of neither and a suppliant to both seems less promising than at any time since Tito chose his middle course. There is an urgency in the need for more durable relationships, above all with the West.

V

From the Western viewpoint, some will say that the Jugoslavs made their bed and whether they find it comfortable or not is their own affair. They have had enormous help from the West

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since their break with Stalin in 1948. The United States provided, up to the end of 1961, over $2 billion in military and economic aid, but still finds Jugoslavia unable to meet its international payments deficit and having to ask, as before, for American food shipments and other help. When these economic facts are seen as part of a general picture which includes Tito's present tactical turn toward the East and his stand on many international issues in direct opposition to the policy of the United States, it is hardly surprising that many American Congressmen, including some who can see a difference between Jugoslav and Soviet Communists, are reluctant to provide further assistance.

It is, of course, unwise to determine policy on the basis of disillusionment or spite. But it is in every way proper to reëvaluate the policy which started as a series of emergency measures "to keep Tito afloat" and came to be a regular and consistent effort to support Jugoslavia's independent effort to attain economic stability and progress. That policy has already been reappraised several times, generally under the stress of some new shock administered by Tito himself, and it has shown remarkable staying power. It has been kept in effect, with variations, under all administrations from Truman to Kennedy. In judging it in the light of Jugoslavia's present and possible future course, we shall be wise to keep in mind what can reasonably be anticipated in the way of results, and what cannot.

Experience has taught us not to expect too much in tangible returns for our assistance. Western aid and good will have not drawn Jugoslavia into association with NATO—that was clear by 1953 when Tito halted certain tentative steps taken toward coöperation in military planning—nor with its Balkan neighbors, despite the Balkan Alliance which was concluded with Greece and Turkey in 1954 but soon fell into a state of desuetude. They have not brought Jugoslav support on issues concerning Africa, colonialism, disarmament or Germany, on which Belgrade's policy, though independently reached, has run closer to that of Moscow. Nor has Western aid to Tito had striking results in promoting disruption within the Soviet bloc, which was one of the main reasons for its adoption. From conversations with some Jugoslav officials today, one gets the impression that Jugoslav influence is not even intended to be disruptive.

As we look at the situation in Eastern Europe today, it is at least questionable whether the contrast and competition between

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Jugoslavia with its freer institutions and the Soviet satellites with their centralized structure on the Soviet model have any sharp meaning. A few years ago the Jugoslav system seemed to be on top of the wave, clearly doing more for its people and making better economic progress than was being done in the neighboring countries to the east. Today the Jugoslavs are reaping a harvest of troubles, while their rivals are not doing badly at all. Rumania, sporting an air of confidence and claiming a 16 percent annual rate of increase in industrial production based largely on new industries like petrochemicals well suited to its resources, has surprised even its own leaders by its progress. Hungary also is doing quite well, thanks largely to the considerable Soviet economic assistance extended to the Kádar régime following the suppression of the revolt of 1956, and to the attitudes of relative tolerance prevailing between the régime and the people. Kádar has finally taken action against the more notorious of those identified with the hated Rákosi régime, and seems intent on winning at least passive support from the people by relaxing some of the pressures on them. Bulgaria, Jugoslavia's other neighbor on the east, is having its troubles with production and is handicapped by a singularly uninspiring political leadership, but is still doing as well economically as comparable parts of Jugoslavia. Actually, the determining factors in the relative economic progress of the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe seem to be not the differences in economic systems but the differences, or similarities, in historical background, basic resources and technical advancement. Titoism has not proved its superiority, at least not at this reading. The real contrast to Prague or Budapest is not Belgrade, but Vienna and Munich.

Yet two facts of prime importance dictate caution in pursuing that argument to its logical conclusion. The first is that Jugoslav society, with all its contradictions and disappointments, is *alive*—with ideas, with enterprise, with new forms of expression, with a search for practical truths in disregard of doctrinal "truth." The second is that Jugoslavia remains independent. It stands as an example, still a significant example despite the frustration of earlier hopes that its force of attraction would somehow draw other East European states out of the Soviet bloc. It is ironic that the one satellite which seems successfully to have broken away from Moscow since 1948 is Jugoslavia's bitter enemy, Albania, whose leaders find Khrushchev too revisionist, or Titoist, for their

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taste. Yet what has happened in Tirana illustrates the ferment and cross-currents that exist within the bloc. As the ties which bind the satellites to Moscow are loosened, a trend which has been unmistakable despite the declarations of solidarity and the grandiose plans for economic integration, Jugoslavia cannot but exert an influence, not because of this or that set of institutions or reforms, but because of the simple fact of its independence.

VI

The Jugoslavs face critical decisions on internal affairs: on the stimulation of economic growth and of exports, the expansion or contraction of recent reforms, the distribution of political power, the real meaning of industrial self-management and the future role of the Communist Party. They face questions just as critical and as difficult to answer in determining the country's international position: how to judge the long-term prospects for neutralism, how strongly to cling to existing ties with the West, how far to move toward the East. Most important of all is the general direction of the régime's policies. Will the leaders preserve the "openings" to the free world—and to the Jugoslav people themselves—that have already been made?

The whole trend of Jugoslavia's development argues that they will, that they do not have an unlimited range of choice. It is true that the régime is essentially a dictatorship, and that dictatorships are capable of sudden turns of policy without accountability to anyone. It is also true that there are those among Jugoslavia's Communists who, whether or not they were "Cominformists" at one time or another, have never been happy about the increasing liberalization of the internal system or the running dispute with Moscow. Even with the top leaders themselves, brought up as they were in the world Communist movement, there is a certain feeling of "coming home" whenever they move toward better relations with Moscow. But these are rather shaky premises on which to spin a theory of impending fundamental change in Jugoslavia's position.

The more reliable signs of the times indicate that Tito does not intend such a change; that any subsequent or alternative leadership is likely to be guided by the same general lines; and that the weight of popular will provides something close to a guarantee of the validity of those two propositions. The Jugoslav people have not all become converts to socialism, even in its compara-

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tively mild Titoist form. For the most part they have accepted the system because there is no alternative and because a Jugoslav citizen, party member or not, can find a place for himself in it that is more than mere submission to his fate. Whether Jugoslav socialism is becoming more socialistic as time passes, or less so, is a matter for interpretation and argument, but there is little doubt that it becomes ever more Jugoslav.

If the Jugoslavs can be counted on in any event to safeguard their independence, to continue building their own system, and to keep useful ties with the West, why should we be concerned at all? The difficulty lies in the fact that nothing can be counted on "in any event." If the internal crisis deepens, if the economic position becomes much weaker, if the United States and other Western nations are totally unresponsive to Jugoslav needs, if the succession reveals unexpected stresses and conflicts, if the cold war enters an intensive phase with increasing Soviet pressures to bring Jugoslavia into line—if any or all of these things happen, no prediction can be sure.

Its nationality conflicts still rumbling under the surface, Jugoslavia has a history marked by courageous struggles but hardly by continued stability under stress. Certainly it is not in the interest of the West, by what we do or fail to do, to encourage chaos, to aggravate Jugoslavia's problems or to make its decisions more difficult than they are bound to be. The Jugoslavs, despite all the pressures to which they were subjected, came through the struggle with Stalin after 1948 thanks to their own determination and courage, but also because they had an anchor to the West. That anchor has continued to be important to Tito's capacity to deal with the Soviet Union on his own terms. Ties with the neutralists are no substitute.

Jugoslavia may never provide what the title of a book by Charles P. McVicker called a "pattern for international Communism." But it does represent a society in which a Communist régime has undergone organic change, for both practical and human reasons. The new constitution appears to confirm that change. So long as its independence is maintained—and both government and people are firm in that resolve—Jugoslavia will have an influence both inside and outside the Communist world that in the long run can only be of benefit to the West. Whatever the superficial appearances may be, as Jugoslavia makes its presence felt in Asia, Africa and Latin America, it is not serving as the

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Kremlin's agent or torchbearer. It is in fact offering an alternative. Tito has won for himself and his country a considerable international prestige and freedom of action. He would not trade that for the status of a Kádar or even of a Gomulka. If his government talks about the sins of imperialism or the virtues of "peaceful coexistence," we have to interpret those words on the basis of Jugoslavia's conduct and not on the fear that it is but the parroting of Soviet tactical slogans at Soviet behest.

Modest assistance, which is all Jugoslavia has been getting in recent years, is no great burden for the Western nations to carry. It can and should be continued. Even more important, the West should make adjustments to allow Jugoslavia to trade with the free world and to make its own way without discrimination. The Common Market should negotiate arrangements with Belgrade while the situation is still favorable. And the United States, when the new Congress meets, should restore to Jugoslavia most-favored-nation treatment, which it was never in the national interest to withdraw.

We may be sure that the sympathies of the Jugoslav people lie with the West as they have even when the régime was hostile, and that a new generation less burdened by the forms and prejudices of the past will be making its influence felt within the leadership. The Western nations will only be spiting themselves if they abandon a policy that has had real success and can have more, for it is based on a fundamental Jugoslav interest that is also in line with their own principles: that of national independence sustained by open and coöperative relations with other nations.

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THE TWO CHINAS IN AFRICA

By Leon M. S. Slawecki

THE newly independent countries of Africa are now providing a somewhat bizarre setting for a continuation of the four-decade struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, embodied in their respective states, the Republic of China (Nationalist), and the People's Republic of China (Communist). The match between the two in this sector of the larger struggle is by no means as uneven as it looks at first glance. Certainly Communist China, with its 700,000,000 people and huge land area, looms far above any individual African country—indeed, it has over three times the population of the entire African continent. Rump Nationalist China, however, while minuscule when compared to its Chinese rival, is a large state by African standards. Its population of 11,000,000 would rank it seventh were it in Africa, ahead of 27 other independent African countries, as well as the few remaining colonial possessions. Moreover, its per capita income of nearly $120, second highest in the Far East, would place it tenth in Africa.

The "two Chinas" share several assets of importance in penetrating Africa. Taiwan and Southern China enjoy a semi-tropical climate that permits the quick transfer of agricultural techniques to tropical Africa, and both have major rice crops which parallel the extensive rice potentialities of West Africa and Madagascar. In consonance with the goals of "African Socialism" as proclaimed all over the African continent, both the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang (whose general socialist tendencies are often overlooked) can claim to help the Africans in working toward this ideal. Each can point to itself as a "developing" country whose example might be followed by the development-hungry African countries, and both share the distinction of being non-white, with no history of colonial involvement in Africa.

Similarities do not end here, for the two share almost identical motives and methods in their courting of African countries. Any new African country can, on the day of its independence, be assured of receiving almost identical messages from the foreign ministries of the two Chinas, advising them that they have been "recognized," in the hope that the recognition will be reciprocated. Both Chinas have sent and received delegations to and

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from various African countries; both have had African leaders on official state visits; both have given scholarships to African students for training in their respective areas; and both are involved in aid projects in Africa.

It is only after a closer focus on their activities that the differences begin to appear. The Communist Chinese have dealt on an official and formal level mainly with the more "radical" states of Africa, such as the members of the Casablanca Group, while maintaining informal and covert relations with factions in other countries. The Nationalist Chinese ties are with the more "mod-

I. AFRICAN COUNTRIES GRANTING DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION
(with year of recognition)

To Communist China		*To Nationalist China*		*To Neither*
*Algeria	'62	†Cameroon	'60	Burundi
*Ghana	'60	†Central African Republic	'62	Ethiopia
*Guinea	'59	†Congo (Brazzaville)	'60	†Ivory Coast
*Mali	'60	Congo (Leopoldville)	'60	†Niger
*Morocco	'58	†Chad	'62	Nigeria
Somalia	'60	†Dahomey	'62	Sierra Leone
Sudan	'58	†Gabon	'60	Tunisia
Tanganyika	'61	Liberia	'57	
Uganda	'62	Libya	'59	
*U.A.R.	'56[1]	†Malagasy	'60	
		†Mauritania	'60	
		Rwanda	'62	
		†Senegal	'60	
		Togo	'60	
		†Upper Volta	'61	
		South Africa[2]		

* Members of the Casablanca Group.
† Members of the *Union Africaine et Malagache.*
[1] Egypt maintained relations with Nationalist China from 1942 until 1956.
[2] A Chinese Consulate in Johannesburg, which has assumed many diplomatic functions, predates the establishment of the Nationalist Government in China in 1927.

erate" states, principally those former French states now in the *Union Africaine et Malagache* (U.A.M.).

The Communist Chinese seem to have the following objectives: to spread the Chinese brand of the Communist world revolution, with its concomitant anti-Americanism; to secure big-power status; to gain support in the United Nations; and, perhaps least of all, to obtain some of the strategic goods lacking in China. The motives of the Nationalist Chinese have been to counter the Communist Chinese on the African continent; to retain and enlarge African support in the United Nations; to maintain old and create

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new markets for Taiwanese agricultural and industrial products; and, to a lesser degree, to develop a useful outlet for those students and technicians frustrated or made restless by the comparatively limited scope of opportunities on Taiwan.

The overseas Chinese in Africa are relatively unimportant—approximately 42,600, centered for the most part in the islands of Réunion, Mauritius and Madagascar—and for this reason I shall not consider this limited aspect of Chinese rivalry. It is significant to note, however, that President Philibert Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) warned the Chinese of his country in 1960 that he would expel them if they subsidized subversive activities; and that in Tanganyika, site of the first Chinese Communist embassy in East Africa, the Chinese Communists have wasted no time in entertaining groups of overseas Chinese residing there.

II

The importance of the African votes on the question of Chinese seating in the United Nations can hardly be exaggerated. Out of

II. VOTES OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND OF U.N. AFRICAN MEMBERS ON THE QUESTION OF CHINESE SEATING, 1959–1962[1]

	FOR Nationalist China	*AGAINST Nationalist China*	*ABSTAINING*	*TOTAL*
1959				
U.N.	44	29	9	82
African Members[2]	2	5	3	10
1960				
U.N.	42	34	22	98
African Members[3]	2	9	16	27
1961				
U.N.	48	37	19	104
African Members[4]	9	9	11	29
1962				
U.N.	56	42	12	110
African Members[5]	17	14	2	33

[1] 1959 and 1960 voting on a U.S. motion to postpone discussion; 1961 and 1962 voting on a Soviet resolution to unseat Nationalist China and seat Communist China.

[2] *For:* Liberia and South Africa; *Against:* Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Sudan, and the U.A.R.; *Abstaining:* Ethiopia, Libya, and Tunisia.

[3] *For:* Liberia and South Africa; *Against:* Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Sudan, the U.A.R., Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal; *Abstaining:* all U.A.M. members except Senegal; Congo (Leopoldville), Libya, Somalia, Togo, and Tunisia.

[4] *For:* Cameroon, Gabon, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy, Mauritania, Senegal, Tanganyika, and South Africa; *Against:* Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and the U.A.R.; *Abstaining:* Central African Republic, Chad, both Congos, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia, and Upper Volta.

[5] *For:* Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, both Congos, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Upper Volta and South Africa; *Against:* Algeria, Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Tunisia, U.A.R., and Uganda; *Abstaining:* Nigeria and Togo.

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110 U.N. members, 33 are African—enough to swing a vote one way or another if all the African countries voted together and were joined by just a few others. This "African Bloc" is thus crucial to the Nationalist Chinese, who have been actively campaigning to keep their U.N. seat, especially when compared to the almost studied indifference of the Communist Chinese. It is therefore in order to consider the trends in the U.N. vote over the past four years on the China question, during which time the African vote became increasingly important. Table II summarizes these votes.

From it we see that the 1961 vote was marked by a gain of seven additional votes for Nationalist China, while Communist China's total remained the same as the previous year. The 1962 vote registered increases for both sides, reflecting the substantial growth in African members, but Nationalist China scored the larger gains. Significantly, all the U.A.M. members voted this time for Nationalist China, enabling Taipei to garner over half the African votes. Though some U.A.M. members had come out for a "two China" solution during the debate, none of them embodied this in a specific proposal. Communist China, on its part, also increased its African vote, though not by as great a percentage. This Nationalist Chinese success was in large part a result of its activities in Africa, as well as strong U.S. support and the recent Communist Chinese actions against India.

III

The Communist Chinese thrust into Africa has been, characteristically, on all fronts: diplomatic and clandestine; conventional and unconventional; political, economic, social and cultural. Perhaps above all it has been revolutionary, citing as early as 1949 the importance of its own example to all the underdeveloped areas, Africa included. Conversely, Nationalist China has operated through conventional diplomatic channels, though it has utilized its resources to the point where they truly rival the more comprehensive efforts of Communist China.

The Bandung Conference of 1955 marks the beginning of Communist Chinese activities in Africa. There, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai was able to meet—and impress—for the first time leaders and delegates from 23 Asian and 6 African countries. Communist China became "respectable," a "developing" country whose example might well be followed by others. One immediate product

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of the Bandung Conference was a plan to continue, more or less, the basic idea behind the conference by further meetings of Afro-Asians. Thus there followed the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in 1957 and thereafter a host of accompanying organizations, including a proposed common market. The Afro-Asian Solidarity organizations have proven to be a useful vehicle for Communist Chinese penetration, and for meeting and influencing Africans.

More important, however, was the aura of the "spirit of Bandung" which, coupled with the allure of the Chinese market and the discrediting of the United Kingdom, France and to a lesser degree Europe by the Suez crisis, allowed the Communist Chinese to gain their first toehold in Africa through diplomatic recognition. Then, in May 1956, President Nasser of Egypt, who was very impressed by Chou at Bandung, not least because of the backing he received on the Palestine issue, established relations with Communist China, to the latter's delight.

During the Suez invasion by Israel and the British and French intervention that followed in October 1956, Communist China was second only to the Soviet Union in pledging its support to Egypt, promising volunteers and magnanimously granting $4,700,000—the beginning of a pattern of direct aid that is small in amount but designed for maximum propaganda advantage. By 1959, however, relations had cooled as Nasser criticized Communist China for its actions in Tibet, and Communist China in turn allowed the Syrian Communist leader Khaled Baghdash to attack Nasser and his United Arab Republic at the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic held in Peking. Nasser regarded this latter act as "aggression," and threatened to call on all Asian and African countries having diplomatic relations with Communist China to lower their representation to the status of chargé d'affaires. This eventually elicited a Communist Chinese apology, though relations remain strictly formal.

Communist China had to wait until 1959 for another spurt of activity, when relations were established with Sékou Touré's Guinea. Even here, however, active aid was delayed until after a Nationalist Chinese good-will mission included Guinea in a tour of African countries in early 1960.[1] Apparently the Communist Chinese protested, but followed with a gift of 10,000 tons of rice and an invitation to Sékou Touré to pay a state visit to Peking.

[1] Others: Cameroon, British Cameroons, Nigeria, Togo, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Somalia, Ethiopia and Ghana.

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The Guinea President made his visit in September 1960 and signed a friendship treaty and two agreements, one on economic and technical coöperation, the other on trade and payments involving an interest-free loan equivalent to about $25,000,000. Under the technical coöperation agreement, some 5,000 Chinese were to go to Guinea to aid in construction and advise in rice growing. Technicians arrived in Guinea in 1961 to help in the construction of the National Assembly building and a tobacco plant, as well as in rice cultivation, but their numbers are reported to have never exceeded 500, and this number has decreased since Touré became disenchanted with Communist methods.

Perhaps the last "spectacular" put on by the Communist Chinese was their reception of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana when he visited Peking in 1961. A friendship treaty was signed, and an agreement gave Ghana a $19,600,000 interest-free loan. Very recently, in October of this year, an agreement of technical coöperation was signed by the two states, but its implementation remains to be seen. In addition, Chou En-lai has accepted, in principle, an invitation to visit Ghana. If he does, he will be the first high-ranking Communist Chinese official to visit Africa.

By 1961 the impact of the virtual economic collapse on the China mainland began to catch up with Communist foreign policy-makers, and, with the exceptional case of Algeria, their activities abroad began to be curtailed, though certainly not ended. Thus the establishment of relations with five other African countries since mid-1960 has not been followed by official offers of aid and assistance. For example, in the case of a Sino-Mali trade agreement of 1961, provision was made for loans which have never been arranged.

These are not the only Communist Chinese activities in "friendly" African countries. In 1959, 20 African delegations toured Communist China; in 1960 the number was 113 but in 1961 only 44. There are or have been nine Communist Chinese organizations dealing with Africa, of which perhaps the most important are the African Affairs Committee within the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese-African Friendship Association whose President, Liu Chang-sheng, headed a friendship delegation that visited eight West African states[2] early in 1961. Radio broadcasting beamed towards Africa has also sharply increased in the past three years.

[2] Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, Senegal, Togo and Dahomey.

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The Communist Chinese have also played host to African students, both, apparently, for conventional university schooling and for the teaching of terrorist tactics. In 1961 it was estimated that 225 Africans, excluding those from North Africa and Sudan, were at the Institute of Foreign Languages in Peking where they were learning Chinese before entering other universities; and in April of that year a "Union of African Students in China" was formed by students from Somalia, Kenya, Zanzibar, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana and Uganda. Their efforts, however, received a setback last August when 30 Cameroonian students were expelled, reportedly for having openly reacted to racial discrimination in Communist China. One of them declared that "every contact is forbidden not only between black men and Chinese women, but between black men and Chinese. Moreover, African students have no right to shop in the same stores as other foreign students." Students from other African states reacted similarly and many have already left Communist China without completing their studies.

A major Communist Chinese effort is concentrated on clandestine activities, such as the support of revolutionary and diversionary groups. Because of the nature of these operations it is obviously difficult to obtain full information on them. The Chinese Communists have apparently tried to support groups in countries where they could draw an analogy to their own revolutionary experience—in particular in Algeria, Cameroon and Angola, upon whose revolutionary fronts they have bestowed the honorific Communist title "National Liberation Movements," and to a lesser degree in the Congo and with the pan-Somalia movement in the Horn of Africa.

Algeria has been their real favorite. Not only did they recognize the rebel Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in 1960, but they have been host to Algerian delegations on many occasions, including a "state" visit by Ferhat Abbas as Premier of the Provisional Government in October 1960. Certainly they have given an indeterminate amount of material military aid, and advice on how to run the "war of liberation"—although they were rebuffed when the Algerians, contrary to advice from Peking, opened negotiations with the French. Following Algerian independence this year, despite their own strained economy, the Communist Chinese gave the new Algerian government a gift of 9,000 tons of wheat, 3,000 tons of rolled steel and 21 tons of medicine.

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By supporting the rebellious section of the *Union des Populations Camerounais* after Cameroon independence the Communist Chinese have ruined any chances of a rapprochement with the Cameroonian government. The best evidence of this support for the rebels came in July 1961 when six Cameroonians were captured entering their country, having on their person weapons and documents showing that they had completed a ten-week course in sabotage and guerrilla warfare in Peking. In Angola, on the other hand, the Communist Chinese have apparently lent little more than political support to the rebels up to now. They also attempted to enter the complicated Congolese situation when, after the murder of Patrice Lumumba, his Vice-Premier, Antoine Gizenga, established a "national government" in Stanleyville. The Communist Chinese immediately recognized this régime, and dispatched an ambassador in February 1961. In August 1961 the Stanleyville government was absorbed by the Leopoldville government, which had diplomatic relations with Nationalist China. Thereupon the Communist Chinese officially withdrew, attacking the United States as the cause of all the troubles.

In any characterization of Communist China's policy toward Africa it must be noted that, like the U.S.S.R., it was ideologically unprepared for the wave of independence in Africa which commenced in 1960. Western imperialists were just not expected to give independence to their colonies, especially so fast. The Communist Chinese first emphasized those contacts which seemed most promising for further penetration into a colonial Africa; they were received enthusiastically by particular African leaders who thought Communist Chinese help would be decisive in their fight for influence in Africa. Independence virtually erased this issue, and their cries against neo-colonialism have never had the same emotional impact. This Communist Chinese lag, then, has opened the way for the rather ambitious Nationalist Chinese activities in Africa. These activities are just beginning to be noticed by the Communist Chinese, as evidenced by a recent confrontation between the two in Burundi, discussed below; but the Chinese Communists have not yet formally "warned" the Africans of these as they have, for instance, warned them of Japanese activities.[8]

[8] In November 1960 the New China News Agency "exposed" the Japanese plan. "Japanese monopoly capital is making strenuous efforts to penetrate into Africa for exploration and plunder at a time when British and French monopoly capital is hit by surging national independence movements."

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IV

Before beginning a discussion of Nationalist Chinese activities, we must consider the particular assets possessed by Nationalist China on Taiwan, in order to show how that comparatively small island can "challenge" the huge mainland. Perhaps the biggest contrast between the two Chinas is that of economic growth. The initial misleading claims of Communist China's Great Leap Forward did impress the African countries, which closely watched this experiment in economic development to see if it was the model for them to follow. The recent admitted failures, however, have had the effect of hardening the views of those more inclined towards the Nationalist Chinese. This has been fortified by the striking economic successes evident on Taiwan. Nationalist China has an important, though invisible, commodity in technical know-how, both in facilities for training and in trained personnel to send out. Another distinct asset is its very successful land reform, and the agricultural extension activities carried on by the Sino-American Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction—part of whose facilities are being used in the current African "campaign." Finally, a good proportion of Nationalist Chinese success in Africa can be traced to the backing and encouragement of the United States.[4]

The Nationalist Chinese activities began tentatively in 1960, gained strength in 1961, and are being maintained at an accelerating pace this year, again presenting a contrast with Communist China, which started out ambitiously, reached early heights in 1960, and then dropped in 1961 and 1962. In 1960, as was mentioned above, a Chinese Nationalist goodwill mission visited 11 African countries. During 1961, paralleling similar activities on the part of the Communist Chinese, Nationalist China invited both African missions and individuals to come to Taiwan, with the result that over 40 prominent Africans from ten countries did visit there. In addition, a Nationalist Chinese commercial mission visited seven West African countries.

In March 1961 a Liberian goodwill mission, headed by the Liberian Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, visited Taiwan and requested that a Nationalist Chinese technical mission be sent to Liberia to survey the agricultural needs there and to for-

[4] It should also be noted that the voting of Nationalist China in the United Nations has generally been anti-colonialist, remarkable when one realizes the diplomatic tightrope the Nationalist Chinese must walk vis-à-vis the European states which still maintain diplomatic relations with Nationalist China.

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mulate a development program. To meet this request, Nationalist China decided to send 14 qualified farmers to Liberia to establish a model farm for two years. They arrived in November 1961, and after one year are reported to have been highly successful.

In June of the same year an agricultural mission arrived from Togo, and in August the Dahomean Minister of Labor and Public Functions visited Taiwan and an agreement was reached whereby Nationalist China would help Dahomey develop its water resources and irrigation system. The Dahomean Minister later stated, in Paris, that he was "vividly struck by what the Chinese in Formosa have accomplished" and believed "that the African states would be interested in visiting this country, which could serve as an example for them."

A Malagasy agricultural mission visited Taiwan in September, purchased some 30,000 tons of tuna and agreed to send men to Taiwan to learn about tuna fishing. The Congolese (Leopoldville) Minister of Agriculture visited in October. The Nationalist Chinese Ministry of Education further announced that it was offering 10 fellowships in 1962 to qualified students from any of the newly independent African countries.

Libya also requested aid in agriculture in 1961. An article in the semi-official Nationalist Chinese *Chung-yang Jih-pao* (Central Daily News) reports that this request resulted from disappointment with U.N. efforts to aid in agriculture and hesitancy to accept either Communist or Western (*i.e.* colonialist) aid. Nationalist China responded by sending a survey group in December 1961. The event coincided with the change in Libya's U.N. vote on the question of seating Communist China, from abstention in 1960 to a vote for Nationalist China in 1961. This was followed up in February 1962 by an agreement for technical coöperation, whereby the Nationalist Chinese will run a demonstration farm in Libya for two years (six Chinese farmers arrived last March) and train Libyan agricultural technicians in Taiwan.

In December 1961 there was set up in Taipei a Committee on Chinese-African Technological Coöperation, a joint venture by the Nationalist Chinese Ministries of Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, Economic Reconstruction and the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction. This intra-governmental committee coördinates the increasing number of activities in Africa and is the medium through which invitations are extended to African countries to send agricultural technicians for training in Taiwan.

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The year 1962 opened auspiciously as two African countries established diplomatic relations with Nationalist China in January. Following floods in Kenya, Nationalist China sent 22,000 pounds of rice for relief there; and in February and March a group of Nationalist Chinese agricultural experts toured Gabon to study the possibilities of rice cultivation in that country.

April, however, was the triumphal month for Nationalist China, when Taiwan welcomed the first visit of an African chief of state, President Philibert Tsiranana of the island Malagasy Republic. A friendship treaty was signed, and Tsiranana called his visit "very rewarding," stating that his country had "much to learn from Nationalist China in economic development, land reform and modernization of armed forces." He also discussed fishery coöperation, promised to send two agriculturists to Taiwan to study rice cultivation and invited Chiang Kai-shek to visit Madagascar.

The middle of the same month 25 Africans from 11 countries[5] arrived in Taiwan for six months of practical training in rice planting, upland crops, agricultural expansion, operation of farmers' organizations and farm credit, sponsored by the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in a program given the name "Seminar for Agricultural Technicians from Africa." This first class has graduated and returned to Africa, and at the request of the same African countries a second seminar is being organized for next spring. The operations of this seminar, as well as the demonstration farms in Liberia and Libya, were cited by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson during the recent U.N. debate on the issue of seating Communist China.

May 1962 saw the visit of a four-man delegation from Chad, and the signing of an agreement on economic and cultural coöperation. Since then, others who have visited Taiwan have been the Ivory Coast Minister of Agriculture, who signed an agricultural coöperation agreement; the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Cameroons, who signed cultural, commercial, educational and economic and technical coöperation agreements; the Foreign Minister of Rwanda, with whom an agreement was reached to send agricultural technicians; and the Dahomey Minister of Agriculture. Further, agricultural demonstration teams were reported

[5] Countries and numbers of students: Central African Republic (2), Congo (Brazzaville) (3), Congo (Leopoldville) (2), Dahomey (4), Ivory Coast (2), Libya (2), Malagasy (2), Mauritania (1), Niger (2), Senegal (2) and Togo (3).

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being formed to be sent to Gabon, Ivory Coast, Dahomey and Ethiopia.

A most interesting development occurred recently in the Kingdom of Burundi, which gained its independence in July but postponed its independence ceremonies until October because of a threat of tribal violence. The Communist Chinese Ambassador to neighboring Tanganyika was already on hand as a guest for the celebration when apparently Burundi, with second thoughts, invited a Nationalist Chinese representative. The Communist Chinese, Ho Ying, withdrew, decrying "the imperialist scheme of using the Chiang Kai-shek clique to undermine Sino-Burundi friendly relations," though blaming all on the "U.S. imperialists." For the first time the Nationalist Chinese had displaced a Communist Chinese when the latter was there first. This was, however, somewhat offset by the situation in Uganda where representatives from both the Chinese capitals were also invited; but this time the Chinese Nationalists declined, and subsequently Uganda—a former British protectorate—agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China.

Nationalist China, in the words of the official Nationalist Chinese News Service, "is sparing no effort to enhance friendly relations with the African nations." A judicious use of resources at a time of economic prosperity and Communist Chinese economic failings have combined to enable it to outdistance its rival in Africa. While unable to directly match, dollar for dollar, the generous though sporadic Communist grants, the Nationalists are making up for this in steady progress within their means. In the space of two years Nationalist Chinese programs have achieved a level that may soon be comparable to the foreign assistance program of Israel (and certainly some of the underlying reasons are the same in both cases)—small, but effective, and with a good reputation. Nationalist China's success in making friends in Africa has been translated into support in the United Nations; it is proving an effective counterpoint to Communist China in Africa; and in the longer run it should provide markets for Taiwan's expanding industry.

Africa, meanwhile, is benefiting from this rivalry, which will be resolved only when the China problem itself is solved.

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WILL UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES LEARN TO TAX?

By Nicholas Kaldor

THE importance of public revenue to the underdeveloped countries can hardly be exaggerated if they are to achieve their hopes of accelerated economic progress. Whatever the prevailing ideology or political color of a particular government, it must steadily expand a whole host of non-revenue-yielding services—education, health, communication systems and so on—as a prerequisite for the country's economic and cultural development. These services must be financed out of government revenue. Besides meeting these needs, taxes and other compulsory levies provide the most appropriate instruments for increasing savings for capital formation out of domestic sources. By providing a surplus over recurrent expenditure, they make it possible to devote a higher proportion of resources to building up capital assets.

This is not to say that poor countries could or should finance their development programs entirely by their own effort. The advanced countries with high incomes have an obligation to assist in the process by providing aid, and this obligation has been amply recognized—if not adequately implemented—in recent years. However, foreign aid is likely to be fruitful only when it is a complement to domestic effort, not when it is treated as a substitute for it.

The fact is that in relation to gross national product the tax revenue of the underdeveloped countries is typically much smaller than in the advanced countries. Whereas the "developed" countries collect 25 to 30 percent of their G.N.P. in taxation, the underdeveloped countries typically collect only 8 to 15 percent.

Is this an ineluctable consequence of their poverty? Since taxation can be paid only out of the surplus of income over the minimum subsistence needs of the population, most people believe that the proportion of the national income which a poor country can divert to communal purposes through taxation—without setting up intolerable social tensions—is much smaller than in a rich country. Two considerations show, however, that this is not the whole, or the main, explanation.

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In the first place, though underdeveloped countries show enormous diversity in their economic and social set-up, they all—excepting the more primitive countries of Africa or Polynesia—show a degree of inequality in the distribution of income comparable to, if not greater than, that of the "developed" countries of Western Europe or North America. The statistical evidence is sketchy and not very reliable; yet such as there is all tends to show that the degree of concentration in the ownership of property is quite as great in the poor or semi-developed countries of the Middle East, Asia or Latin America as in the countries of advanced capitalism. The share of the national income which accrues to property owners of all kinds is probably appreciably larger in countries like Mexico, Chile, India, Turkey or Persia than in the United States or in Britain.

Hence, while their average income per head is low, the fraction of their national income which accrues to a small minority of individuals is frequently greater than in the rich countries; and a much higher proportion of that income is devoted to personal consumption, and a lower proportion to savings. This is partly a reflection of the failure of their taxation systems, but partly it follows from the fact that—depending on the degree of underdevelopment and the pressure of population on the land—a considerably greater part of wealth comes from the ownership of land, and a smaller proportion from industrial or commercial capital; and the owners of land, unlike the owners of industrial or commercial enterprises, are high spenders, not high savers. In a study which I made of Chile some years ago (one of the countries for which detailed national income statistics are available) I found that the proportion of the G.N.P. which is "taken up" by the consumption of property owners was over 20 percent—probably three times as high a proportion as that of the United States. This shows that the *level* of the national income per head is not a good indicator of taxable capacity; a poor country may have a high taxation potential if a relatively large part of its resources is nevertheless devoted to unessential or luxury consumption.

The second important consideration is that the incidence of taxation in most underdeveloped countries is regressive—far more regressive (or far less progressive) than that of the developed countries. Indirect taxes, the bulk of which normally falls on articles of mass consumption, make up a much higher share of

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the total revenue, and far more of the income tax revenue falls on salaries and wages, which is collected by the deduction-at-source method, and often operates with a very low exemption limit.[1] As far as the mass of the people are concerned, the burden of taxation as measured by the percentage of income taken in tax is probably just as large in the low-income countries (at least in the urban sectors) as in the rich countries.

The shortfall in revenue is thus largely a reflection of failure to tax the wealthier sectors of the community effectively. Though progressive income taxes and inheritance taxes exist on paper in most of the underdeveloped or semi-developed countries—sometimes imposed at high nominal rates, mounting to 80 percent or more on the highest incomes—there are few cases in which such taxes are effective in practice. This is evinced by the glaring discrepancy between the amount of incomes of various types—profits, rents, etc.—that can be presumed to exist, judging from national output statistics, and the incomes declared in tax returns or computed on the basis of tax receipts. In the developed countries, the national income estimates based on the "income" and the "output" methods of computation are more easily reconciled, and do not reveal such glaring differences. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the typical underdeveloped country collects in direct taxation (excluding the taxation of wages and salaries) no more than one-fifth, possibly only one-tenth, of what is due—or rather what would be due if the tax laws themselves did not accord wide legal loopholes through exemptions and omissions of various kinds.

This broad generalization requires, of course, a great deal of qualification when applied to individual countries or regions. There are some countries which have been conspicuously unsuccessful in imposing taxes on the wealthy classes—chiefly, I think, the countries of Latin America—for whom the above picture may even be an understatement. There are others, chiefly the ex-colonies of the British Empire, which have only recently gained independence but inherited relatively high standards of tax administration from their colonial days; for these it may be an exaggeration. Some countries have made notable efforts in recent years to improve both their legislation and their tax administration. In others the situation is deteriorating, owing to

[1] In Turkey, for example, the exemption limit for income tax is around $100 a year for a single person.

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the paralyzing effect of corruption, or the steady erosion of ancient taxes; there the weight of direct taxation may be less now than it was 50 or 100 years ago.

II

Another source of untapped taxable capacity in many underdeveloped countries is to be found on the land. The agricultural or "subsistence" sector, which typically accounts for one-half or more of the national output, virtually escapes taxation at present,[2] owing to the "erosion" of the ancient land taxes of the countries of the Middle East and Asia. It is true that the peasantry is poor everywhere and its capacity to pay is limited. It is also true, however, that in most places—at least in most of the over-populated regions—only a proportion of the produce accrues to the cultivator, the rest accrues to the owner of the land, or to some intermediary tenant; and as has been known since the time of Ricardo, the incidence of land taxes necessarily falls on the landlord. Despite recent measures of land reform in countries like India, the distribution of land-holdings remains very uneven, with no more than one-half, or possibly two-thirds, of the land in the hands of genuine owner-cultivators.

The land tax is one of the most ancient forms of taxation in both Europe and Asia, and up to the early part of this century it still provided the principal source of revenue in the countries of the Middle East, India and Japan. Since that time, however, political pressures combined with monetary changes have succeeded in virtually eliminating it; the tax continues to be collected in most places but on the basis of completely out-of-date valuations. Its rehabilitation now faces heavy political and administrative obstacles. Traditionally, the land tax was one-tenth of the value of the produce of the land. But its current yield in India is only about 1.5 percent; in Turkey only 0.2 percent. Yet, as the economic history of Japan demonstrates, the taxation of land can be a very potent engine of economic development, though its importance cannot be measured adequately by its money yield. This is because the land tax yields not just revenue but the right kind of revenue; it enlarges the supply of foodstuffs to urban areas, and thus the amount of employment that can be offered outside agriculture without creating inflation. It also pro-

[2] This is not meant to apply, of course, to plantation agriculture or to the production of cash crops for export by native farmers who may be heavily taxed through export levies or through the price policy of a marketing board.

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motes agricultural efficiency. It encourages the more efficient use of the land as well as the transfer of ownership from relatively inefficient to efficient cultivators.

It is possible, moreover, to "streamline" this tax in accordance with more modern notions of equity by making it a progressive tax, graduated according to the total value of the land held by an individual and his family, so that the burden is concentrated on the large landowners. A scheme recently proposed in Turkey by the State Planning Organization would have exempted holdings of less than 2 hectares altogether, while larger holdings would have borne a graduated charge rising from 5 percent on holdings of less than 10 hectares to 15 percent on holdings of 50 hectares or more. Since the top 1.5 percent of agricultural families own more than 21 percent of the land (and a further 14 percent of families another 31 percent), this scheme would have made it possible to collect the revenue needed for the new five-year development plan by a levy which, without being exorbitant, would have avoided the anti-social features of the old land tax. However, the Cabinet, which approved the development plan, has refused to sanction the scheme for financing it, and recently it was reported that all the top officials of the Planning Organization have resigned in protest. In countries where a powerful landowning class exists the prospects for effective land taxation do not appear more promising than the prospects for land reform.

III

When countries pass to a higher stage of development, as the more advanced regions of Latin America have done, industrial and commercial wealth (which is less tangible) assumes increasing importance. The taxation of that wealth raises more complicated problems, while any genuine measure of reform designed to tap it meets with the same kind of political resistance.

The effective administration of income tax on individuals or corporations requires a carefully-thought-out legal code and a corps of capable and honest administrators. It is often argued that these taxes are really too difficult for the less developed countries to cope with, and it would be better if they concentrated on simpler forms of taxation. But the fact is that there is no suitable alternative. A graduated system of commodity taxation can never succeed in mitigating growing economic inequalities (and the political and social tensions which are asso-

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ciated with this process), or in reducing the resources devoted to socially unnecessary luxury consumption, in the same manner as progressive taxes on income and wealth. The same commodities are bought by people of very different means—the richer people buying more kinds of goods and services, and not just more luxurious goods; and many of the things on which wealthy individuals spend money cannot be effectively taxed—for example, domestic service, foreign travel, antiques and so on.

It is also argued that the progressive taxation of industrial and commercial wealth, unlike that of landed wealth, slows down the rate of development by reducing both the means and the incentives to accumulation. In the United States or in Britain, the argument runs, progressive taxation was imposed only after the process of industrialization was largely completed—not in the middle of the industrial revolution. It does not follow, however, that if the system of progressive taxation had been imposed earlier the course of economic development would have been very different. It is true that profits have always been the main source of industrial and commercial capital accumulation. But experience has shown that taxes on profits affect consumption out of profits far more than business savings. The reason for this is that for a successful businessman or corporation (in developed or undeveloped countries alike) the requirements of business expansion take precedence over the desire for higher consumption; the money that the owners take out of a business is generally no more than what is left after the business' own needs are satisfied. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain why fast-growing businesses should invariably plough back so much more of their profits than slow-growing businesses, or why the proportion of profits distributed as dividends should be so much less in countries where the taxation of profits is high than where it is low.

If the effects of increased public spending are taken into account, and not only the reduction in private spending, and if public money is wisely spent (admittedly this is not something that can be taken for granted), it is difficult to maintain that the reduction in inequality through progressive taxation puts a brake on economic development. It may do the very opposite. For in countries where luxury spending is not effectively curbed, the pattern of investment gets distorted. Too much of the capital accumulation is taken up by the expansion of industries and services which mainly cater to the rich. This kind of "growth" merely

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serves to make the rich even richer; it does not improve the standard of living of the masses of the population.

There are basic differences in the way capitalism developed in North America and the way it is now developing in the countries of Latin America. They cannot be explained merely by the differences in fiscal systems. Long before progressive taxation was invented, a whole set of attitudes and circumstances forced American business to concentrate on developing products for the mass market; the Woolworths and the Fords made their fortunes by providing goods within the reach of the many and not for the better satisfaction of the few. In Latin America development takes a different course. I know of no Latin American millionaire who made his fortune in the five-and-ten business. But vast fortunes were made in providing luxuries for a class whose members prospered largely by catering to each other. Whatever the true cause of such differences, it becomes vastly more important to apply progressive taxation, as a deliberate corrective to spontaneous economic forces which produce steadily growing inequality.

IV

Nor would it be correct to say that an effective system of progressive taxation cannot work because of the lack of administrative competence or honesty of officials, or the lack of a sense of social obligation of taxpayers. It is true that in most underdeveloped countries—though conditions vary a good deal—revenue officials are grossly underpaid, revenue departments are frequently understaffed, and are short of men of ability and training. Straightforward corruption must be widespread. However, it is impossible to find out how much of the shortfall in revenue is due to this, as against sheer inefficiency or incompetence, or a laxity in the enforcement of the law which is tolerated, if not inspired, in higher quarters.

But the experience of many countries which suffered from much the same evils in the past shows that corruption and inefficiency *can* be eradicated if sufficient attention is given to the creation of corps of permanent officials[3] whose pay, status and prospects of promotion are high enough to attract the best talent,

[3] In many Latin American countries the top-ranking officials of the tax administration—including district commissioners or even their deputies—are not permanent civil servants at all, but are appointed on the spoils system, changing with each administration.

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and also high enough to establish the professional standards and etiquette associated with a public service that enjoys a privileged social status. The example of the Chinese Maritime Customs has shown what the creation of a well-paid body of permanent officials could accomplish, even in a country where corruption was as deeply ingrained as it was in Imperial China. Of course no underdeveloped country has the manpower resources or the money to create a high-grade civil service overnight. But it is not sufficiently recognized that the revenue service is the "point of entry"; if they concentrated on this, they would secure the means for the rest.

It is true that the prevailing systems of income taxation in the United States, Britain or Canada rely heavily on the voluntary compliance of the taxpayer; for important categories of income the revenue authorities mainly depend on the taxpayers themselves to supply information, the accuracy and completeness of which is not automatically or systematically checked. But there is no technical necessity for this. One could conceive of a system in which transactions in capital assets and income payments of all kinds are systematically reported, in the same way as wage and salary payments are now reported. With the aid of modern business machines it would be possible to keep a record of the ownership of all property—land and houses and stocks and shares—and to keep a running check on changes in the personal balance sheet of all wealthy individuals. Each taxpayer could be asked to give a statement of his net worth each year, and not only of his income, and the return on this wealth could be independently checked if all property were registered and all changes in property registration were automatically reported in the name and the tax-code number of the beneficial owner. Tax administrators know that the discovery of changes in an individual's net worth over a period is the most effective method of bringing to light concealment of income. In advanced countries such investigations are made sporadically as a spot-check on returns or in cases where fraud is suspected; there is no reason why they should not be made systematically in countries where taxpayers are less honest or compliant.

V

It would be wrong to assume, therefore, that there are insuperable technical obstacles to the introduction of any effective system

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of progressive taxation. It is not beyond the wit of man to devise laws and administrative procedures which would oblige even the most recalcitrant (or cunning) Latin American or Middle East millionaire to surrender a reasonable share of his income or wealth to the state in taxation. But that is not to say that in the countries where such reforms are most needed they have much chance of acceptance. The secrecy and anonymity of property is regarded as sacred and is safeguarded by the system of "bearer" shares which effectively hides the identity of the shareholders of companies and which enables even the ownership of real property to be concealed through holding companies. Any suggestion that ownership should be disclosed and regularly reported to the government—as is done, for example, in the Scandinavian countries —would be unthinkable.[4] No doubt secrecy of property ownership is a far more valuable safeguard in countries which are politically unstable than in the settled democracies of Western Europe or North America. But political instability is itself a consequence of economic and social conditions which result from the unbridled greed of an oligarchical ruling class.

To the detached observer, fiscal reform undoubtedly appears as the most appropriate instrument for transforming the feudal or quasi-feudal régimes which inhibit the healthy evolution of so many of the underdeveloped countries and prevent them from following the path toward the kind of mass-prosperity civilization which has evolved in Western Europe and North America. But the advocacy of fiscal reform is not some magic potion that is capable of altering the balance of political power by stealth. No doubt, expert advice on tax reform can be very useful in making men of good will—ministers or officials—conscious of the precise nature of the legislative and administrative changes that are required. But what can actually be accomplished does not depend merely on the individual good will of ministers or on the correct intellectual appreciation of the technical problems involved. It is predominantly a matter of political power.

In a successfully functioning democracy the balance of political

[4] In Turkey, one of the achievements of the military dictatorship that followed the Menderes régime was to introduce a measure for a single compulsory declaration of personal wealth. But Parliament insisted that these declarations should be deposited in sealed envelopes with public notaries and should not be opened for at least two years. There is now strong pressure in Parliament for a further provision to the effect that after two years have elapsed, the envelopes should be returned unopened to the taxpayers. In Mexico when it was suggested that some similar provision would be needed for the proper enforcement of inheritance taxes, the Congress responded by abolishing the inheritance tax altogether.

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power is itself a reflection of a continuous social compromise between the conflicting interests of particular groups and classes, which shift automatically in response to varying pressures. But experience has shown that in underdeveloped countries with a predominantly ignorant and illiterate electorate parliamentary institutions do not, in general, work in this way. Periodic elections and multi-party systems are not instrumental in securing continuous or peaceful social adjustment. Power remains in the hands of certain dominant groups, irrespective of whether one party or another is in office or whether there is an elected government or a dictatorship of some kind. The history of the last ten years produced plenty of examples—in Asia or in Latin America—of dictatorships replacing parliamentary systems, or vice versa, without significantly altering the underlying balance of power in society.

In many areas of the Middle East and of Latin America revolutionary pressure continues to build up, as a result of blind opposition to overdue social reforms. Ostensibly it is motivated by fear of Communism: in reality it serves to bring Communism nearer. The problem which has to be solved and to which no one has yet found a satisfactory answer is how to bring about that change in the balance of power which is needed to avert revolutions without *having* a revolution. Can it be brought about by outside pressure —by making internal social and economic reforms the quid pro quo for external aid, as in the Alliance for Progress? Or can it be brought about by some organized attempt at the political re-education of backward ruling classes—a kind of Westernized version of Chinese brainwashing? History does provide cases—nineteenth-century England is an obvious one—of a ruling class voluntarily relinquishing privileges for the sake of social stability. It did so in an instinctive appreciation of its long-run interests. But when ruling classes evince no signs of such instinct, can they be made to acquire it?

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THE STATUS OF THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION

By Moshe Decter

DURING the past quarter-century, enlightened public opinion throughout the world has become keenly sensitive to the treatment of minorities as a barometer of moral decency and social sanity. The awesome experiences of this period have drawn particular attention to the symbolic and actual position of the Jewish minority. In this light, the status of the Jews in the Soviet Union warrants special concern.

The situation of Soviet Jews can be comprehended primarily within the framework of Soviet nationalities policy. That policy, as reflected in Communist party directives, the Soviet Constitution and public law, is based on the ideological acceptance of the concept of national self-determination and on the legal recognition of the right of all nationalities within Soviet borders to cultural freedom. Actual Soviet policy toward the Jews clearly violates these principles. It is tantamount to a policy of discrimination for it denies to the Jews such ethnic-cultural rights as are generally accorded all other Soviet nationalities.

The Soviet Union officially recognizes Jews as a nationality. In the personal identification papers which all Soviet citizens carry (the internal "passport"), Jews must list their nationality as "Jewish" (*Yevrei*) just as other nationalities—such as Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians and others—must list theirs. Thus, in the official Soviet census returns of 1959, published in *Pravda* on February 4, 1960, Jews are listed among the official nationalities. In all previous censuses, citizens were required to provide proof, in the form of their internal passport, of their claim to belong to one or another nationality. In 1959, for the first time, they were allowed to volunteer, without proof, the nationality with which they chose to be identified. Despite the possibility thus provided for Jews to "pass," 2,268,000 people specified their nationality as Jewish (there are reasons to believe that the total number more closely approximates 3,000,000).

Soviet Jews constitute 1.09 percent of the population, but they occupy a far more significant place than this figure suggests. Of the considerably more than 100 diverse Soviet nationalities, the Jews are eleventh numerically. The great majority of them live in the three most populous Union Republics: 38 percent in the Russian Republic, 37 percent in the Ukraine, 7 percent in White Russia; but there is no republic of the U.S.S.R. where Jewish communities may not be found. And an important reflection of their sense of identification after several decades of direct and indirect forcible assimilation is that 472,000 (20.8 percent) gave Yiddish, which is the traditional language of speech and literature of East European Jews, as their mother tongue.

The Jews are also regarded, secondarily, as a religious group. This complicates their status and makes it even more precarious. For though their unique dual character is a natural outgrowth of Jewish history and tradition, it creates unusual difficulties for them under Soviet conditions. An assault upon

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the Jewish religion, for example, will inevitably be taken, by Jews and non-Jews alike, as an attack upon the Jewish nationality as a whole—upon Jews as such. And they have come increasingly to be considered an alien group in a land where they have resided for more than a thousand years.

Their vulnerability is increased by the fact that, unlike most other Soviet nationalities, which have their own geographic territories, the Jews are widely dispersed throughout the country. They are also the only Soviet nationality a majority of whose total world population lives outside the U.S.S.R. Because the Soviet Jewish minority has historic and traditional ties of culture, religion and family with Jewish communities throughout the world outside the Communist bloc, it is subject to even greater suspicion.

Soviet Jews are especially sensitive to their vulnerable condition because their memory of what they themselves call the "Black Years"—the last five years of Stalin's rule, when his terror assumed a viciously and openly anti-Semitic form—has not been erased. One reason they have not forgotten is that Soviet policy toward Jews and Judaism has remained essentially the same since 1948—with the vitally important exception, of course, that the terror is gone. And they are not less keenly cognizant of the fact that, of all the crimes of Stalin catalogued by Premier Khrushchev and his colleagues at the Twentieth and Twenty-second Congresses of the C.P.S.U., his crimes against the Jews were passed over in utter silence.

The significance of Soviet policy toward the Jews was dramatically highlighted in September 1961 by the publication of a poem, "Babi Yar," in the *Literary Gazette,* organ of the Soviet Writers Union. This poem by a loyal Communist, Yevgeny Yevtushenko—one of the most popular young Soviet poets—caused a sensation. It is a searing indictment of anti-Semitism both historically and as a facet of contemporary Soviet society. In his opening line, the poet protests that there is still no monument to the scores of thousands of Jewish martyrs slaughtered by the Nazis in 1941 at Babi Yar, a vale on the outskirts of Kiev. This is a pointed reflection of the fact that Soviet authorities have been consistently silent about the nature, dimensions and even the very existence of the unique Jewish tragedy during the Second World War. Though not himself a Jew, Yevtushenko identifies himself in his poem with persecuted Jewry throughout history. He thus points up the existence of a historic Jewish people, which Soviet doctrine denies—and of Jewish history, which Soviet policy prevents Jews from learning.

Yevtushenko is not alone in mirroring the mood and sensibility of the literate younger Soviet generation. There is a whole "underground" literature that passes from hand to hand among the university and literary youth, and one of its frequent leitmotifs is isolated, disadvantaged Soviet Jewry. In this, as in their general quest for a purified idealism, Yevtushenko and his confrères are in the main stream of the honorable tradition of the liberal Russian intelligentsia from Pushkin to Tolstoy and Gorky.

II

The Jews are the only nationality which is deprived of the basic cultural rights accorded to all others in the U.S.S.R. These rights have recently been reaffirmed by no less an authoritative source than the new Party Program

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adopted by the Twenty-second Congress in October 1961: "The Communist Party guarantees the complete freedom of each citizen of the U.S.S.R. to speak and to rear and educate his children in any language—ruling out all privileges, restrictions or compulsion in the use of this or that language."

Until 1948 the Jews were permitted a cultural life in their own language, Yiddish (though Hebrew was forbidden), on a large scale: newspapers, publishing houses, thousands of books, a variety of literary journals, professional repertory theatres and dramatic schools, literary and cultural research institutes, a network of schools, and other means of perpetuating Jewish cultural values, albeit in a Communist form. In 1948 (and in some cases during the purges of 1937–39), the whole vast array of institutions was forcibly closed.

No basic change in this policy of cultural deprivation occurred, despite Stalin's death and the gradual easing of the tyranny, until 1959. Since then, a grand total of six Yiddish books has been published—by writers long dead. (None has been published in 1962 as of November.) They were put out in editions of 30,000 each, mostly for foreign consumption, but those copies that were available to Jews inside the U.S.S.R. were eagerly and quickly snapped up.

This total of six books is to be compared with the facilities made available to many ethnic groups far smaller than that of the Soviet Jews, and which do not possess as ancient, continuous and rich a culture. Two striking examples are in order. The Maris and Yakuts are two tiny primitive Asian groups which number 504,000 and 236,000 respectively. In 1961 alone, Soviet printing presses produced 62 books for the Maris and 144 for the Yakuts, in their own languages.

The Soviet Yiddish theatre was once considered one of the prides of Soviet artistic achievement. Today there is only a handful of amateur theatrical groups, made up of Jewish workers banded together after working hours, existing on a marginal basis; there is not even such a group in Moscow or Leningrad, the two major centers of Soviet Jewry, together totaling nearly one million.

In the autumn of 1961, for the first time since 1948, a Yiddish literary journal, *Sovietish Heimland,* began publication as a bimonthly. Welcome though this is, it is no more than the exception proving the rule. But it does represent, along with the meager half-dozen Yiddish books (and the "concerts" of Yiddish dramatic readings and folk songs which have been permitted and which have been attended by millions of Jews in recent years) a tacit repudiation of the oft-repeated Soviet assertion that Soviet Jews have lost interest in their culture. This state of affairs is again to be contrasted with the press available to the Maris and Yakuts. The former have 17 newspapers, the latter 28.

A frequent Soviet rationalization for the absence of cultural institutions for the Jews is that the Jews are so widely dispersed. This is invalidated, however, by the fact that tiny minorities like the Chechens (418,000), Ossetians (410,000) and Komis (431,000), which do not have their own territories, yet have their own newspapers and literatures in their own languages, and schools where their languages are taught. The Tadjik minority in Uzbekistan (312,000 out of a total Republic population of 8,106,000) has similar rights and institutions, as have the Poles in White Russia (539,000 out of 8,055,000).

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It is not just schools that are forbidden to the Jews.[1] They are not even allowed classes in Yiddish or Hebrew in the general schools; nor, for that matter, classes in the Russian language (comparable to Sunday School education in the United States) on Jewish history and culture. Nor are Soviet Jews permitted to have contact on purely Jewish cultural matters with Jewish institutions abroad.

III

All religions in the U.S.S.R. exist very precariously within a context of official anti-religious ideology and propaganda. In a variety of fundamental respects, however, Judaism is subjected to unique discrimination. Jewish congregations are permitted no variant of the right enjoyed by the others to maintain nation-wide federations or other central organizations through which religious functions are governed, religious needs serviced, religious belief bolstered and communication between congregations strengthened. Rabbis and synagogue leaders have nothing at all comparable to the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, the National Ecclesiastical Assembly of the Armenian Church, the Lutheran Churches of Latvia and Estonia or the Moslem Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

These churches are permitted a wide range of religious publishing facilities, publishing houses and paper supplies. Thus, the Russian Orthodox version of the Bible was reprinted in 1957 in an edition of 50,000. In 1958, 10,000 copies of a Russian-language Protestant Bible were published by the Baptists. The same year the Moslem Directorates in Ufa and Tashkent produced editions of 4,000 and 5,000 copies, respectively, of the Koran. And in May 1962 the Moslem Board for Central Asia issued still another new edition. It should be noted that these editions of the Koran are in Arabic, a language not spoken by Soviet Moslems, but used for religious study and other religious functions. This is comparable to what the status of Hebrew might be there.

Judaism is permitted no publication facilities and no publications. No Hebrew Bible has been published for Jews since 1917. (Nor has a Russian translation of the Jewish version of the Old Testament been allowed.) The study of Hebrew has been outlawed, even for religious purposes. Not a single Jewish religious book of any other kind has appeared in print since the early 1920s. In contrast, prayerbooks are available to the other denominations in relatively ample supply: the Baptists were authorized in 1956 to publish 25,000 hymnals; the Lutheran Church of Latvia has produced 1,500 copies of a psalter and is now preparing a new edition of its 1954 hymnal. Religious calendars, indispensable guides for religious holidays and observances, are freely available. Other types of religious publications are also permitted. The Russian Orthodox Church publishes the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate,* its official monthly organ. It has also published collections of sermons and several annuals. The All-Union Council of Baptists puts out a bimonthly, the *Fraternal Review.*

[1] Though Soviet law permits any ten parents who request it to organize instruction for their children in their own language, Jewish parents have been understandably loath to take advantage of this provision.

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No such prerogatives have been vouchsafed to the Jews. Until 1958, no *siddur* (Sabbath prayerbook in Hebrew) was printed. In that year, an edition of 3,000 copies of a pre-Revolutionary *siddur* was provided by photo-offset—a ridiculously small figure for the hundreds of thousands of religious Jews whose prayerbooks are tattered and worn. No edition at all has been allowed of special prayerbooks which Jews use on their High Holidays and major Festivals. As for calendars, the Jews have had to depend on photographed copies of handwritten ones, surreptitiously circulated from hand to hand.

A subtler but harsher form of discrimination has resulted from the ban on Hebrew. The Russian Orthodox, Baptist, Lutheran, Georgian or Armenian believer is not handicapped in his participation in religious services, for they are conducted in his native spoken tongue. But the half-century-old ban on Hebrew has made it impossible for Jews educated under the Soviet régime to make sense of their synagogue services. Thousands come—and must stand mute and dumb.

The other major ecclesiastical bodies are authorized to produce a variety of religious articles—ritual objects such as church vessels, vestments, candles, beads, crucifixes and ikons. The mass sale of such articles, especially candles, is an important source of church income. But the production of such indispensable religious objects as the *tallis* (prayer shawl) and *tefillin* (phylacteries) is prohibited to Jews.

A brief statistical examination illuminates the extent to which the faithful are served by churches and priests, synagogues and rabbis. For the 40,000,000 Russian Orthodox there are some 20,000 churches and 35,000 priests (quite apart from those in the 69 monasteries and convents). This comes to one place of worship for each 2,000 believers and one priest for each 1,100 believers. For the 3,000,000 Baptists (including women and children who are affiliated through family membership) there are roughly 6,000 parishes and pastors, which amounts to one place of worship and one minister for each 500 believers. The Lutheran Churches of Latvia and Estonia have 100 churches and 150 pastors for about 350,000 communicants— approximately one church for each 3,500 believers and one minister for each 2,300. By contrast, there are some 60 or 70 synagogues and rabbis for the nearly 1,000,000 Jewish believers—which amounts to one synagogue and one rabbi for each 15,000 to 16,000 Jewish believers.

Most religious groups also maintain educational institutions to prepare men for the priesthood. The Russian Orthodox have two academies and five seminaries; the Moslems have a *madrassa* where their mullahs are trained. In addition, quite a few Moslem clerical students have been permitted to advance their studies at the theological seminary in Cairo. Young Baptist seminarians have attended theological schools in Great Britain and Canada. Such programs serve the twofold function of maintaining spiritual contacts with co-religionists abroad and of enhancing the quality of religious education at home.

Until 1957, religious Jews had no institution to train rabbis. In that year, a *yeshiva* (rabbinical academy) was established as an adjunct of the Great Synagogue in Moscow. Since then, precisely two men have been ordained as rabbis, neither of whom has functioned as a synagogue leader. Of the 13 students at the *yeshiva* until April 1962, 11 were over 40—which means that

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very little provision was made for replacing the rabbis now serving in the U.S.S.R., all of whom are in their seventies and eighties. This is to be contrasted with the "accent on youth" for Russian Orthodox seminarians. The Jewish community is thus being deprived of needed religious leadership.

A most serious restriction was imposed on the *yeshiva* in April 1962, when a majority of the students, who came from the oriental Jewish communities of Georgia and Daghestan, were forbidden to resume their studies in Moscow, on the ground that they lacked the necessary residence permits for the capital city which is suffering from a housing shortage. This left just four students in an institution that has been transformed into a virtually empty shell. Nor has any Jewish seminarian in the last five years been allowed to advance his studies at institutions of Jewish learning abroad.

In addition to their prerogatives at home, other Soviet ecclesiastical bodies have enjoyed the privilege of regular and permanent ties with coreligionists abroad, an incalculably important boost to their morale. Since 1956 there have been innumerable exchange visits of religious delegations—Russian Orthodox, Baptists and Moslems—between the U.S.S.R. and Western Europe, the United States and the Middle East. The Soviet Moslems have for years been associated with a World Congress of Moslems. At the end of October 1962 a national conference of Moslem leaders, meeting in Tashkent, was authorized to establish a permanent department for international relations, with headquarters in Moscow, which would speak for all Moslem Boards in the country. And within the past year, the World Council of Churches (Protestant) accepted the full-fledged membership of the Russian Orthodox Church and of five other major Soviet ecclesiastical bodies: the Georgian and Armenian Churches, the Baptists, and the Lutheran Churches of Latvia and Estonia.

No Jewish religious delegation from the U.S.S.R. has ever been permitted to visit religious institutions abroad. Nor are synagogues in the Soviet Union allowed to have any kind of official contact, permanent ties or institutional relations with Jewish religious, congregational or rabbinic bodies outside their country.

The process of attrition and pressure against Judaism and Jewish religious institutions and practitioners has been systematically stepped up since the middle of 1961. In June and July of that year, the synagogue presidents in six major provincial cities were deposed. In the same period, six lay religious leaders in Moscow and Leningrad were secretly arrested. In September 1961, on the occasion of the Jewish High Holy Days, the authorities ordered the construction of a special loge in the Moscow Great Synagogue to seat the Israel Embassy officials who came to attend services—the better to cut off the thousands of Jews who came to the synagogue from their fellow Jews from abroad. In October 1961, the Moscow and Leningrad leaders were secretly tried and convicted of alleged espionage, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. In January 1962, *Trud,* the central trade union paper, published a notorious article that portrayed these devout religious Jews as agents of Israeli spies who, in turn, were described as tools of American intelligence.

On March 17, 1962, Rabbi Judah Leib Levin of the Moscow synagogue announced that the public baking and sale of *matzah* (the unleavened bread indispensable to the observance of the Passover) would be forbidden. This

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was the first time in Soviet history that a total ban on *matzah* was enforced throughout the country. The ban was actually part of the larger official attempt to destroy the bonds between Soviet Jewry and the traditional roots of Judaism that have a national historical significance. Since Passover is the ancient feast that commemorates the liberation of the Hebrews from Egyptian slavery and their establishment as a religious people, this holiday is subjected to especially virulent assault in the Soviet press. It is linked with "Zionist ideology," the State of Israel, chauvinism and so forth. The propaganda goes so far as to brand Jewish religious holidays, and Passover in particular, as subversive. "Judaism kills love for the Soviet motherland"—this is a slogan from a typical press article.

All this adds up to a systematic policy of attrition against religious Jews and their religious practices. The synagogues are the only remaining institutions in the U.S.S.R. which still embody the residues of traditional Jewish values and where Jews may still foregather formally as Jews. The objective of this policy is clearly to intimidate and atomize Soviet Jewry, to isolate it both from its past and from its brethren in other parts of the world, to destroy its specifically Jewish spirit.

IV

This policy of cultural and religious repression is conducted within the charged atmosphere of a virulent press campaign against Judaism. From it the image of the Jew emerges in traditional anti-Semitic stereotypes. The majority of the articles appear in the provincial press—in the larger cities, frequently the capitals, of the various republics, primarily the Russian Republic, the Ukraine and White Russia. These are the regions where the bulk of Soviet Jewry lives and where "popular" anti-Semitism is still widespread and endemic.

A study of a dozen such publications reveals that the following themes recur repeatedly:

1. The stereotype that emerges most blatantly is that of Jews as money worshippers. Rabbis and lay leaders of the synagogues are consistently portrayed as extorting money from the faithful for ostensibly religious purposes, their object in fact being to feather their own nests. Thus, whether it is the religious service itself or some ancient rite, it is all presided over by religious figures who are "in reality" money-grubbing thieves.

2. Judaism is constantly denigrated. All its rites are mocked in a manner which contrasts harshly with the Soviet Union's boasts of religious toleration. Circumcision, for example, is denounced in the crudest terms as a barbarous and unhealthful ritual: "The priests of the synagogue offer the regular sacrifice to their God Jehovah."

3. Drunkenness in the synagogue is another favorite theme. The scandalous rogues who pocket the money innocently contributed by the believers are shown as devoted to drink—guzzlers who confuse their prayers under the influence of alcohol. The leader of a synagogue burial society is quoted as saying: "In booze—I believe; in God—I don't."

4. Brawling is alleged to occur frequently in the synagogue, invariably over the division of the ill-gotten profits from religious "speculation." The

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newspapers "name the names" of the religious "mis-leaders" allegedly involved and frequently give their addresses and public positions, if any.

5. In these articles Jews often are used to inform on fellow Jews and to denounce Judaism. Many articles are signed by Jews; some contain recantations, usually by elderly men, of their religious faith.

6. A favorite device is for the writer to single out for special attention the adult children of elderly religious Jews. They are usually named and their public positions (teacher, engineer, nurse, etc.) noted, as well as their places of work and, where relevant, their party membership. Thus not only the parents but the presumably loyal, non-religious Communist children are held up to public obloquy, in a not very subtle effort to exert social blackmail on them.

7. Propaganda assaults on private prayer meetings are also frequent. Since many synagogues throughout the country are closed, Jews have taken to foregathering in each other's homes for prayers. Such gatherings are frowned upon, indeed unauthorized, and have regularly been dispersed, and their members warned and even punished. Articles list those who organize and attend such prayer meetings.

8. Perhaps the most ominous of all the themes is the consistent portrayal of the tenets and practitioners of traditional Judaism as potentially or actually subversive. The following references are typical: "The Jewish clericals and bourgeois nationalists provide grist for the mills of our class enemies, distract workers from their class and Communist interests, and weaken their consciousness with chauvinist poison." "The traditions bolstered by the synagogue are doubly harmful. First of all, they contribute to the perpetuation of the false religious world outlook. Secondly, they serve as an instrument for the propagation of bourgeois political views which are alien to us."

This must be contrasted with the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, signed by Premier Khrushchev on November 10, 1954, and re-echoed in *Pravda* on August 21, 1959: "It must not be forgotten that there are citizens who, though actively participating in the country's life and faithfully fulfilling their civic duty, still remain under the influence of various religious beliefs. Toward these the Party has already demanded, and will always demand, a tactful, considerate attitude. It is especially stupid to put these under political suspicion because of their religious convictions."

These standards have been clearly violated where Jews and Judaism are concerned. In the Soviet Union official atheism affects all religious groups; but it is only with regard to Jews and Judaism that the theme of lack of patriotism, disloyalty and subversion is injected into the propaganda. When the religion of the Russian Orthodox, the Armenian Orthodox, the Georgian Orthodox, the Baptist or the Moslem is attacked in the press he does not thereby come under political suspicion, nor does he feel his loyalty impugned either as a member of a given nationality or as a Soviet citizen. By the same token, the mass of non-believing Russians, Armenians, Georgians or Uzbeks do not feel that they are involved when the religious members of their nationality see their religion attacked in the official propaganda.

But with the Jews it is different. Because of the persistence of "popular" anti-Semitism, subtly encouraged from above, an attack upon the religious

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Jew and the portrayal of the Jewish image in traditional anti-Semitic stereotypes is felt even by the non-religious Jew as somehow involving him too. And he is not far wrong in feeling that many of his non-Jewish neighbors understand it in the same way. Small wonder, then, that—in the absence of a consistent educational campaign against anti-Semitism, such as was conducted in Lenin's time—an assault upon the Jewish religion will be sensed, by Jews and non-Jews alike, as an assault upon the entire Jewish group.

V

In such an atmosphere, it is hardly surprising that Jews should be subject to a subtle policy of discrimination in employment, education and other sectors of public life. That policy may be summarized in the phrase attributed, perhaps apocryphally but none the less aptly, to a top-level Soviet leader: "Don't hire, don't fire, don't promote."

A few especially gifted or brilliant Jewish individuals can still be found within the Soviet leadership. Many occupy positions in the middle ranks of professional, cultural and economic life. But virtually all face potent discriminatory measures in key "security-sensitive" areas of public life. The instrumentality for this exclusion, carried out quietly and informally, is the nationality listing on the internal passport. Thus, Jews have virtually disappeared from positions of major responsibility in the diplomatic service and, with rare exceptions, in the armed forces. This contrasts sharply with the situation that prevailed from 1917 to the late 1930s. The proportion in higher education, science, the professions and political life has also been declining for many years. The key to the decrease is the system of nationality quotas in university admissions. A considerable body of evidence points to the existence of a *numerus clausus* for Jews in the universities and, in some cases, of a *numerus nullus*. This explains the decline of Jewish representation in important activities.

The extent of the decline in higher education is reflected in the fact that Jews today represent 3.1 percent of all students in higher education, as contrasted with 13.5 percent in 1935. During this 27-year period, the Jewish proportion of the population decreased merely from 1.6 to 1.1 percent. There is no way of accounting for this drastic decline in a country with an expanding economy and growing opportunities—except by discrimination.

Even the present 3.1 percent is a skewed figure, for it fails to take account of two decisive factors. In the first place, the category "higher education," as given in Soviet statistics, lumps together both universities and many other types of specialized academies such as teacher training schools, music conservatories and journalism institutes. Jews have a strong position in the latter types, and this fact artificially raises the total by balancing out the much lower proportion of Jews in the universities as such. Secondly, it is estimated that 90 percent of Soviet Jews are urbanized. Most universities are located in the larger cities and recruit their student bodies from the children of the urban intelligentsia, in which the Jews have traditionally occupied a leading position. To get a more accurate measure of Jewish representation in higher education in proportion to the population, the Jewish proportion would have to be compared not with the percentage of Jews in the total population of a

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given republic, but with the percentage of Jews in an urban university area.

As for the professions, the declining proportion of Jews has been as much as admitted by Premier Khrushchev and Culture Minister Furtseva themselves as a matter of policy. (In making such admissions, they have referred to the necessity of making room for "our own intelligentsia"—clearly giving away their feeling that the Jews are not truly indigenous.) In general, the proportion of non-Jewish nationalities among professionals has been rising at a very rapid rate, but that of the Jews at a much slower rate. For example, since 1955 the number of Russians and Ukrainians in science has increased by 40 percent, that of the Jews by 25 percent. In 1955, Jews constituted 11 percent of Soviet scientists; the figure was 10.2 percent by 1958 and 9.8 percent by 1960. Even this figure is deceptively high, for it includes a substantial number of an older generation who had far freer access to the universities and the professions in the '20s and '30s. It is obviously the Jewish youth who are hardest hit by the declining rate; they have to be very good indeed even to get into the universities, and they find it increasingly difficult to enter the professions.

The disappearance of Jews from leadership positions in political life has been striking and dramatic. Soviet spokesmen have tried to counter this fact by noting recently that 7,623 Jews were elected to local soviets all over the country. This seems impressive until it is realized that, as of 1960, more than 1,800,000 such local deputies were elected. The "large" number of Jews thus comes to less than one-half of 1 percent. Moreover, in all but one of the Supreme Soviets of the 15 republics, the number of Jews is far below their proportion of the population.

When this pattern of discrimination is linked to other facets of Soviet policy toward the Jews, it becomes clear that they are considered a security risk group—suspected of actual or potential disloyalty, of essential alien-ness.

VI

Many nuances of the same pattern of hostility have been revealed in the massive campaign waged with increasing severity in the past few years against the widespread economic abuses that characterize so much of Soviet life. A series of decrees, beginning in May 1961, called for capital punishment for such offenses as embezzlement of state property, currency speculation and bribery. The authorities have made no attempt to conceal their concern over these activities or the fact that vast numbers of the population engage in them. Major pronouncements by leading officials have, indeed, given a picture of a country shot through with corruption—ironically, of a "capitalist" sort. All organs of the Party, the Komsomol, the state, the press and other major institutions have been pressed into service in the campaign against it. The secret police, one of the last strongholds of Stalinism, plays a key role. And the public at large has been strenuously urged on to be vigilant, with all the overtones of vigilanteeism.

Though the campaign's objective may not be anti-Jewish, there is little doubt that it has had anti-Jewish implications and consequences, of which the authorities—and the secret police—cannot but be aware.

Thus the Soviet press has especially featured those trials that have resulted in death sentences (frequently accompanied by the denial of the right of

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appeal). To date, 36 such trials have been reported in 26 different cities. In these trials, death sentences have been meted out to 70 individuals—of whom 42 (and possibly 45) are Jews. In a number of cases, the Jewish religious affiliation of some of the culprits was made explicit: the synagogue was portrayed as the locus of illegal transactions, religious Jews were mockingly described as money worshippers, the rabbi was shown as their accomplice, their family connections in Israel and the United States were pointed up. In general, the Jews are presented as people "whose only God is Gold," who flit through the interstices of the economy, cunningly manipulate naïve non-Jewish officials, prey upon honest Soviet workers and cheat them of their patrimony. They are portrayed as the initiators and masterminds of the criminal plots; the non-Jews are depicted primarily as the recipients of bribes and as accomplices.

The ominous significance of this publicity is clear. It informs the conditioned Soviet reader that the government thinks the tiny community of Jews, which constitutes little more than one percent of the population, is responsible for nearly two-thirds—and in some areas 100 percent—of the economic crimes that warrant capital punishment. Anti-Semitic feelings are exacerbated. From many cities come reports of grumbling on the food queues: "The Jews are responsible for the shortages." Western travelers who were in Vilna during and immediately after a major economic trial in February 1962—where all eight accused were Jews, four of them receiving capital punishment and four lengthy prison terms—reported that the authorities mobilized the entire population to attend what was universally called the "Jewish show trial." The atmosphere of fright in the Jewish communities may be imagined.

VII

In sum, Soviet policy places the Jews in an inextricable vise. They are allowed neither to assimilate, nor live a full Jewish life, nor to emigrate (as many would wish) to Israel or any other place where they might live freely as Jews. The policy stems, in turn, from doctrinal contradictions abetted by traditional anti-Jewish sentiments. On the one hand, the authorities want the Jews to assimilate; on the other hand, they irrationally fear the full penetration of Soviet life which assimilation implies. So the Jews are formally recognized as a nationality, as a religious group, as equal citizens—but are at the same time deprived of their national and religious rights as a group, and of full equality as individuals.

Though the Jews are considered a *Soviet* nationality, official doctrine has consistently denied the existence of a historic Jewish people as an entity, and official practice has always sought to discourage Soviet Jews from feeling themselves members of that entity throughout the world.

Soviet policy as a whole, then, amounts to spiritual strangulation—the deprivation of Soviet Jewry's natural right to know the Jewish past and to participate in the Jewish present. And without a past and a present, the future is precarious indeed.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political and Legal

FACING THE DICTATORS: THE MEMOIRS OF ANTHONY EDEN, EARL OF AVON. Boston: Houghton, 1962, 746 p. $7.50.

This volume of Anthony Eden's memoirs, which precedes chronologically the first volume ("Full Circle," noted here July 1960), deals centrally with his activities in the Foreign Ministry from the autumn of 1931 until his resignation, in disagreement with Chamberlain, in February 1938. These were the darkening years of mounting Fascism, the Spanish Civil War, the invasion of Abyssinia and the faltering efforts at appeasement. A most important contribution to the history of this period, by a central figure.

WORLD ORDER AND NEW STATES. By PETER CALVOCORESSI. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London), 1962, 113 p. $4.25.

A serious effort to explain the "instability created by the rise of a great many new sovereign states at a time when the great powers have lost their old freedom of action against the spread of disorder."

DISCORD AND COLLABORATION. By ARNOLD WOLFERS. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 283 p. $7.00.

This collection of his essays brings together Professor Wolfers' balanced and well-considered thoughts on international relations, power and national security.

WESTERN UNITY AND THE COMMON MARKET. By WALTER LIPPMANN. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1962, 51 p. $2.75.

In these brief articles, derived from a visit to Western Europe in the spring of 1962, Mr. Lippmann is chiefly concerned by elements of exclusiveness in a possible Franco-German combination and by European, especially French, reactions against the American monopoly of Western nuclear power.

PEKING UND MOSKAU. By KLAUS MEHNERT. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962, 605 p. DM. 19.80.

A leading German student of the Communist world here compares the two Communist giants, their similarities, differences, partnership and rivalry. A significant contribution.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE MENACE OF WEST GERMAN MILITARISM. Prague: Orbis (for the Institute for International Politics and Economics), 1962, 489 p. 21–20 Kčs.

The proceedings of a Soviet bloc conference in Prague in May 1961.

THE SECRET WAR: THE STORY OF INTERNATIONAL ESPIONAGE SINCE WORLD WAR II. By SANCHE DE GRAMONT. New York: Putnam, 1962, 515 p. $5.95.

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In addition to undertaking a description of the functions of the major espionage agencies in the postwar world, the author, a correspondent for the New York *Herald Tribune,* recounts some of the more spectacular spy stories of recent years. The coverage tends to be quite uneven: some solid reporting, some factual errors and some excessive touches of sensationalism.

THE COLD WAR: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT. By Frederick L. Schuman. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962, 104 p. $3.50.

In these lectures Professor Schuman offers his reflections on the Russian past, the Soviet system and the cold war. In general he believes that "our greatest danger . . . is not the Communist challenge as such; it is a continuation and extension of international anarchy, of power politics, of war."

THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS. By Shabtai Rosenne. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana Publications, 1962, 230 p. $6.00.

A solid guide to the organs and operations of the World Court, by an Israeli diplomat and lawyer.

THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Sydney D. Bailey. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962, 113 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $3.50.)

A brief review of the development of the Secretariat and the conflicting views of its functions and composition.

FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE. By Boleslaw Adam Boczek. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 323 p. $8.00.

A comprehensive study in international law of "flags of convenience," such as those of Panama, Liberia and Honduras, under which foreign-owned vessels may be registered.

MODERN CONSTITUTIONS AT WORK. By Indra D. Sharma. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962, 552 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $8.50.)

A discussion of the theory and operation of modern constitutions, by a political scientist at Panjab University.

HITLERS GLÜCKLICHSTER TAG: LONDON, AM 18. JUNI 1935. By Robert Ingrim. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1962, 301 p. DM. 17.80.

On British responsibility for Hitler's advances in the mid-1930s.

STUDIES IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY IN HONOUR OF G. P. GOOCH, C. H. Edited by A. O. Sarkissian. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962, 393 p. $9.00.

An appropriate *Festschrift* with contributions by an impressive assembly of diplomatic historians. A fair number of the pieces deal with twentieth-century diplomacy.

SCHULD UND SCHICKSAL. By J. G. Burg. Munich: Damm, 1962, 370 p. DM. 15.20.

A personal account of a Jew's odyssey through eastern and central Europe and on to Israel, during and after the Second World War.

COMMUNISM: ITS FAITH AND FALLACIES. By James D. Bales. Grand Rapids (Mich.): Baker Book House, 1962, 214 p. $3.95.

A discussion centering chiefly on certain doctrinal components of Communism: its atheism, and the concepts of the dialectic, class struggle and revolution.

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GESCHICHTE DER INTERNATIONALE. By Julius Braunthal. Hanover: Dietz, 1961, 403 p. DM. 29.80.

This first volume of what promises to be a major contribution covers the years of the First and Second Internationals, up to the outbreak of the First World War.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1958. Selected and Edited by Gillian King. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1962, 605 p. $13.45.

This volume in the continuing documents series prepared by Chatham House deals with East-West exchanges and with alarums and excursions in the Middle East.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

LIMITED STRATEGIC WAR. Edited by Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read. New York: Praeger (for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University), 1962, 258 p. $6.00.

An interesting if strenuous set of essays dealing with the means and prospects of keeping a war within some kinds of limits. The authors, including Herman Kahn, Morton A. Kaplan and T. C. Schelling, treat such themes as limited retaliation and selective response.

STUDIES OF WAR: NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL. By P. M. S. Blackett. New York: Hill and Wang, 1962, 242 p. $3.95. (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 21/.)

A collection of a prominent British physicist's articles and lectures on nuclear war, disarmament and operational research, some of them quite controversial.

L'AVENTURE ATOMIQUE: SES ASPECTS POLITIQUES ET TECHNIQUES. By Bertrand Goldschmidt. Paris: Fayard, 1962, 291 p. NF. 12.

One of France's leading atomic scientists reviews the headlong course of world atomic developments in recent years.

MAN'S MEANS TO HIS END. By Sir Robert Watson-Watt. New York: Potter, 1962, 221 p. $5.00.

The British inventor of radar discusses the fearful implications of nuclear and chemical advances and probes for means to avoid our being destroyed by them.

TOTAL WAR AND COLD WAR: PROBLEMS IN CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY. Edited by Harry L. Coles. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962, 300 p. $7.00.

These essays on civil-military relations include studies on the high command in the Second World War, political and organizational issues in the United States, and on generals and party leaders in the Communist states.

PREVENTING WORLD WAR III: SOME PROPOSALS. Edited by Quincy Wright and Others. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962, 460 p. $6.95.

A substantial collection of essays by scholars concerned with averting a nuclear catastrophe, whether by stopping the arms race, reducing international tensions or building a world society.

THE PRICE OF PEACE. By James J. Wadsworth. New York: Praeger, 1962, 127 p. $3.95.

On the basis of his considerable experience with disarmament negotiations Mr. Wadsworth puts forward his own proposals for a renewed effort, including the idea of "minarmament"—a minimum requirement for a nation's internal security but too little for external aggression.

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THE STRATEGY OF DISARMAMENT. By Henry W. Forbes. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962, 158 p. $3.75.

A survey of recent trends in disarmament and arms control proposals, and their prospects for the future.

THE GUERRILLA—AND HOW TO FIGHT HIM. Edited by Lieutenant Colonel T. N. Greene. New York: Praeger, 1962, 310 p. $5.95.

A selection of articles on guerrilla warfare, its theory and practice, taken from the *Marine Corps Gazette*.

PEOPLE'S WAR, PEOPLE'S ARMY. By General Vo Nguyen Giap. New York: Praeger, 1962, 217 p. $5.00.

A collection of papers on guerrilla warfare and insurrection by a leader of the Communist Viet Cong, with a foreword by Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research in the State Department, and a profile of Giap by Bernard B. Fall.

DEFENCE PSYCHOLOGY. Edited by Frank A. Geldard and Others. New York: Pergamon Press (for the Division of Scientific Affairs, the Science Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 1962, 354 p. $10.00.

These proceedings of a NATO Symposium held in Paris in 1960 deal with such general themes as the identification and assessment of abilities and aptitudes, training and military education, and group productivity.

WORLD WAR I: AN OUTLINE HISTORY. By Hanson W. Baldwin. New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 181 p. $3.95.

The military analyst for *The New York Times* has written a highly condensed but skillful and well organized narrative of the First World War.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

AID FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By H. J. P. Arnold. Chester Springs (Pa.): Dufour, 1962, 159 p. $3.50.

A comparative assessment by a British scholar of Western and Soviet aid efforts in underdeveloped areas.

ENTWICKLUNGSHILFE. By Anton Antweiler. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 1962, 212 p. DM. 15.80.

An effort to create a theoretical approach to the problem of economic development and assistance.

A PRIMER OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Robert J. Alexander. New York: Macmillan, 1962, 218 p. $5.00.

A concise introduction for the general reader.

RESTLESS NATIONS: A STUDY OF WORLD TENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENT. By M. S. Adiseshiah and Others. New York: Dodd, 1962, 217 p. $3.25.

An international symposium dealing with tensions within and between nations at different levels of economic and political development.

RESEARCH IN FAMILY PLANNING. Edited by Clyde V. Kiser. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, 662 p. $12.50.

A substantial collection of papers dealing with the state of research on family planning, fertility and birth control in various areas of the world.

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The Second World War

PEARL HARBOR: WARNING AND DECISION. By Roberta Wohlstetter. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, 426 p. $7.50.

This is an admirable study of the problem why the United States was surprised at Pearl Harbor. Dealing chiefly in the area of intelligence processing and evaluation, the book is of much significance not only in clarifying the record but in providing insights for avoiding the repetition of such a catastrophe.

DER DEUTSCHE IMPERIALISMUS UND DER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG. BAND 2: BEITRÄGE ZUM THEMA: "DIE VORBEREITUNG DES ZWEITEN WELTKRIEGES DURCH DEN DEUTSCHEN IMPERIALISMUS." Edited by Günter Paulus and Wolfgang Ruge. Berlin: Rütten, 1961, 794 p. DM-Ost. 18.50.

Materials, prepared for a conference of East German and Soviet historians, dealing with the preparations for the Second World War.

DER DEUTSCHE WEHRMACHTBERICHT 1939–1945. By Erich Murawski. Boppard/Rhine: Boldt, 1962, 768 p. DM. 28.

A documentary study of Wehrmacht reports on the military situations in the Second World War.

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE 1939–1942. By Douglas Gillison. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1962, 786 p. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 40/.)

This volume in the official Australian war history deals mainly with the air war against Japan from December 1941 to early 1943 when air superiority was gained.

BLACK BOOMERANG. By Sefton Delmer. New York: Viking, 1962, 303 p. $5.75.

A personal account, by a well-known war correspondent, of Britain's "black" radio propaganda operations in World War II and of some of their untoward effects.

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. By Basil Collier. New York: Macmillan, 1962, 183 p. $4.50.

A concise history, in the British Battles Series.

GEHEIMAUFTRAG IRLAND:DEUTSCHE AGENTEN IM IRISCHEN UNTERGRUNDKAMPF 1939–1945. By Enno Stephan. Oldenburg: Stalling, 1961, 345 p. DM. 19.80.

An account of the not very substantial achievements of German agents in Ireland during the Second World War.

The United States

AMERICA AND THE WORLD REVOLUTION AND OTHER LECTURES. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 231 p. $4.75.

In these lectures the central question is why the United States, with its great revolution, has failed to provide leadership and inspiration for the revolutionary changes and impulses of the contemporary world. For all Mr. Toynbee's enormous historical perspective his answers do not seem to meet the complexities of the issue.

STRATEGY, POLITICS, AND DEFENSE BUDGETS. By Warner R. Schilling and Others. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 532 p. $10.00.

This work comprises three studies relating to U.S. security policy in the years after 1948: "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," by Mr. Schilling;

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"NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," by Paul Y. Hammond; and "The 'New Look' of 1953," by Glenn H. Snyder.

SCIENCE AND THE NATION: POLICY AND POLITICS. By J. Stefan Dupré and Sanford A. Lakoff. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1962, 181 p. $3.95. (Paper, $1.95.)

A discussion of the formulation of science policy in the United States and the activity of scientists in politics.

THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE: AN INTERPRETATION. By Alexander DeConde. New York: Praeger, 1962, 182 p. $4.50. (Paper, $1.75.)

A "brief biography" of the office of Secretary of State—its responsibilities, influence and vulnerabilities in the American political system.

THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL. By Chester Bowles. New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 351 p. $5.95.

A selection of Mr. Bowles' writings and speeches on international, economic and domestic affairs.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMON MARKET: A BACKGROUND STUDY. By Don D. Humphrey. New York: Praeger, 1962, 176 p. $4.50.

In this brief study the author reviews the history of American trade policy with a view to providing a setting for our dealings with the Common Market.

JUST FRIENDS AND BRAVE ENEMIES. By Robert F. Kennedy. New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 211 p. $3.95.

A book based largely on the Attorney General's speeches, discussions and exchanges in the course of his trip around the world in the spring of 1962.

WASHINGTON COVER-UP. By Clark R. Mollenhoff. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 239 p. $4.50.

An angry book on "bureaucratic secrecy," by the Washington correspondent of the Des Moines *Register and Tribune*.

CONGRESS AND THE COURT. By Walter F. Murphy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 307 p. $6.95.

An account of the "Warren Court" and its frequently tempestuous involvement in major political issues of the country.

EX-COMMUNIST WITNESSES. By Herbert L. Packer. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, 279 p. $4.95.

A discussion, by a professor of law at Stanford, of the governmental processes used in taking the testimony provided by ex-Communists in Congressional investigations, criminal trials and administrative proceedings.

SOLDIERS OF THE SEA. By Colonel Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1962, 692 p. $14.00.

A solid but affectionate history of the U.S. Marine Corps. About half the volume is devoted to the period since 1939.

HERBERT HOOVER AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY. By Joseph Brandes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962, 237 p. $4.50.

A study of Herbert Hoover's economic policies during the years when he headed the Department of Commerce, 1921–1928.

BLACK NATIONALISM. By E. U. Essien-Udom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 367 p. $6.95.

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A sociological study of the Black Muslim movement in the United States, by a Nigerian scholar currently associated with the Center for International Affairs at Harvard.

Western Europe

CASE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC UNION. By J. E. Meade and Others. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1962, 424 p. $6.10.

The three cases studied are the inter-war Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, Benelux, and the European Coal and Steel Community, with a view to considering the economic problems of a mechanical nature facing these unions.

DER VERKEHR IM GEMEINSAMEN MARKT FÜR KOHLE UND STAHL. ByWerner Klaer. Baden-Baden: Lutzeyer, 1961, 386 p. DM. 39.

A study of rail, ship and truck commerce within the Coal and Steel Community.

DOKUMENTATION DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION MIT BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DES VERHÄLTNISSES EWG—EFTA. Edited by Heinrich von Siegler. Bonn: Siegler, 1961, 474 p. DM. 35.

A documentary presentation of the movement toward the political, economic and military integration of Europe from 1946 to 1961.

EUROPE'S FUTURE IN FIGURES. Edited by R. C. Geary. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1962, 343 p. Gldrs. 32.50.

A symposium of studies on medium and long-term forecasting for the European economies.

PARISER ERINNERUNGEN. By Wilhelm Hausenstein. Munich: Olzog, 1961, 246 p. DM. 18.50.

Diplomatic memoirs of Bonn's first ambassador in Paris, 1950–1955.

LES GRANDS DOSSIERS DE L'HISTOIRE CONTEMPORAINE. By Robert Aron. Paris: Perrin, 1962, 312 p. NF. 13.90.

A historian's account of a number of events in recent French history that have divided the nation, including the assassination of Georges Mandel, the Laval and Pétain cases and the onset of the Algerian revolt.

GERMANY AND THE DIPLOMACY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, 1931. By Edward W. Bennett. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 342 p. $7.50.

A scholarly monograph on the interplay of German, French, British and American diplomacy during the disastrous financial crisis of 1931.

DIE HITLERBEWEGUNG: DER URSPRUNG, 1919–1922. By Georg Franz-Willing. Hamburg: Decker, 1962, 256 p. DM. 24.

This first volume of an ambitious history of the Hitler movement deals with the formative years immediately following the First World War and before the Munich *putsch*. The author is chiefly concerned with the driving impulses of the movement and its capacity to attract supporters.

YOUNG GERMANY. By Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Basic Books, 1962, 253 p. $6.00.

An exceptionally good and penetrating study of the German youth movements—such as the *Wandervogel*—that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and gave a quite special cast to German politics and society in the ensuing decades.

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DEUTSCHE WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK. By Ludwig Erhard. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag; Frankfurt/Main: Knapp, 1962, 638 p. DM. 28.80.

Minister Erhard's speeches and articles on the German economy since 1945.

BERLIN ZWISCHEN FREIHEIT UND DIKTATUR. By Klaus-Peter Schulz. Berlin: Staneck, 1962, 576 p. DM. 24.80.

A substantial review of Berlin's vicissitudes as a focal point for international tension since 1945.

ALFRED NOBEL. By Erik Bergengren. New York: Nelson, 1962, 222 p. $6.50.

An authoritative biography based in part on materials in the Nobel Foundation archives.

DALL'UNITÀ AL FASCISMO. By Franco Catalano. Milan-Varese: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1961, 346 p. L. 2500.

Essays on various political themes and problems in Italy in the years preceding the advent of Fascism.

SPAIN AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1936–1941. By Dante A. Puzzo. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 296 p. $7.50.

In this study of the international setting of the Spanish Civil War the author records "how a vertebrate Spain succumbed to an invertebrate diplomacy" that left it an Axis satellite.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

THE SOVIET UNION, 1922–1962: A FOREIGN AFFAIRS READER. Edited by Philip E. Mosely. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1963, 495 p. $6.95. (Paper, $2.95.)

In its 40 years, Foreign Affairs has printed over 200 articles dealing with the Soviet Union and Soviet-American relations. From this rich storehouse Dr. Mosely has selected the 30 most significant articles and has written a preface to each, thereby opening up a fascinating panorama of men, facts and opinions.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. By J. M. Mackintosh. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 332 p. $8.00.

In this solid study the author analyzes the major trends and shifts in Stalinist and post-Stalinist foreign policy since 1944. The author stresses that Europe and especially the United States remain the main and decisive targets; the outcome, in his view, hinges on the West's recognition of this challenge.

GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN THE SOVIET UNION. By G. Warren Nutter and Others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, 706 p. $15.00.

This massive study, prepared under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research, traces and analyzes the growth of Soviet industry over the last 40 years. The author finds Soviet growth to have been impressive, but neither unprecedented in the experience of other industrialized countries nor inexplicable.

THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND. By John Erickson. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962, 889 p. $15.00.

This is a quite monumental history of the Soviet military leadership from the Russian Revolution to the German invasion of 1941. The study includes a substantial treatment of German-Soviet military collaboration in the 1920s and the devastating purge of the army in the 1930s. An important contribution.

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CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Leon Gouré. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. 207 p. $2.45 (paper).

Mr. Gouré presents his evidence for the thesis that the Soviet régime has been engaged in an extensive and expanding civil defense program. The relation between plan and reality, however, remains uncertain.

IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION: AN INTRODUCTION. By John A. Armstrong. New York: Praeger, 1962, 160 p. $4.00. (Paper, $1.65.)

A concise but knowledgeable introduction to the Soviet political system.

CIVIL WAR IN RUSSIA. By David Footman. New York: Praeger, 1962, 328 p. $7.50.

In this excellent series of studies Mr. Footman investigates a number of events and themes in the vast and chaotic panorama of the Russian Civil War, including the *Volunteer Army*, the *beginnings of the Red Army*, *British activities in the North*, Kolchak's defeat and Makhno's extraordinary anarchist forces in the Ukraine.

RUSSIA UNDER KHRUSHCHEV. By Alexander Werth. New York: Hill and Wang, 1962, 352 p. $5.00.

Chiefly a report of Mr. Werth's impressions of a visit to the Soviet Union in 1959, his first in more than a decade, plus some reflections on the trend of Khrushchev's foreign policy.

THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES. By Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, 593 p. $10.00.

This volume, a valuable companion to the authors' "A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917–1957," is "an attempt to extract and analyze the salient features and the more enduring tendencies, conditions, and trends which help to explain the making of Soviet treaty theory, law, and policy."

THE FUTURE OF COMMUNIST SOCIETY. Edited by Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz. New York: Praeger, 1962, 196 p. $5.00. (Paper, $1.75.)

Essays on the 1961 program of the C.P.S.U., the prospects for the future, Russian-Chinese relations and related topics.

INSIDE A SOVIET EMBASSY. By Aleksandr Kaznacheev. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1962, 250 p. $4.95.

Personal memoirs of his training and career as a diplomat by a young Soviet official who defected from the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon in 1959.

A MODERN HISTORY OF SOVIET GEORGIA. By David Marshall Lang. New York: Grove Press, 1962, 298 p. $6.50.

In this sequel to his "The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, 1658–1832," a leading student of the Caucasus skillfully traces the history of the Georgian people from the nineteenth century to the present.

INFORMATION U.S.S.R. Edited and Compiled by Robert Maxwell. New York: Pergamon Press, 1962, 982 p. $30.00.

This volume is chiefly a translation from Volume 50 of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia and from the 1960 Soviet statistical handbook.

WHO'S WHO IN THE USSR 1961/62. Edited by Heinrich E. Schulz and Stephen S. Taylor. New York: Scarecrow Press, 1962, 963 p. $21.00.

A biographical directory of 4,000 leading personalities in the Soviet Union.

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A HISTORY OF FINLAND. By Eino Jutikkala with Kauko Pirinen. New York: Praeger, 1962, 291 p. $7.75.

A brief but comprehensive history to 1945 by two professors of history at the University of Helsinki.

THE FORGOTTEN PEOPLE. By Seymour Freidin. New York: Scribner, 1962, 336 p. $5.95.

Mr. Freidin, who served as correspondent in or on the fringes of Eastern Europe for most of the last two decades, reports on the vicissitudes there since 1945.

HUNGARY: A SHORT HISTORY. By C. A. Macartney. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1962, 262 p. $4.50.

A first-rate, brief history by the leading English student of Hungary and its past.

A STRATEGY FOR GREEK ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Andreas G. Papandreou. Athens: Center of Economic Research, 1962, 179 p.

A study of the growth alternatives open to the Greek economy, given the need for rapid development.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITAIN'S LOCUST YEARS, 1918–1940. By William McElwee. London: Faber, 1962, 292 p. 25/.

As the title suggests, the author finds that "the record of British effort and achievement between the two wars is not a proud one"—either domestically or in foreign affairs.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH ECONOMY, 1914–1950. By Sidney Pollard. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962, 422 p. $7.50.

A useful review of the economic history of Great Britain from the outbreak of the First World War through the reconversion to peace after the Second.

CANADIAN AGRICULTURE IN WAR AND PEACE, 1935–50. By G. E. Britnell and V. C. Fowke. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, 502 p. $8.75.

An assessment of the contribution of Canadian agriculture to the war effort and the impact of war upon the farmer.

AUSTRALIA: THE QUIET CONTINENT. By Douglas Pike. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962, 241 p. $3.95.

A short but able history of Australia with good attention to twentieth-century developments.

AUSTRALIA IN THE ANTARCTIC: INTEREST, ACTIVITY AND ENDEAVOUR. By R. A. Swan. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962, 432 p. $9.50.

An account of Australia's growing interest and activity in the Antarctic region.

The Middle East

BORDERLANDS. By Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn. New York: Knopf, 1962, 335 p. $6.75.

A most interesting report, by two journalists, on six remote border regions of Asia: Hokkaido, the Sulu Sea, the Shan and Kachin states of Burma, Sikkim, Afghan Turkestan and the eastern part of Turkey. Even these areas are being swept by the changes of the modern world.

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A VISION OF HISTORY. By Albert Hourani. Beirut: Khayats, 1961, 160 p.
Superior essays, by the director of the Middle East Center at St. Antony's College, Oxford, on a number of themes of modern and contemporary history of the Near East.

GOLDEN RIVER TO GOLDEN ROAD. By Raphael Patai. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962, 422 p. $7.50.
A survey of Middle Eastern culture from Rio de Oro to Samarkand.

OF LIONS, CHAINED: AN ARAB LOOKS AT AMERICA. By Mohammad T. Mehdi. San Francisco: New World Press, 1962, 177 p. $3.25.
A critical but not inimical view of American policy in the area of American-Arab relations, by the Director of the Arab Information Center.

ATATÜRK. By Irfan and Margarete Orga. London: Michael Joseph, 1962, 304 p. 30/.
A lively but not particularly serious biography of the founder of modern Turkey.

THE ECONOMY OF CYPRUS. By A. J. Meyer with Simos Vassiliou. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 94 p. $3.50.
A concise survey of the island's economy, for the general reader.

UNEASY LIES THE HEAD: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN I OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. New York: Geis, 1962, 306 p. $4.95.
While 26 is rather young for an autobiography, the King of Jordan has obviously had a crowded and harrowing career thus far. The title is altogether appropriate.

IRAN: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN A CHANGING SOCIETY. By Leonard Binder. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, 362 p. $7.50.
A study of the Iranian political system, based in part on field study in the country, and accompanied by some theoretical scaffolding and slightly distressing jargon.

A HISTORY OF LANDOWNERSHIP IN MODERN EGYPT, 1800–1950. By Gabriel Baer. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1962, 252 p. $5.60.
A study of the changes in landownership and distribution over the last century and a half. The author is lecturer on the modern history of Islamic countries at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

South and Southeast Asia

THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By John D. Montgomery. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1962, 336 p. $6.50. (Paper, $2.25.)
In Washington and in the field, the provision of American aid is a political process. Against a broad background of the analysis of American purposes, policies and administrative machinery, this book makes a close examination of experience in working with foreign governments, much of it in Viet Nam, supplemented by studies in Burma, Thailand and Taiwan.

CHANGING PATTERNS IN SOUTH ASIA. By Ian Thomson. New York: Roy, 1962, 166 p. $4.25.
A brief introduction, perhaps too brief for the vast and complicated area it treats—most of Asia south of the Soviet Union.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN ECONOMY. By W. B. Reddaway. Homewood (Ill.): Irwin, 1962, 216 p. $5.00.

Less a description than a discussion of models for economic planning, with particular reference to Indian conditions and possibilities.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BURMA 1951–1960. By Louis J. Walinsky. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962, 680 p. $10.00.

A massive and authoritative study of the Burmese experience in economic development during the 1950s. The author participated in the initial planning and was for some years the Chief Economic Adviser to the government of Burma.

REBELS IN PARADISE: INDONESIA'S CIVIL WAR. By James Mossman. London: Cape, 1961, 257 p. 18/.

A British correspondent's lively and perceptive report on the peculiar civil war in Indonesia that broke out in 1958.

PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA. By Brian Essai. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 255 p. $4.90.

An informative survey of the territory, its people, government and economy.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

COMMUNIST CHINA IN PERSPECTIVE. By A. Doak Barnett. New York: Praeger, 1962, 88 p. $2.95.

In these three lectures Professor Barnett discusses the background of the Chinese Communist régime, its achievements and the problems it faces for the future.

COMMUNIST CHINA 1955–1959: POLICY DOCUMENTS WITH ANALYSIS. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for the Center for International Affairs and the East Asian Research Center), 1962, 611 p. $10.00.

A collection of 48 documents, with introduction and commentary, relating to the internal history of Communist China during the critical years 1955–1959; foreword by Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank.

MAO TSE-TUNG: EMPEROR OF THE BLUE ANTS. By George Paloczi-Horvath. London: Secker and Warburg, 1962, 424 p. 42/.

A participant in the Hungarian writers' revolt in 1956 here turns to a political biography of the Chinese Communist leader. While the author is not a Sinologist he does have good familiarity with totalitarian systems and his interpretation of Mao has much of interest.

MY LAND AND MY PEOPLE. By His Holiness, the Dalai Lama of Tibet. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, 271 p. $5.95.

These modest and moving memoirs are climaxed by the Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India.

NOMADS AND COMMISSARS: MONGOLIA REVISITED. By Owen Lattimore. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 238 p. $5.75.

Although Professor Lattimore has long been a student of the Mongols, his visit in 1961 to the Mongolian People's Republic was his first extended stay in Outer Mongolia. In this book he surveys the recent history of the area, describes the life of the Mongol people and the changes that are going on.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN JAPAN: THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY. By John M. Maki. New York: Praeger, 1962, 275 p. $6.00.

A quite heartening book about the emergence of democracy in Japan: "The most

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important lesson is that Japan's experiment has proved that modern democracy is of universal relevance."

TWO MINUTES TO NOON. By Noel F. Busch. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962, 191 p. $4.95.
An account of the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923.

NEW KOREA. By Kyung Cho Chung. New York: Macmillan, 1962, 274 p. $6.00.
Chiefly an account of developments in Korea since the downfall of Syngman Rhee's régime.

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS: KOREA. By James A. Field, Jr. Washington: Department of the Navy, 1962, 499 p. $4.25.
An authoritative, but not official, account of the Navy's role in the Korean War.

CONFLICT: THE HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR, 1950–53. By Robert Leckie. New York: Putnam, 1962, 448 p. $6.95.
A solid, if not definitive, account of the Korean War—that was neither a "marvelous victory nor miserable defeat."

Africa

PAN-AFRICANISM RECONSIDERED. Edited by the American Society of African Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, 376 p. $7.00.
A symposium of papers and comments dealing with the theme of pan-Africanism and other elements of African unity or disunity. A number of the contributors are native Africans.

THE HUMAN FACTOR IN CHANGING AFRICA. By Melville J. Herskovits. New York: Knopf, 1962, 500 p. $6.95.
A leading American anthropologist deals with the cultures of sub-Saharan Africa and their response to contemporary changes.

AFRICAN ONE-PARTY STATES. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962, 501 p. $7.25.
This collaborative study of politics in the emerging African states comprises chapters on Tunisia, Senegal, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Liberia and Tanganyika.

THE EDUCATED AFRICAN. Compiled by Ruth Sloan Associates, Edited by Helen Kitchen. New York: Praeger, 1962, 542 p. $12.50.
This reference work provides a country-by-country survey of educational developments throughout Africa.

MEYERS HANDBUCH ÜBER AFRIKA. Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1962, 779 p. DM. 19.80.
This reference provides both general coverage of the geography and peoples of Africa and a country-by-country survey.

AFRICA: A HANDBOOK TO THE CONTINENT. Edited by Colin Legum. New York: Praeger, 1962, 553 p. $15.00.
Chiefly a survey by countries, but including general essays on art, culture, religion, economic and international affairs.

SCHWARZE HAUT IM ROTEN GRIFF. By Rolf Italiaander. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1962, 421 p. DM. 19.80.
A somewhat heavy-going account of Communist penetration in the countries of Africa.

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SOUTH AFRICA 1906–1961: THE PRICE OF MAGNANIMITY. By Nicholas Mansergh. New York: Praeger, 1962, 104 p. $3.50.

Brief but informative lectures on the history of the Union of South Africa and of the continuing consequences, positive and negative, of the 1906 settlement.

SMUTS: THE SANGUINE YEARS 1870–1919. By W. K. Hancock. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962, 618 p. $10.00.

This first volume of a full-dress and authoritative biography based on the materials in the Smuts Archive covers the first 50 years of the great South African statesman's career—down to the year when he became Prime Minister.

THE HISTORY OF APARTHEID. By L. E. Neame. London: Pall Mall Press, with Barrie and Rockliff, 1962, 200 p. 22/6.

A review of the history of the disastrous but deeply held views on racial segregation in South Africa, by a South African journalist.

SOUTH AFRICAN PREDICAMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF APARTHEID. By F. P. Spooner. New York: Praeger, 1961, 288 p. $5.00.

The author, working from many of the premises of the white community in South Africa, discusses the unsatisfactory condition of the economy, in part because of the untoward consequences of *apartheid*.

UNE AUTRE AFRIQUE DU SUD. By Paul Giniewski. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1962, 312 p. NF. 15.

In this discussion of the racial problem in South Africa the author looks for constructive possibilities in the idea of "parallel development" of the white and black communities.

BRUTAL MANDATE. By Allard K. Lowenstein. New York: Macmillan, 1962, 257 p. $5.00.

A young American's report on a trip to South West Africa in the summer of 1959.

KENYA TO-DAY: SOCIAL PREREQUISITES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Marion Wallace Forrester. The Hague: Mouton, 1962, 179 p. Gldrs. 15.

A monograph on the necessary social foundations for sustained economic growth and capital formation.

TOM MBOYA: YOUNG MAN OF NEW AFRICA. By Alan Rake. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 264 p. $4.50.

A journalist's biographical sketch of Kenya's most dynamic politician and one of Africa's principal leaders.

REBELS, MERCENARIES, AND DIVIDENDS: THE KATANGA STORY. By Smith Hempstone. New York: Praeger, 1962, 250 p. $4.95.

A quite critical and at times partisan discussion of the U.N. efforts to support the Central Congo government against the secessionist movement in Katanga, by an experienced observer of Africa.

PORTUGAL IN AFRICA. By James Duffy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 239 p. $3.95.

A brief history of Portuguese policies and traditions in Angola and Mozambique, by the Professor of Spanish at Brandeis University. A third of the book is devoted to present problems, for which independence is, the author believes, an indispensable part of the solution.

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Latin America and the West Indies

LATIN AMERICA BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE BEAR. By Salvador de Madariaga. New York: Praeger, 1962, 192 p. $4.50.

In this essay on the present trends and problems in Latin America, Madariaga properly urges a shift in U.S. attitudes—away from indifference and condescension—and stresses the Spanishness of the area, a point, however, that may be overemphasized.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE HEMISPHERE CRISIS. By John C. Dreier. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1962, 147 p. $2.95. (Paper, $1.25.)

This volume, one of the Policy Books of the Council on Foreign Relations, outlines the main features of the Inter-American System and the Organization of American States and appraises the latter's achievements. The author served for ten years as U.S. representative on the Council of the O.A.S.

EL GRINGO: THE YANKEE IMAGE IN LATIN AMERICA. By D. H. Radler. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1962, 169 p. $3.95.

A vigorous critique of U.S. policies in and attitudes toward the peoples of Latin America, with a number of recommendations to improve matters.

LABOR RELATIONS IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE. By Robert J. Alexander. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, 411 p. $8.95.

This volume, published under the auspices of the Wertheim Committee, provides a useful and informed account of the development of labor-management-government relations in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

SOCIAL FACTORS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE ARGENTINE CASE. By Tomás Roberto Fillol. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1961, 118 p. $3.75.

A discussion of the social reasons for Argentina's failure to break through its economic stagnation.

BRITISH HONDURAS: A HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY SURVEY. By D. A. G. Waddell. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1961, 151 p. $2.90.

A useful, brief account.

LA GUADELOUPE: ÉTUDE GÉOGRAPHIQUE. By Guy Lasserre. Bordeaux: Union Française d'Impression, 1961, 2 v. NF. 80.

A valuable and authoritative work of reference on the physical, economic and social geography of the islands.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations:* United Nations, Sales Section, N.Y.; *International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, Euratom:* 220 Southern Bldg., Washington 5, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 87th Congress, 2d Session. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

UNITED STATES and Canadian publications on Africa in 1960. Washington, Library of Congress, 1962. 98 p. 50¢.

PLANNING in Morocco; organization and implementation, by Albert Waterston. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press (for the Economic Development Institute, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 1962. 72 p. $2.50.

Atomic Energy

AMENDMENTS to the atomic energy act of 1954. Report, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to accompany H.R. 12336, Jl. 5, 1962. Washington, 1962. 20 p. (H. Rept. 1966.)

——. Report, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to accompany S. 3491, Je. 5, 1962. Washington, 1962. 20 p. (S. Rept. 1677.)

——. Act, approved Aug. 29, 1962. Washington, 1962. 3 p. (87-615—S. 3491.)

AUTHORIZING appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commission. Hearings, Subcommittee on Legislation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Apr. 5–29, 1962. 515 p.

——. Report, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to accompany S. 3392, Je. 29, 1962. Washington, 1962. 18 p. (S. Rept. 1671.)

DEVELOPMENTS in the field of detection and identification of nuclear explosions (project Vela) and relationship to test ban negotiations. Hearings, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Jl. 25–27, 1962. Washington, 1962. 440 p.

——. Summary-analysis of hearings, Jl. 1962. Washington, 1962. 68 p. (Com. Print.)

Commercial Policy and Trade

TRADE expansion act of 1962. President's message along with section-by-section analysis and summary of H.R. 9900, as prepared by the Executive Branch. Committee on Ways and Means, House, Mar. 13, 1962. Washington, 1962. 81 p. (Com. Print.)

——. Brief digest of direct statements of public witnesses . . . , Apr. 11, 1962. Washington, 1962. 33 p. (Com. Print.)

——. Report, Committee on Ways and Means, House, to accompany H.R. 11970, Je. 12, 1962. Washington, 1962. 104 p. (H. Rept. 1818.)

——. Hearings, Committee on Finance, Senate, on H.R. 11970, Jl. 23–Aug. 16, 1962. Washington, 1962. 5 pts.

——. Report, Sept. 14, 1962. Washington, 1962. 40 p. (S. Rept. 2059.)

FOREIGN trade. Hearings, Committee on Commerce, Senate, Apr. 3–May 7, 1962. Washington, 1962. 97 p.

SUGAR act amendments of 1962. Hearings, Committee on Agriculture, House, on H.R. 11730, May 15–25, 1962. Washington, 1962. 552 p.

——. Hearings, Committee on Finance, Senate, on H.R. 12154, Je. 20–23, 1962. Washington, 1962. 508 p.

——. Report, Committee on Agriculture, House, to accompany H.R. 12154, Je. 15, 1962. Washington, 1962. 90 p. (H. Rept. 1829.)

——. Report, Committee on Finance, Senate, to accompany H.R. 12154, Je. 26, 1962. Washington, 1962. 9 p. (S. Rept. 1631.)

——. Report, Committee of Conference, to accompany H.R. 12154, Je. 29, 1962. Washington, 1962. 16 p. (H. Rept. 1957.)

——. Act, approved Jl. 13, 1962. Washington, 1962. 11 p. (87-535—H.R. 12154.)

EXPORT control act of 1949. Hearing, Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, on S. 3161, May 2, 1962. Washington, 1962. 30 p.

——. Report, Je. 7, 1962. Washington, 1962. 10 p. (S. Rept. 1576.)

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——. Report, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, to accompany H.R. 11309, Je. 18, 1962. Washington, 1962. 8 p. (H. Rept. 1836.)

——. Report, Committee of Conference, to accompany S. 3161, Je. 28, 1962. Washington, 1962. 1 p. (H. Rept. 1949.)

——. Report, Committee of Conference, Je. 29, 1962. Washington, 1962. 4 p. (H. Rept. 1955.)

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REGULATION of textile imports. Report, Committee on Agriculture, House, to accompany H.R. 10788, Mar. 27, 1962. Washington, 1962. 5 p. (H. Rept. 1511.)

——. Report, Committee of Conference, House, to accompany H.R. 10788, Je. 12, 1962. Washington, 1962. 2 p. (H. Rept. 1817.)

——. Act, approved Je. 19, 1962. Washington, 1962. 1 p. (87-488—H.R. 10788.)

GATT Programme for Expansion of International Trade. Geneva, GATT, 1962.

Trade in Agricultural products; reports of Committee II on country consultations. 500 p. Sw. Fr. 10.50. Trade in agricultural products; second and third reports of Committee II. 48 p. $1.00. Trade of less-developed countries; special report of Committee III. Development plans: study of the Third Five-Year Plan of India. 60 p. $1.50.

TRADE agreements with the European Economic Community, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden. Message from the President, Mar. 7, 1962. Washington, 1962. 242 p. (H. Doc. 358.)

AGRICULTURAL commodities and the European Common Market. Rome, FAO, 1962. 61 p. (Commodity Policy Studies, 13.) $1.00.

SOVIET oil in East-West trade. Hearing, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act . . . , Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, Jl. 3, 1962. Washington, 1962. 141 p.

EASTERN EUROPE

COMMUNIST propaganda, and the truth, about conditions in Soviet Russia. Hearing, Committee on Un-American Activities, House, May 22, 1962. Washington, 1962. 48 p.

DEVELOPMENT of self-government in Yugoslavia, by Pavle Kovăc. Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 1961, 50 p.

THE ECONOMY of Yugoslavia, by Milutin Bogosavljević. Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 1961. 113 p.

THE FOURTH Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 1962. 137 p. (Documentation, 2002.)

PLANNING in Yugoslavia; organization and implementation, by Albert Waterston. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press (for the Economic Development Institute, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 1962. 109 p. $3.00.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Where are the many-sided men?

The Renaissance was a bursting forth time—of creativity, exploration, discovery and individualism. But above all, it was the age of the many-sided men. For they created a climate in which the all-sided man—"l'uomo universale," as Burkhardt termed him—could flourish.

And today, some 500 years later, mankind needs the many-sided men, perhaps as never before. We, too, have new worlds to conquer, new ideas to express, conflicting philosophies to understand. And yet, too much specialization has sapped and narrowed us, and individualism is too often stifled by statistics and machines.

Men of every nation must broaden their horizons and understanding. They must see and think for themselves. It is here that international magazines serve. They show the many sides of today's world to their readers, and it is among these readers that the many-sided men of today can be found.



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

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

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

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

LOCKHEED EXPLORES SPACE

Mariner's silent partner on the Venus flyby

On the morning of December 14, America's Mariner II radioed back across 36 million miles of space its report on mysterious, cloud-shrouded Venus.

The success of this great venture was made possible on the August morning a Lockheed-built U.S. Air Force Agena – after separating from its Atlas booster – put Mariner on the right course at the precise speed that allowed it to escape the earth's orbit, fall inward toward the sun, and – with a planned mid-course correction – intercept Venus.

Mariner II demonstrated once again the reliability and accuracy of the Lockheed-built Agena space vehicle. Because it is so readily adaptable to a wide range of payloads, the Agena is now being used in many of America's major programs for the exploration of space.

So complete was the data Mariner II sent home to its makers –California Institute of Technology's Jet Propulsion Laboratory–that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has cancelled plans for two additional Venus missions.

Next stop: Mars.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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